Siekierda v. Com., Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2004
• Citation: 580 Pa. 259,860 A.2d 76
• Parties: John W. SIEKIERDA, Appellee v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

860 A.2d 76

580 Pa. 259

John W. SIEKIERDA, Appellee v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 7, 2003.

Decided October 20, 2004.

Timothy P. Wile, Harold H. Cramer, Harrisburg, for Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, appellant.

Charles T. DeTulleo, Wilmington, DE, for John W. Siekierda, appellee.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.

OPINION

Justice CASTILLE.

This Court granted review to determine whether a Pennsylvania-licensed driver who has been convicted of driving while intoxicated in Indiana, a sister state which, like Pennsylvania, is a signatory of the Drivers License Compact of 1961 (the "Compact")¹, can avoid the one-year suspension of his Pennsylvania driving privileges otherwise required under the Compact because it was not clear that the Indiana proof of the conviction, which consisted of a court abstract, was forwarded by the Indiana driver's licensing authority. The lower courts dismissed the administrative suspension of appellee's Pennsylvania driving privileges because they deemed the Indiana court abstract defective under the Compact, absent proof from the Pennsylvania licensing authority that the abstract had been issued from Indiana's driver's licensing authority. For the reasons set forth below, and consistently with this Court's decisions in Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. McCafferty, 563 Pa. 146, 758 A.2d 1155 (2000), and Harrington v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 563 Pa. 565, 763 A.2d 386 (2000), we hold that the perceived defect in the origin of the Indiana conviction report is immaterial to Pennsylvania's home state power of driver's license suspension. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand to the trial court for consideration of any remaining properly preserved issues.² On May 21, 1998, appellee John W. Siekierda, a licensed Pennsylvania driver, was arrested in the State of Indiana and charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI"), in violation of Section 9-30-5-2 of the Indiana Code.³ Appellee submitted to chemical testing at the time of his arrest, which revealed a blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") level of 0.18%. On July 28, 1998, appellee was found guilty of OWI in the Hancock Superior Court in Indiana. He was sentenced to a one-year term of probation and was directed to pay a $1,000 fine and costs. The Court also suspended appellee's Indiana driving privileges for 30 days, but granted him probationary driving privileges.

Indiana and Pennsylvania are party states to the Compact. See Ind.Code §§ 9-28-1-1 through 9-28-1-6; 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1581-1586. The Compact is an interstate agreement, adopted by statute, designed to coordinate law enforcement efforts against intoxicated drivers and other serious traffic offenders, and to increase uniformity among member states in exchanging information on convictions, records, licenses, and other pertinent data. See Driver License Compact Administrative Procedures Manual 1994, preface, § 1.1. Article I of the Compact includes a declaration of policy which makes clear that it is intended to "promote compliance with the laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles" in each of the party states, and to make the "reciprocal recognition" of the license to drive "more just and equitable" by considering compliance with the rules of the road as a "condition precedent" to the issuance or continuance of the license to drive. Article IX of the Compact, which addresses "construction and severability," directs that "[t]his Compact shall be liberally construed so as to effect the purposes thereof."

The Compact addresses both the reporting obligation of a party state when a qualifying conviction occurs in that state, as well as the obligation of a party state when it is the home/licensing state in receipt of a report that one of its drivers has been convicted in another state of a qualifying offense. Article III of the Compact sets forth the reporting obligation as follows:

The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted, describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated, identify the court in which action was taken, indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered or the conviction was a result of forfeiture of bail, bond or other security and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1581 (Art. III). Article IV delineates the home state's responsibility upon receipt of a report of a qualifying conviction pursuant to Article III, as follows:

Effect of Conviction.

(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state in the case of convictions for:

(1) manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

(2) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

(3) any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used; or

(4) failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1581 (Art. IV(a)).⁴ Thus, appellant Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing ("PennDOT"), as the Pennsylvania "home state" licensing authority, is required to treat a qualifying out-of state conviction for driving under the influence ("DUI") as if the driver had been convicted of DUI in Pennsylvania.⁵ See also McCafferty, 758 A.2d at 1160. As a practical matter, this means that PennDOT is required to suspend for one year the operating privileges of any person who is convicted of DUI. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3). See also Crooks v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 564 Pa. 436, 768 A.2d 1106 (2001); McCafferty, supra; Sullivan v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 550 Pa. 639, 708 A.2d 481 (1998).

Pursuant to its reporting obligation, Indiana reported appellee's OWI conviction to PennDOT by way of a court abstract which the trial court determined was forwarded to PennDOT by the convicting court. Following receipt of the report, PennDOT determined that the Indiana conviction was substantially similar to the offense set forth in Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact, and accordingly, treated appellee as if he had been convicted of DUI in Pennsylvania. Thus, by official notice dated and mailed February 10, 1999, PennDOT notified appellee that it was suspending his operating privileges for one year, effective March 17, 1999.

On March 10, 1999, appellee filed a statutory appeal from the one-year suspension with the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. A de novo hearing was held before the Honorable Howard F. Riley, Jr., President Judge, on April 22, 1999. At that hearing, PennDOT entered into evidence a packet of documents that had been certified by both the Pennsylvania Secretary of Transportation and the Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Driver Licensing. Included in the packet were copies of the Indiana report of appellee's OWI conviction, which were generated by the convicting court in Indiana, rather than by the licensing authority in that state.⁶ President Judge Riley sustained appellee's appeal on December 20, 1999.

PennDOT appealed to the Commonwealth Court, but then filed an application to transfer the appeal to this Court, which was granted on May 8, 2000. By per curiam order dated December 22, 2000, this Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the intervening decisions in McCafferty and Harrington. Siekierda v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 563 Pa. 521, 762 A.2d 1085 (2000).

On February 15, 2001, a remand hearing was held before the Honorable Michael Joseph Melody, Jr. On November 21, 2001, the trial court again sustained appellee's statutory appeal. The court held that the report of appellee's Indiana OWI conviction did not comply with the requirements of Article III of the Compact because the conviction report was a court abstract and was not transmitted by the actual "licensing authority," i.e., the Indiana BMV. Assuming that it was bound by the Commonwealth Court's decision in Boots v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 736 A.2d 64 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (licensing authority of convicting state must be reporting body), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 722, 766 A.2d 1242 (1999), the trial court held that the judicial report of conviction was insufficient to satisfy PennDOT's burden of proving a basis for suspension under the Compact. The trial court failed completely to address McCafferty and Harrington, as ordered by this Court.

PennDOT appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that Boots and similar cases, such as Tripson v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 773 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 690, 796 A.2d 320 (2002), lacked vitality in light of McCafferty and Harrington, and unduly restricted its efforts to enforce the Commonwealth's drunk driving statutes. PennDOT further argued that the notice it had received from the Indiana court in this case was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Compact and that, for purposes of Pennsylvania home state enforcement, conviction reports may come from reliable sources other than the licensing authority of the convicting state.

On May...