Sidlow v. Sheridan

• Decision Date: 29 December 1941
• Citation: 310 Mass. 395,38 N.E.2d 665
• Parties: SIDLOW v. SHERIDAN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

310 Mass. 395

38 N.E.2d 665

SIDLOW

v.SHERIDAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Dec. 29, 1941.

Petition in equity by N. Oscar Sidlow, administrator of the estate of Annestia E. Murrey, deceased, otherwise known as Annestia E. Murray, against Bernadette Gosselin Sheridan and others, to establish title to a deposit in the Worcester North Institution for Savings standing in the name of plaintiff's intestate at the time of her death, and to compel the named respondent to deliver the ‘bank book’ to petitioner. From an adverse decree, the named respondent appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Probate Court, Worcester County, Wahlstrom, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

P. F. Shaughnessy, of Marlboro, and R. T. Lilly, of Fitchburg, for petitioner.

J. J. Philbin and A. A. Philbin, both of Clinton, for respondent.

DOLAN, Justice.

This is a petition in equity in which the petitioner as he is administrator of the estate of Annestia E. Murrey, otherwise known as Annestia E. Murray, seeks to establish title to a deposit in the Worcester North Institution for Savings standing in the name of the intestate at the time of her death, and to compel Bernadette Gosselin Sheridan, hereinafter called the respondent, to deliver the ‘bank book’ to him. The respondent claimed ownership of the deposit by virtue of an alleged ‘gift and transfer’ thereof to her by the intestate.

After hearing, the judge entered a decree that the deposit in question and a deposit in the Clinton Trust Company (claim to which the respondent has waived) ‘are the property of the estate of * * * [the intestate].’ The respondent appealed and at her request the judge filed a ‘Report of Findings of Material Facts.’ The evidence is not reported. The report, however, does not comply with the requirements of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 11 (see also c. 214, § 23), as established by many prior decisions of this court, since the report, so far as the deposit now in dispute is involved, consists for the most part of a recital of the testimony of certain witnesses, concerning which in important aspects no findings are made by the judge, although most of the testimony recited, if believed by him, would warrant if not require a finding of a perfected gift of the deposit by the intestate in her lifetime to the respondent. There is no ultimate finding by the judge in the report with relation to whether a gift of the deposit in question was in fact made to the respondent by the intestate, or whether at her death it constituted an asset of her estate.

Reports of material facts provided by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 11, to be made in the Probate Court upon the request of any party entitled to appeal therefrom, are governed by the same principles as apply in cases of such reports in equity under c. 214, § 23, which is phrased in substantially the same language. The finding of facts contemplated by the statute constitutes the substance of the conclusions made by the judge from the evidence and is the foundation upon which the decree rests. Smith v. Smith, 222 Mass. 102, 109 N.E. 830.

When a judge makes a report of material facts under the statutes ‘he does not make a report of the evidence but recites certain facts which he considered as material and which in his opinion formed the basis of his decision. It is not a new or additional proceeding after the termination of the case by final decree, but is in the nature of an extension of the record in the form of a statement of facts in the mind of the judge when his decision was made, which, when included in the record, puts the case in proper form for hearing on the appeal.’ Plumer v. Houghton & Dutton Co., 277 Mass. 209, 214, 178 N.E. 716, 718. Where such a report is made and the evidence, as in the represent case, is not reported under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 12, the only question presented for our determination is whether the decree entered is supported by the material facts found by the judge under section 11; the report is regarded as a finding of all the material facts upon which his decision was founded, Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 476, 192 N.E. 52, and ‘there is no room for any implication of further findings.’ Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass. 559, 562, N.E.2d 885, 886;Bottoms v. Carlz, 310 Mass. 29, 33, 36 N.E.2d 379.

In the present case the principle that in the absence of a report of material facts the decree imports a finding of every fact essential to its entry is not applicable. Compare Harlow Realty Co. Whiting, 308 Mass. 220, 223, 224, 31 N.E.2d 928. It follows that resort may not be had to any findings that otherwise could be implied from the decree entered by the judge. Viens v. Viens, 302 Mass. 366, 367, 19 N.E.2d 306;Sullivan v. Quinlivan, 308 Mass. 339, 341, 32 N.E.2d 209. The decree must stand or fall upon the facts found in the report of material facts. Each of the parties in argument has treated the case as though the recitals of testimony by the judge constituted findings of fact. We cannot adopt that view since the testimony is in some respects conflicting.

In the case at bar the report of facts was irregular. The respondent, however, if she had desired to secure a review of the facts found by the judge on the ground that they were plainly wrong on the evidence before him, should have taken appropriate steps in conformity to the statute, G.L. (Ter....