Simmons v. Sigler
| Decision Date | 20 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:19-cv-4108 |
| Parties | JEREMY M. SIMMONS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER SIGLER, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Jeremy M. Simmons ("Simmons"), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting claims of excessive force, negligent training and malicious prosecution against Defendants Christopher Sigler ("Sigler"); Hocking County, Ohio Juvenile Court; Hocking County, Ohio Prosecutor's Office; and Jorden M. Meadows ("Meadows").1 With the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 16), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (ECF No. 12), and Defendants' Reply in Support (ECF No. 13). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.
Simmons alleges the following in his Complaint. On September 1, 2016, Simmons appeared under subpoena to testify as a witness in a proceeding in the Hocking County, Ohio Juvenile Court. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1, 4.) When Simmons arrived, Meadows,2 the defense attorney, directed him to leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4.) Sigler, a Juvenile Court bailiff, approached Simmons to escort him out and, when Simmons' back was turned, Sigler physically attacked him. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) According to Simmons, the force used was excessive and deadly. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18.) The Hocking County Prosecutor charged Simmons with resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. (Id. at ¶ 8.) The resisting arrest and disorderly conduct charges were dismissed on May 26, 2017 and September 27, 2017, respectively. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Simmons maintains that the Hocking County Juvenile Court failed in its duty to train Sigler. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27.) On March 18, 2019, Simmons had the charges filed against him expunged. (Id. at ¶ 29.) On that same day, the Hocking County Prosecutor's Office filed new assault charges against Simmons. (Id. at ¶ 30.) These new charges arose from an altercation at Simmons' home on February 1, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 31.) The assault charges against Simmons were dismissed on July 8, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Simmons contends that none of the charges against Simmons was supported by probable cause. (Id. at ¶ 36.) He seeks compensatory damages in excess of $75,000 and punitive damages. (Id.)
Defendants bring their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Tosurvive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) "imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints." 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Although this pleading standard does not require "'detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). However, "the tenet that acourt must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Thus, while a court is to afford plaintiff every inference, the pleading must still contain facts sufficient to "provide a plausible basis for the claims in the complaint"; a recitation of facts intimating the "mere possibility of misconduct" will not suffice. Flex Homes, Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp of Mich., Inc., 491 F. App'x 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Simmons alleges a negligent training claim against the Hocking County Juvenile Court and a malicious prosecution claim against the Hocking County Prosecutor's Office. Defendants contend that Simmons' claims against these entities are subject to dismissal because they lack the capacity to sue or be sued. For the following reasons, the Court agrees.
The capacity to sue or be sued in the United States District Courts is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. Rule 17(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows: ... for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
Simmons asserts that Ohio law establishes that both the Hocking County Juvenile Court and the Hocking County Prosecutor's Office have the capacity to sue or be sued. According to Simmons, these entities are political subdivisions of Ohio as defined by Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.01(F) because they each constitute an "other body" responsible for government activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state. Further, Simmons asserts that, as political subdivisions, these entities are liable for damages in this action pursuant Ohio Rev. Code § 2744(B). Simmons' position misinterprets Ohio law.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.01 defines political subdivision to include:
(F) ... a municipal corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate and politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state.
Further, Ohio courts, have defined a political subdivision as follows:
A political subdivision of the state is a geographic or territorial division of the state rather than a functional division of the state. Almost invariably the statutory definitions of "political subdivision" involve a geographic area of the state which has been empowered to perform certain functions of local government within such geographic area. Accordingly, a "political subdivision of the state" is a geographic or territorial portion of the state to which there has been delegated certain local governmental functions to perform within such geographic area.
In re Forfeiture of Prop. of Louis, 187 Ohio App. 3d 504, 508 (2nd Dist. 2010) (citing Fair v. School Emp. Retirement System of Ohio, 44 Ohio App.2d 115, 119 (10th Dist.1975)). Section 2744.01(F) lists specific examples of political subdivisions, but neither a county prosecutor's office nor a county juvenile court are among them.
Moreover, a county prosecutor's office is not a political subdivision but a subunit of the county. See Lenard v. City of Cleveland, 2017 WL 2832903, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 30, 2017) (). Further, a juvenile court is considered an arm of the state. See Godfrey v. Hamilton Cty. Juvenile Court, No. 1:18-CV-663, 2019 WL 3239259, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-663, 2019 WL 3819023 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2019)(citing Smith v. Grady, 960 F. Supp. 2d 735, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ()
Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that Ohio courts are not sui juris. Harsh v. City of Franklin, Ohio, No. 1:07-874, 2009 WL 806653, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26,2009) (). "Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right." Malone v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 344 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio 1976) (quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council, 296 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1973)). See also Phillips v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:18-CV-541, 2019 WL 2289277, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2019) (). More specifically, a juvenile court is not a legal entity that is capable of being sued. Godfrey v. Hamilton Cty. Juvenile Court, 2019 WL 3239259, at *5 ().
Similarly, a county prosecutor's office is not sui juris and cannot be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rose v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor's Office Ohio, No. 1:19 CV 314, 2019 WL 2451642, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 12, 2019) (citing Lenard v. ...
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