Sigurdson v. Isanti County

• Decision Date: 23 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. C2-86-2071,C2-86-2071
• Citation: 408 N.W.2d 654
• Parties: 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 116 Renja SIGURDSON, Appellant, v. ISANTI COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 654

408 N.W.2d 654

44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 116

Renja SIGURDSON, Appellant, v. ISANTI COUNTY, et al., Respondents.

No. C2-86-2071.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 23, 1987.

Review Denied Aug. 19, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court did not clearly err in finding and concluding that Sigurdson failed to establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of gender discrimination with regard to hiring practices in 1975.

2. The trial court did not clearly err in finding and concluding that Sigurdson established a prima facie case of retailiation, that respondents successfully rebutted the presumption of gender discrimination with proof of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions and that Sigurdson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons advanced were merely pretexual.

3. The trial court clearly erred in finding and concluding that respondents successfully rebutted Sigurdson's prima facie case of gender discrimination with regard to advancement when the evidence established that the first available opening for additional field appraisal work was created in April 1976, when Sigurdson became qualified to fill the position in December 1976, and when she was not offered an opportunity to do field appraisal work until the fall of 1979.

4. The trial court properly denied Sigurdson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence arising during pendency of the first appeal.

David A. Singer, Singer & Singer, Ltd., Minnetonka, for appellant.

Richard A. Beens, Steffen & Munstenteiger, P.A., Anoka, for respondents.

Heard, considered and decided by CRIPPEN, P.J., and LESLIE and STONE, ^* JJ.

OPINION

STONE, Judge.

This gender discrimination case is before us for the second time. The action originated when appellant Renja Sigurdson sued respondents Isanti County, Aaron Boettcher and Frank Mennenga, alleging sex discrimination in employment practices under the Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1982). The trial court rejected an advisory jury's finding of sex discrimination, denied appellant recovery on any of her claims and ordered her to pay Isanti County attorney's fees. This court affirmed the trial court's finding that appellant was not discriminated against on the basis of her sex but reversed the award of attorney's fees in Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 363 N.W.2d 476 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).

The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the case and affirmed this court's reversal of attorney's fees but reversed and remanded for new findings on the discrimination issue. See Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.1986), holding that in employment discrimination cases based on disparate treatment and brought under the Human Rights Act, trial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that explicitly apply the three-step analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

On remand, the trial court adopted Isanti County's proposed findings and conclusions of law verbatim and entered judgment in respondents' favor. Appellant subsequently moved for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence" arising during pendency of the first appeal. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal from the judgment and the order denying a new trial followed. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

FACTS

The facts underlying this case have been recited in detail both by this court in Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 363 N.W.2d 476 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) and by the supreme court in Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.1986) (Sigurdson I ). This decision will simply highlight facts relevant to the trial court's findings and conclusions after remand.

ISSUES

1. What is this court's standard of review following the supreme court's remand to the trial court for new findings in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)?

2. Did the trial court err in finding and concluding that Sigurdson was not discriminated against by respondents on the basis of her gender with regard to hiring practices, advancement or retaliation?

3. Did the trial court err in denying appellant's new trial motion?

ANALYSIS

I.

In affirming the trial court's original findings and conclusions of law, this court noted that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it was "clear that the court used this three-step process to arrive at its decision." Sigurdson, 363 N.W.2d at 480-481. The supreme court disagreed, stating that the trial court's utilization of this analysis was "far from clear." Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 721. Stressing that effective and meaningful appellate review could only take place when the basis of a trial court's decision is set forth clearly and explicitly, the supreme court reversed this court on the discrimination issue, vacated the original judgment and remanded "for new findings and conclusions" that explicitly applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 722 (emphasis supplied).

We are called upon to examine two aspects of this case: (1) whether the trial court's findings and conclusions reflect clear and explicit analysis of the McDonnell Douglas formula; and (2) whether, given this analysis, the trial court erred in finding and concluding that respondents did not discriminate against Sigurdson on the basis of her gender.

A complicating factor in our review of this case is the trial court's verbatim adoption of Isanti County's proposed findings and conclusions of law. Federal cases have uniformly disapproved of this practice as a dereliction of the trial court's function under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), identical in substance to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 52.01. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 640 (4th Cir.1983), reversed on other grounds by Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984); Hosley v. Armour & Co., 683 F.2d 864, 866 (4th Cir.1982).

Although federal courts have firmly disapproved of this practice, no decision to our knowledge has held that verbatim adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions is reversible error per se. Rather, the "clearly erroneous" standard remains the proper standard of review.

The adoption by the District Court of proposed findings and conclusions, though disapproved, will not, however, warrant reversal of the cause per se nor does it mean that the " 'clearly erroneous' " rule of Rule 52(a) will not be applied at all, simply because the findings and conclusions were developed by one of the parties and adopted in course by the judge.

Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 641 (emphasis in original). Whatever the procedure adopted, we do not concur with appellant's claim that this was necessarily a failure of independent evaluation by the trial court. The record shows conscientious consideration of all the issues in a complex case.

II.

Essentially, the McDonnell Douglas analysis provides a three-step approach for proving a case of disparate treatment based on gender: ¹ (1) the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) if the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to present evidence of some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) if the employer establishes some legitimate business reason for its actions, the burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason or justification advanced by the employer is a mere pretext for discrimination. Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 720. At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff. Id. at 720 n. 2 (citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

In Sigurdson I, the supreme court outlined a generalized formulation of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas (step one) for proof of Sigurdson's claims (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) plaintiff sought and qualified for opportunities that the employer was making available to others; (3) plaintiff, despite her qualifications, was denied the opportunities; and (4) after plaintiff was denied, the opportunities remained available or were given to other persons with plaintiff's qualifications.

Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 720. ²

In assessing whether the employer has rebutted the presumption (step two) of unlawful discriminatory action once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing, a trial court "should look for evidence [that the employer's] actions were related to some legitimate business purpose." Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). The sufficiency of an employer's evidence should be evaluated in part to the extent it "frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 720 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95).

Assuming the employer has met its burden of production, then in order to prevail, the plaintiff must persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason advanced by the employer was actually pretexual and that the employer intended to discriminate against her (step three). Sigurdson I, 386 N.W.2d at 720. This burden may be sustained by direct proof that "persuad[es] the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer" or by indirect proof "that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095).

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