Sicaras v. City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 22 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15439,15439
• Citation: 44 Conn.App. 771,692 A.2d 1290
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: George W. SICARAS v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

Page 1290

692 A.2d 1290

44 Conn.App. 771

George W. SICARAS v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

No. 15439.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 14, 1997.

Decided April 22, 1997.

William A. Snider, Wethersfield for appellant (plaintiff).

Karen K. Clark, with whom, on the brief, were Bourke G. Spellacy and M. Catherine Healy, Hartford for appellees (defendants).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and LANDAU and SPEAR, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff former chief of police of the defendant city of Hartford (city) appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Berger, J., enforcing a settlement agreement signed by the plaintiff and corporation counsel for the city. The plaintiff claims that the settlement agreement is unenforceable because (1) it required the subsequent approval of the city's pension committee, (2) the corporation counsel lacked authority to settle on behalf of the city and (3) the plaintiff signed the agreement under duress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Prior to the judgment that is the subject of this appeal, the parties ¹ appeared before the trial court, Corradino, J., for trial on March 15, 1994. After some discussions and before beginning trial, the parties signed a settlement agreement that was read onto the record in open court on the same day. ² Judgment did not enter in accordance with the agreement, but both parties signed and then filed a withdrawal of action with the court. On January 27, 1995, after several communications between the parties in which they expressed disagreement as to the meaning of the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff informed the city that he would not agree to the settlement. Subsequently, on February 3, 1995, the defendants filed motions to restore the case to the docket, to enforce the settlement agreement, and for judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement, to which the plaintiff objected. The trial court, Berger, J., granted the motions, restored the case to the docket and rendered judgment enforcing the agreement.

The trial court found certain relevant facts. In 1987, the plaintiff brought suit pro se against the defendants in order to obtain certain pension, medical, severance, and other benefits that he claimed he did not receive upon termination of his employment. ³

Although the plaintiff had been represented by counsel after he brought suit, on the day that his case was scheduled for trial and he signed the settlement agreement, he appeared pro se, accompanied by his wife. ⁴ At the end of the negotiations that day, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would sign certain releases of workers' compensation claims and make submittals to the pension commission, and that the city would make certain payments and place a "name clearing letter" in the plaintiff's personnel file. Approximately one week later, the releases of the workers' compensation claims were sent to the plaintiff for his signature. On March 29, 1994, the plaintiff sent the city documents that he wanted included in his personnel letter. On March 30, 1994, a copy of the letter was sent to the plaintiff, and on April 1 the plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with it and also indicated that he did not have the documents ready that were required for his pension application. On April 1, the city submitted a revised personnel letter, and on May 11 the city wrote to the plaintiff to express interest in finalizing the settlement agreement. The plaintiff responded on May 14, 1994, requesting certain pension changes and indicating that he was still dissatisfied with the letter. On June 22, 1994, the city wrote to the plaintiff asking him to complete the releases. Finally, on January 27, 1995, the plaintiff informed the city that he would not agree to the settlement. The trial court held two hearings on the defendants' motions, including the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, before rendering its judgment that the settlement should be enforced.

I

Before we can reach the merits of the plaintiff's claims, we must consider the threshold issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to restore the plaintiff's case to the docket eleven months after both parties had signed and filed a withdrawal of the action with the court.

It is clear from the record before us that, although the parties read, in open court, the settlement agreement that they signed on March 15, 1994, the court did not render judgment incorporating the agreement. This is clear because (1) the transcript of March 15, 1994, indicates that Judge Corradino made comments to the parties about their comprehension of the agreement, but not about its content, and directed the parties to withdraw their case with the clerk, (2) the docket sheet in the trial court file refers to the March 15, 1994 interaction as "agreement" not as "judgment" or "order," and (3) the defendants titled their motion of February 3, 1995, a "motion to enforce settlement agreement and for entry of judgment in accordance with settlement agreement." The question we must resolve is whether a court retains jurisdiction over an action after both parties have signed withdrawals of it and judgment was never rendered.

Withdrawals are analogous to final judgments. "The right of a plaintiff to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits, as allowed by § 52-80, is absolute and unconditional. Under [the] law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of the case from the docket. Housing Authority of East Hartford v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 157, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988), quoting Lusas v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church Corporation, 123 Conn. 166, 170, 193 A. 204 (1937)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) H.G. Bass Associates, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 26 Conn.App. 426, 431, 601 A.2d 1040 (1992); see also Baker v. Cordisco, 37 Conn.App. 515, 520, 657 A.2d 230 (1995).

Because withdrawals are analogous to final judgments, we next consider whether there is a finite time period during which a withdrawal can be "opened," just as there is a finite time period during which final judgments can be opened. See General Statutes § 52-212a; Practice Book 326. ⁵ We reason that the motion to restore a case to the docket is the vehicle to "open" a withdrawal, while the motion to open is the vehicle to open judgments. The issue of timeliness is of concern in this case, the defendants having filed the motion to restore the case to the docket eleven months after the withdrawal. A motion to restore a case to the docket must have a jurisdictional time limitation in the same way as a motion to open.

"We take judicial notice of the practice among presiding trial judges to require counsel to submit withdrawals when the in-court settlement is reached, prior to the execution of the settlement agreement. This practice provides an efficient method of clearing the court's docket. The trial court often instructs the parties that if difficulties arise upon effectuating the settlement, either party may request that the case be restored to the docket provided it is requested during the time period in which the court maintains jurisdiction. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-212a. Either party may then proceed under the original jurisdiction of the court without the necessity of instituting another cause of action." (Emphasis added.) Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 806 n. 3, 626 A.2d 729 (1993). ⁶

The facts in Audubon are nearly identical to those presented here, with three differences. Two differences are inconsequential, whereas the other difference could be crucial. Unlike in this case, the parties did not sign the agreement in Audubon. That distinction is not significant, however, because in both cases the parties assented in open court to each provision of the agreements. Parties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. Schwarzschild v. Martin, 191 Conn. 316, 321, 464 A.2d 774 (1983). The plaintiff in Audubon moved to restore the case to the docket by filing a motion to open. The defendants here filed a motion to restore the case to the docket, which is a difference without significance. The third difference is that the Audubon plaintiff's motion was within the time period prescribed by § 52-212a, whereas, the defendants' motion in this case was not. If the defendants in this case had filed their motion to restore the case to the docket within four months of March 15, 1994, the court would, on the basis of the Audubon precedent, have retained its original jurisdiction. Our question, however, is whether the court also retains jurisdiction when a motion is filed more than four months after the withdrawal of the action.

General Statutes § 52-212a applies to the restoration of a case to the docket as well as to the opening of judgments. Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, supra, 225 Conn. at 806 n. 3, 626 A.2d 729. The statute provides that "[t]he parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court...." Section 52-212a, therefore, relates not to jurisdiction over the subject matter, but to jurisdiction over the person or parties. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 288, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). "The express inclusion in § 52-212a of a provision that the parties may waive the four month limitation underscores the fact that the statute deals with personal and not with subject matter jurisdiction." Id. Here, we conclude that the parties waived the four month limitation and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The defendants moved to restore the case to the docket as a precursor to their motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The plaintiff also waived the four month limitation by...