Shvartser v. Lekser

• Decision Date: 13 September 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-473 (JDB)
• Citation: 330 F.Supp.3d 356
• Parties: Konstantin SHVARTSER, Plaintiff, v. Evelina LEKSER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

330 F.Supp.3d 356

Konstantin SHVARTSER, Plaintiff,

v.Evelina LEKSER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-473 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 13, 2018

Douglas P. Hibshman, Fox Rothschild LLP, Washington, DC, Ely Goldin, Pro Hac Vice, Fox Rothschild LLP, Blue Bell, PA, for Plaintiff.

Evelina Lekser, Forest Hills, pro se.

Michael Savino, Forest Hills, pro se.

Arthur Holmberg, Greenwich, CT, pro se.

Ashley E. Wiggins, Bruce M. James, Griffin, Murphy & Wiggins, LLP, Washington, DC, Bradford Scott Bernstein, Miles & Stockbridge, Rockville, MD, Stephen L. Fox, S Fox Law Group PC, Greenwich, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge

Before the Court is [29] the motion by defendants Snowpoint Capital, LLC and SP Funding 452, LLC (together, the "lender defendants") for reconsideration of [24] the Court's order granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons explained below, the lender defendants' motion for reconsideration will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Because the Court has reviewed the lengthy factual and procedural history of this case in prior opinions, it will do so again here only briefly. Plaintiff Konstantin Shvartser and defendant Evelina Lekser are father and daughter, and in 2008 they purchased a house located at 2150 Florida Avenue in northwest Washington, D.C. (the "property") for $800,000. Verified Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 1–2, 15, 17. Although Shvartser and Lekser initially intended to renovate the house and sell it at a profit, the pace of the renovations fell behind, and in 2015 Shvartser informed Lekser that he wished to sell the property to recoup his investment. Id. ¶¶ 16, 29. According to Shvartser, this demand prompted Lekser to "embark[ ] on a fraudulent scheme to withdraw equity from the Property." Id. ¶ 30. Shvartser alleges that Lekser forged a document that purported to grant her Shvartser's power of attorney to refinance the property, id. ¶ 78, which she then used to obtain an $800,000 loan from the lender defendants, id. ¶¶ 31, 40, the proceeds of which she kept for herself after paying off an existing mortgage on the property, id. ¶ 101.

In 2016, Shvartser filed a complaint against Lekser alleging fraud, breach of contract, and other claims arising out of the forgoing alleged events. That complaint, and dispositive motions related thereto, are currently pending in another case before this Court. See Shvartser v. Lekser, Civil Action No. 16-1199 (JDB) (D.D.C. filed June 20, 2016). Shvartser filed this related case in late February 2018, after the lender defendants notified him of their intent to foreclose on the property because of Lekser's default on the $800,000 loan. See Compl. ¶¶ 184–85. Shvartser sought a temporary restraining order against the foreclosure, which the Court entered on March 1, see Order [ECF No. 6], and which Shvartser later moved to convert into a preliminary injunction, see Pl. Konstatin Shvartser's Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s PI Mot.") [ECF No. 10].

The Court then granted Shvartser's motion, explaining that Shvartser had satisfied the four-part test that courts use to decide whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See Shvartser v. Lekser, 308 F.Supp.3d 260, 264–65, 269 (D.D.C. 2018). First, the Court found that Shvartser had shown a "likelihood of success on the merits" of his claim to quiet title to the property. Id. at 265. "Under District of Columbia law," the Court explained, "a deed of trust in favor of a mortgage lender is void if the power of attorney used to acquire it is a forgery." Id. (citing Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, 991 A.2d 20, 26–27 (D.C. 2010) ). Here, Shvartser had not only testified under oath that the 2015 power of attorney was forged, but he had also presented several other reasons to doubt its validity. See id. at 265 (summarizing those reasons). The Court also rejected the lender defendants' reliance on the doctrine of equitable subrogation—which, the Court pointed out, they had not asserted as a counterclaim—and their argument that "the deed of trust ‘would still be valid [based] on Ms. Lekser's one-half interest in the Property.’ " Id. at 266 (citations omitted). This latter argument, the Court concluded, was contrary to District of Columbia law. See id.

