Sierra Club v. City of Hayward

• Decision Date: 09 February 1981
• Docket Number: S.F. 24201
• Citation: 623 P.2d 180,28 Cal.3d 840,171 Cal.Rptr. 619
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 623 P.2d 180, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,293 SIERRA CLUB et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF HAYWARD, Defendant and Respondent; Y. Charles SODA et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

Page 619

171 Cal.Rptr. 619

28 Cal.3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,293

SIERRA CLUB et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF HAYWARD, Defendant and Respondent Y. Charles SODA et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

S.F. 24201.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 9, 1981.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 26, 1981.

[623 P.2d 182] Julie E. McDonald and Laurens H. Silver, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants

Nicholas C. Arguimbau, E. Clement Shute, Jr., Mark I. Weinberger and Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

John W. Scanlon, City Atty., for defendant and respondent.

Berliner, Cohen & Biagini and Jeffrey P. Widman, San Jose, for real parties in interest and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

In this administrative mandamus proceeding (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) we are asked for the first time to construe the provisions of the California Land Conservation Act of 1965 (Gov.Code, § 51200 et seq., hereinafter called the Williamson Act) that authorize cancellation of land preservation contracts made pursuant to that act. The Sierra Club and others (Sierra Club) ¹ appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to set aside the Hayward City Council's partial cancellation of a Williamson Act agreement between the city and landowners Y. Charles and Helen Soda.

Sierra Club contends that the findings made by the city council are not supported by substantial evidence, and that they do not support the council's conclusion that cancellation of the land preservation agreement was appropriate to allow subdivision and development of the contracted land. It alleges that the council failed to make findings implicitly required by the cancellation provisions of the Williamson Act, and otherwise failed to properly apply those provisions. We conclude that the case is an appropriate subject for administrative mandamus and that the city council applied the cancellation provisions incorrectly, both in failing to make certain findings and in making other findings unsupported by substantial evidence.

I

The Sodas own a 2,300-acre cattle ranch in the foothills rising along the eastern edge In January 1978 the Sodas petitioned the city for cancellation of their land preservation agreement as to a 93-acre parcel of their ranch. In the same month, Ponderosa Homes (Ponderosa) filed with the city a zone change application requesting that the 93-acre parcel be rezoned from "agricultural" to "planned development" so as to enable Ponderosa to build thereon an upper-middle income residential subdivision. The city planning commission denied Ponderosa's application, and Ponderosa appealed to the city council. Early in 1979, the city counsel considered both the zone change application and the cancellation request.

of the City of Hayward. Until 1979, 600 acres of the land were part of an agricultural preserve created by Hayward in 1969, and were subject to a Williamson Act agreement that restricted the land to agricultural use or compatible uses for 10 years. Because the agreement had been annually renewed since 1969, the 10-year restriction had not begun to lapse.

The Williamson Act authorizes approval of a cancellation request only if the relevant agency finds "(a) That the cancellation is not inconsistent with the purposes of (the act); and (P) (b) That cancellation is in the public interest." (Gov.Code, § 51282, 1st par.) Section 51282 continues: "The existence of an opportunity for another use of the land involved shall not be sufficient reason for the cancellation of a contract. A potential alternative use of the land may be considered only if there is no proximate, noncontracted land suitable for the use to which it is proposed the contracted land be put.

"The uneconomic character of an existing agricultural use shall likewise not be sufficient reason for cancellation of the contract. The uneconomic character of the existing use may be considered only if there is no other reasonable or comparable agricultural use to which the land may be put."

