State ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council

• Decision Date: 16 May 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-320,72-320
• Parties: , 63 O.O.2d 199 . CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL. Supreme Court of Ohio
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 120

34 Ohio St.2d 120

296 N.E.2d 544, 63 O.O.2d 199

The STATE ex rel. CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL COURT v. CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL.

No. 72-320.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Decided May 16, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Absent an express statutory duty, the legislative authorities of a municipal corporation are not required to allocate all funds sought for the administration of justice by a municipal court.

2. The appropriate governmental authority must allocate its portion of those funds necessary to facilitate the administration of justice by its municipal court.

This original action arose in this court by the filing of a complaint for a writ of mandamus by relator, Cleveland Municipal Court, alleging certain failures on the part of respondent, Cleveland City Council, to appropriate and provide all funds, as requested by relator, for the operation and administration of the Cleveland Municipal Court during 1972. ¹

Respondent admits that not all the funds requested were appropriated, but contends that it has funded all items which it had a mandatory duty to so fund; that absent a specific duty and breach thereof a writ mandamus cannot issue; and that all vouchers received from relator for 1972 have been paid, making that question moot.

Respondent also filed a counterclaim, asking for a money judgment against eight of the thirteen judges of the Cleveland Municipal Court for money paid them as an increase in salary during their term of office. Relator filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the individual judges are not parties against whom a counterclaim could be brought and that this court lacks jurisdiction to enter a money judgment.

In view of the entwinement of issues herein, we shall discuss related issues together, rather than deal separately with the original complaint, the counterclaim and the motion to dismiss.

Edwin F. Woodle, Cleveland, for relator.

Herbert R. Whiting, director of law, and Howard H. Fishkin, Cleveland, for respondent.

STERN, Justice.

Fundamental to both the complaint and the counterclaim is the nature of the parties thereto. On its face, the complaint is brought by the Cleveland Municipal Court rather than by the individual judges thereof. A court, however, is not sui juris. "A court is defined to be a place in which justice is judicially administered. It is the exercise of judicial power, by the proper officer or officers, at a time and place appointed by law." Todd v. United States (1895), 158 U.S. 278, 284, 15 S.Ct. 889, 891, 39 L.Ed. 982. Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right.

However, examination of the complaint reveals that this action is proper in that it is brought by the existing judges of the Municipal Court who are public officers clothed with judicial authority. Having so concluded, it follows that the eight individual judges named in the counterclaim are proper parties against whom the counterclaim could be filed.

It should be noted, however, that the Cleveland City Council likewise is not sui juris and, absent statutory authority it cannot sue or be sued as such. An action involving the council should be brought against the city, or against the existing councilmen. Examination of the complaint and counterclaim, however, suffices to convince us that the respondent in fact is the councilmen individually.

It is evident, therefore, that the individual judges could not avoid the counterclaim on the ground that they were not parties to the original action. The counterclaim fails, however, in that Section 2(B)(1) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which prescribes the original jurisdiction of this court, does not include original actions for money judgment.

Respondent contends that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 13(B), which provides: 'A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing parties' claim.' We agree that a permissive counterclaim of this nature could be brought in a proper jurisdiction, but neither the Civil Rules nor statutes can expand this court's original jurisdiction and require it to hear an action not authorized by the Ohio Constitution.

Respondent argues further that Section 2(B)(1)(f) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution ² authorizes this court to determine this counterclaim. The determination sought is a judgment against eight Municipal Court judges for money paid them, under color of law, as an increase in pay during their term of office.

In paragraph one of the syllabus in State ex rel. Wallace v. Celina (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 109, 279 N.E.2d 866, decided March 1, 1972, this court held that: 'Under the provisions of Section 20 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution, the salary of a Municipal Court judge may not be increased during his term of office.' Prior to that decision, and subsequent to the enactment of Section 6(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, effective May 7, 1968, and the amendment of R.C. 1901.11, effective June 10, 1968, the status of the law on this question was unclear. It was during this period that the contested money payments were made under authority of judicial pronouncements by lower state courts. We intimate no view as to that question in concluding that its resolution is not necessary to the complete determination of the cause set forth in the complaint before us.

The motion to dismiss the counterclaim is allowed.

As to the complaint, respondent contends it should be dismissed as moot, because there are no remaining outstanding vouchers for 1972 which have not been paid. ³ To do so would be to ignore the essence of the complaint, for, although no vouchers remain unpaid for the year in question, it is apparent that (1) this was partially accomplished by deficit financing from the 1973 budget and (2) not all funds or items requested were granted. ⁴

Additionally, the second cause of action in the complaint requests funds for the use of courtroom No. 6; for expenses covering the installation and operation of air conditioning for the court during the summer; and for the purchase, installation and operation of an electronic computer system to assist the court in its administration. Those items, not having been provided by respondent, prevent the issue from being moot.

Finally, we arrive at respondent's contention that city council has complied with its statutory duty, and that consequently a writ of mandamus may not issue. We note foremost that '* * * mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.' R.C. 2731.01; paragraph three of the syllabus in State ex rel. Selected Properties v. Gottfried (1955), 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371. Before mandamus may lie it must be ascertained that the Cleveland City Council has, because of its official status or by operation of law, a specific duty to perform the act sought to be ordered by the writ.

The specific action sought herein is the unquestioned allotment and distribution by city council of all funds requested by the Municipal Court for the purpose of administering the Municipal Court so long as the court has not abused its discretion in making the request. Relator relies heavily upon this court's holding in the first and second paragraphs of the syllabus in State ex rel. Foster v. Bd. of County Commrs. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89, 242 N.E.2d 884, which provide:

'1. The administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers.

'2. Courts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions and cannot be directed, controlled or impeded therein by other branches of government. (Paragraph two of the syllabus in Zangerle v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 N.E.2d 865, approved and followed.)

In that case, we reaffirmed the separation of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches of government, acknowledging the necessity of having the judiciary free from infringements to the greatest extent possible. We did not hold that legislative authorities have an inherent duty to allocate all the funds requested by a Municipal Court, without regard to the limited funds available for disbursement to all departments and divisions of city government and the ability of the court to properly exercise its judicial function.

Contrary to relator's reading of State ex rel. Foster v. Bd. of County Commrs., supra, such a duty does not inherently exist even where the request is reasonable and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. At indicated by paragraph three of the syllabus, that case was controlled by statute, for the stated reason that:

'Under the provisions of Section 2151.10, Revised Code, determination of the necessary annual administative expenses of the Juvenile Court lies solely within the sound discretion of the juvenile judge, and the Board of County Commissioners has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile judge by appropriating an amount less than that requested.'

R.C. 2151.10 has no application to the funding of Municipal ...