Sikes v. State
| Decision Date | 12 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S96G1546,S96G1546 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 19,485 S.E.2d 206 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 1644 SIKES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Frances Cullen, Marcus & Cullen, Debra Blum, Georgia Indigent Defense Council, James C. Bonner, Jr., Atlanta, for Sikes.
David McDade, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, Douglasville, for State.
Torin D. Togut, Georgia Legal Services, Lisa J. Krisher, Phyllis J. Holmen, Susan C. Jamieson, Atlanta, amici curiae.
The issue presented by this granted certiorari 1 concerns the proper interplay between the first and third sentences of OCGA § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B). The need to clarify the interplay between these sentences arises when a defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity and who has been ordered to undergo involuntary inpatient treatment successfully completes a conditional release program ordered by a trial court under the authority of OCGA § 17-7-131(e)(5)(A). In this situation, it is unclear (1) whether the first sentence of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) requires the trial court to discharge the defendant from both involuntary inpatient and outpatient treatment, or (2) whether the first sentence requires the trial court only to discharge the defendant from the existing order for involuntary inpatient treatment, with the third sentence of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) authorizing the trial court to require the defendant to participate in involuntary outpatient treatment. We conclude that the first sentence of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) only requires a trial court to discharge the defendant from the order requiring involuntary inpatient treatment, and that the third sentence of that same Code section authorizes the trial court to require involuntary outpatient treatment. Because the record does not disclose whether the trial court found that the appellant, Hershel Sikes, had successfully completed his conditional release program, we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. OCGA § 17-7-131(e)(5) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(5) (A) If a defendant appears to meet the criteria for outpatient involuntary treatment as defined in Part 3 of Article 3 of Chapter 3 of Title 37, which shall be the criteria for release on a trial basis in the community in preparation for a full release, the court may order a period of conditional release subject to certain conditions set by the court. The court is authorized to appoint an appropriate community service provider to work in conjunction with the Department of Human Resources to monitor the defendant's compliance with these conditions and to make regular reports to the court.
(B) If the defendant successfully completes all requirements during this period of conditional release, the court shall discharge the individual from commitment at the end of that period. Such individuals may be referred for community mental health, mental retardation, or substance abuse services as appropriate. The court may require the individual to participate in outpatient treatment or any other services or programs authorized by Chapter 3, 4, or 7 of Title 37.
(C) If the defendant does not successfully complete any or all requirements of the conditional release period, the court may:
(i) Revoke the period of conditional release and return the defendant to a state hospital for inpatient services; or
(ii) Impose additional or revise existing conditions on the defendant as appropriate and continue the period of conditional release.
In the present case, Sikes was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the crime of misdemeanor theft by shoplifting. The trial court then found that Sikes met the requirements for involuntary inpatient treatment, 2 and ordered Sikes to undergo such treatment. The court subsequently conditionally released Sikes under the provisions of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(A). Sikes contends that he successfully completed all requirements of his conditional release plan, and that the "discharge ... from commitment" language of the first sentence of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) requires that he be released from any involuntary treatment plan, whether inpatient or outpatient. Contrary to Sikes' request, the trial court continued Sikes' involuntary outpatient treatment. The record, however, does not establish whether the trial court found that Sikes had successfully completed his conditional release program. Thus, we cannot determine whether the trial court continued Sikes' involuntary outpatient treatment under the authority of subsection (e)(5)(C)(ii), on the ground that Sikes had not successfully completed the program, or whether the trial court continued outpatient treatment based upon the third sentence of subsection (e)(5)(B), on the ground that that sentence authorized it to do so even if Sikes had successfully completed the conditional release program. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's order was authorized by the third sentence of subsection (e)(5)(B). 3 Because the trial court's order does not reveal whether the trial court found that Sikes had successfully completed his conditional release plan, it is necessary to remand the case to the trial court for that finding. However, to guide the trial court in the exercise of its options once it makes its findings on remand, we undertake to interpret the meaning of the first and third sentences of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B).
2. In interpreting these two sentences, certain rules of statutory construction are relevant. First, courts should construe a statute to give "sensible and intelligent effect" to all of its provisions and should refrain, whenever possible, from construing the statute in a way that renders any part of it meaningless. 4 Second, a court's duty is "to reconcile, if possible, any potential conflicts between different sections of the same statute, so as to make them consistent and harmonious." 5 Third, in construing language in any one part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole. 6 Fourth, in attempting to ascertain legislative intent of a doubtful statute, a court may look to the caption of the act 7 and its legislative history. 8
3. Focusing on the "discharge ... from commitment" language of the first sentence of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B), Sikes contends that the word "commitment" should be interpreted to include involuntary inpatient and outpatient treatment. Thus, he argues that, if a defendant successfully completes a conditional release plan, he must be discharged from any involuntary treatment plan, either inpatient or outpatient. This interpretation, however, facially contradicts the third sentence of subsection (e)(5)(B), which provides that "[t]he court may require the individual to participate in outpatient treatment or any other services or programs authorized by Chapter 3, 4, or 7 of Title 37." (Emphasis supplied.) By using the terms "require" and "outpatient treatment," the third sentence unequivocally permits the trial court to impose an involuntary outpatient plan on the defendant after he has successfully completed a conditional release program.
Sikes attempts to reconcile these two sentences by contending that the third sentence authorizes a trial court to refer a defendant to the oversight and control of a Regional Board pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title 37. This contention, however, only highlights the conflict between the two sentences created by Sikes' interpretation of the word "commitment," as the third sentence expressly gives the trial court, not a Regional Board, the authority to require outpatient treatment, and expressly permits that outpatient treatment to be imposed under Chapter 3 of Title 37. The third sentence, in fact, does not mention Chapter 2 of Title 37. Further, the authority that Sikes contends the third sentence grants to the trial court actually exists under the second sentence of subsection (e)(5)(B), which provides that a trial court may refer defendants who have successfully completed a conditional release program "for community mental health, mental retardation, or substance abuse services as appropriate."
The interpretation that Sikes urges this Court to adopt places the first and second sentences of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) in conflict with the third sentence, and renders the third sentence meaningless. As previously stated, courts should refrain from such interpretations. Further, we conclude that the statutory scheme of § 17-7-131, as well as the statutory history of the first and third sentences of subsection (e)(5)(B), demonstrates that the General Assembly intended for the word "commitment" in the first sentence of subsection (e)(5)(B) to refer to orders requiring involuntary inpatient treatment. Further, this interpretation reconciles the first, second, and third sentences of § 17-7-131(e)(5)(B) and gives "sensible and intelligent effect" to each. 9
4. We begin our examination of the statutory scheme with OCGA § 17-7-131(d). It provides that when a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court shall order the Department of Human Resources (DHR) to detain the defendant for a period not to exceed 30 days so that the DHR can conduct an evaluation of the defendant's mental condition and send a report thereof to the trial court. Section 17-7-131(e)(1) then provides that if the report "indicates that the defendant does not meet the inpatient commitment criteria of Chapter 3 of Title 37," 10 (emphasis supplied) the trial court may discharge the defendant without a further hearing. Because an inpatient is defined by Chapter 3 of Title 37 as being a person who, among other things, is "mentally ill ... and who is in need of involuntary inpatient treatment," 11 Section 17-7-131(e)(1) thus equates commitment under its provisions with the involuntary inpatient requirements of Chapter 3 of Title 37.
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