After holding public hearings as required by statute (Gov.Code, § 51284), the city council cancelled the contract and granted the requested zoning change, clearing the way for the proposed subdivision. The council made the following findings to justify its decision:

"The Council hereby determines that the partial cancellation of the ... Land Conservation Agreement is not inconsistent with the purposes of the California Land Conservation Act of 1965 and is in the public interest by reason of the following:

"Removal of this relatively small area from the agricultural preserve will not jeopardize the continued use of the remaining lands in the preserve for grazing purposes;

"Potential conversion to subdivision development by persons other than applicants (i. e., by Ponderosa) is neither premature nor unnecessary; such development would be of benefit to urban dwellers requiring housing accommodations as an orderly extension of contiguous residential subdivisions;

"Potential retention within the subject land and dedication to the City of Hayward as open space of an area in excess of 30 acres will contribute to the esthetic, physical, and open space environment of adjacent property owners and of the City as a whole." (Hayward City Council Res. No. 79-012 C.S.)

II

The city raises a preliminary objection to our consideration of the case. It contends that its decision to cancel the contract is legislative in nature and is therefore reviewable only in an ordinary mandamus action (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085), and reversible only if arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.) The city would thus have us hold that the cancellation procedure is a quasi-legislative function analogous to the passage of zoning ordinances (Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28 Cal.3d 511,169 Cal.Rptr. 904, 620 P.2d 565, and cases cited) and annexation decisions (City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978) 76 Firmly established precedent, however, compels a different conclusion. We have repeatedly held that administrative mandamus is appropriate "for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer ...." (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a); see, e. g., Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637, 234 P.2d 981; Temescal Water Co. v. Dept. Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 101, 280 P.2d 1; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514, fn. 12, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.) The statute at hand clearly requires a public hearing (Gov.Code, § 51284) and discretionary weighing of evidence in order to make required findings (id., § 51282). Furthermore, cancellation proceedings are classically adjudicatory in nature: the landowner must initiate the proceedings by filing a petition for cancellation; the council sits as arbiter, hearing evidence from proponents and opponents; and in every case the ultimate decision, unlike most zoning and annexation decisions, directly affects only one parcel. (Compare Arnel, supra, 28 Cal.3d 511, 169 Cal.Rptr. 904, 620 P.2d 565, holding that a zoning initiative that affected only three parcels was nonetheless a legislative act.) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that cancellation of a land preservation agreement is adjudicatory and therefore reviewable in a proceeding brought under the provisions of section 1094.5. ²

Cal.App.3d 381, 387, 142 Cal.Rptr. 873, and cases cited).

III

We reach the question whether the city council abused its discretion in cancelling the land preservation agreement. A comprehensive answer must begin with an analysis of the Williamson Act and its purposes.

The Williamson Act was the Legislature's response to two alarming phenomena observed in California: (1) the rapid and virtually irreversible loss of agricultural land to residential and other developed uses (see Falasco, Preserving California's Agricultural Green, prepared for Sen. Com. on Governmental Organization (1976) p. 59; Land, Unraveling the Rurban Fringe: A Proposal for the Implementation of Proposition Three (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 421, 422-424 (hereinafter Unraveling the Rurban Fringe); Fellmeth, The Politics of Land (1973) pp. xv, 29), and (2) the disorderly patterns of suburban development ³ that mar the landscape, require extension of municipal services to remote residential enclaves, and interfere with agricultural activities (see Gov.Code, § 51220, subd. (b); Kelsey v. Colwell (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 590, 594, 106 Cal.Rptr. 420; Unraveling the Rurban Fringe, supra, at pp. 423-424). The Legislature perceived as one cause of these problems the self-fulfilling prophecy of the property tax system: taxing land on the basis of its market value compels the owner to put the land to the use for which it is valued by the market. As the urban fringe approaches, the farmer's land becomes valuable for residential development. His taxes are therefore increased, although his income To combat the problem, the Legislature passed the Williamson Act on the basis of the following findings:

is likely to shrink as more costly practices must be undertaken both to avoid interfering with his new neighbors and to protect his crops, livestock, and equipment from their intrusion. (Falasco, op. cit. supra, at p. 52; Unraveling the Rurban Fringe, supra, at pp. 423-424.) Often the farmer is forced to sell his land to subdivision developers, sometimes long before development is appropriate. As houses go up, so does the value of the...