Second, the Court found that Shvartser had shown an irreparable injury because the foreclosure sale presented a "certain and great" threat of interference with his "right to dispose of the property as [he] chooses"—a right that the Court recognized as being "[i]nherent in ownership of property." Id. at 267 (citations omitted). Third, the Court found that the balance of equities tipped in Shvartser's favor, since the harm to his property rights outweighed the purported harms to the lender defendants of having to wait to recover the balance of the loan (since interest was continuing to accrue on that loan), and of potentially having to obtain a new mediation certificate (a prerequisite to foreclosure under D.C. law) if the existing certificate were to expire in November 2018.¹ Id. at 267–68. Fourth, the Court found that the public interest "weighs slightly in plaintiff's favor" because "the public has an interest in seeing that an innocent property owner is not deprived of his or her interest in real property by fraud." Id. at 268–69. Thus, the Court granted the motion and preliminarily enjoined the lender defendants from foreclosing on the property. Id. at 269.

The lender defendants now seek reconsideration of that decision. See SnowPoint Capital, LLC and SP Funding 452, LLC's Mot. for Recons. ("Lender Defs.' Mot.") [ECF No. 29] at 1. They do so on two grounds: first, they argue that the Court should have held an evidentiary hearing to test the veracity of Shvartser's testimony regarding the allegedly forged power of attorney, see id. at 2–6; and second, they claim that the Court committed legal error when it concluded that the lender defendants could not foreclose on Lekser's one-half interest in the property if the power of attorney were indeed fraudulent, see id. at 6–10. Shvartser has filed a response to the lender defendants' motion, see Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Recons. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [ECF No. 32], which is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

As an initial matter, the Court must determine the correct legal standard to apply to the lender defendants' motion for reconsideration. Although the lender defendants assume, and Shvartser does not dispute, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is the correct vehicle for their motion, the Court does not share the parties' confidence. Thus, out of an abundance of caution and for the reasons explained below, the Court will apply the less demanding standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which governs the reconsideration of interlocutory decisions. See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F.Supp.3d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2017) (discussing the differences between Rule 59(e) and Rule 54(b) ).

Under Rule 59(e), a party may move "to alter or amend a judgment ... no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." This rule "provides a limited exception to the rule that judgments are to remain final," and a court "may grant a motion to amend or alter a judgment under three circumstances only: (1) if there is an ‘intervening change of controlling law’; (2) if new evidence becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be amended in order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’ " Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Moreover, because " Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at ‘reconsideration, not initial consideration,’ " id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ), the rule " ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment,’ " id. (quoting Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) ).

But Rule 59(e) applies only to final judgments. See Scahill, 286 F.Supp.3d at 17. Interlocutory orders, on the other hand, "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Whereas Rule 59(e)"sets a high threshold" for reconsideration, Rule 54(b)'s "more flexible" standard allows it "as justice requires." Scahill, 286 F.Supp.3d at 17 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ). "Justice may require reconsideration ‘where a court has "patently misunderstood a party[,] ... has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the law or facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the Court.’ " " Id. at 17–18 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see Singh v. George Wash. U., 383 F.Supp.2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Errors of apprehension may include a Court's failure to consider ‘controlling decisions ... that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.’ " (citation omitted) ). However, even a Rule 54(b) motion cannot be used "to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled" or to "present[ ] theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier." Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity, 319 F.Supp.3d 70, 81, 2018 WL 3150217, at *4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted).

Courts in this district have reached different conclusions as to whether Rule 54(b) or Rule 59(e) governs a request for reconsideration of an order granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief. Compare Dunlap, 319 F.Supp.3d at 83–85, 2018 WL 3150217, at *7 (declining to evaluate such a reconsideration motion under "what appears to be a higher standard associated with Rule 59(e)" because "the Court has not entered final judgment"), with Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn...