Simmons v. Smith

Decision Date29 June 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:10-908-HMH-JRM
PartiesALFONZA SIMMONS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER CRAIG SMITH, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Alfonza Simmons, filed this action on April 13, 2010.1 At the time he filed this action, he was represented by counsel. Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") and also alleges state law claims under South Carolina law. Defendant is Officer Craig Smith, a deputy with the Hampton County Sheriff's Department. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on November 8, 2011. A hearing was held before the undersigned on April 23, 2012, at which time it was clarified that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se.2 At the hearing, Plaintiff was given written notice (Doc. 50) and advised, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment could result in the dismissal of his complaint. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2012.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). The moving party "bears the initial burden of pointing to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)) If the moving party carries this burden, "the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Id. at 718-19 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. While the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow thedevelopment of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that on January 26, 2009, he was at home with his adult daughter, Renee Sanders ("Sanders"). Sanders allegedly gave her father some money, asked for it back, and when Plaintiff refused to do so, she called the police. Defendant came to Plaintiff's home in response to the call. Plaintiff claims that, "rather than letting Plaintiff and daughter work out their misunderstanding, [Defendant] took advantage of the occasion to get back at Plaintiff, falsely charging him with larceny and assault, misdemeanors which had not occurred in Defendant's presence and had not occurred at all." Plaintiff claims he was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause. He also claims that on March 5, 2009, "Defendant falsely prosecuted Plaintiff wherein Plaintiff was found not guilty by a jury." Complaint, Paras. 5-10.

In his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff claims that he was lying in bed around 8:30 p.m. on January 16, 2009,3 when Sanders entered and began to curse him saying she did not think he deserved the $300 she had given him earlier that night She went to the kitchen and cursed him in a threatening manner, he followed her, and she picked up a knife and approached him. Plaintiff states that he and Sanders had a "little scuffle" and he took the knife away from her.He states that he got himself together, left his home to cool off, and called the "law" to report what happened. Plaintiff claims that Defendant called back and said he was on his way to Plaintiff's house. Plaintiff asserts that before he reached his home, Defendant saw him and placed him under arrest. Plaintiff claims that Sanders was disrespectful and disobedient, used illegal drugs in the past, and committed violent acts in the past. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Sanders "eventually" apologized for pulling a knife on him and for saying he took her money. Plaintiff's Opp. Mem.

Plaintiff alleges that: (1) his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because Defendant seized him without probable cause; (2) Defendant falsely arrested him; (3) he was maliciously prosecuted; (4) Defendant's actions constituted battery; (5) Defendant violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment as to his right to free speech and his right to criticize Defendant; and (6) Defendant's action constituted abuse of process. Defendant contends that his motion for summary judgment should be granted because: (1) he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; (3) the minimal force used to arrest Plaintiff was justified; (4) no First Amendment right of Plaintiff was violated; (5) he is entitled to qualified immunity; (6) he is entitled to summary judgment as to all state law claims in that he is a state officer and is not a proper party to any cause of action brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA"), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et seq,; (7) there is no indication that he acted outside the scope of the common law privilege to use the force necessary to take an arrestee into custody, such that Plaintiff's battery claim fails; (8) he is entitled to summary judgment as to any South Carolina false arrest/false imprisonment claim because the arrest of Plaintiff was valid on several grounds; (9) any claim for malicious prosecution under South Carolina law fails because Plaintiff has not shownmalice or a want of probable cause; and (10) Plaintiff fails to establish the required elements of a claim for abuse of process.

I. Claims Under § 1983

Plaintiff asserts claims, pursuant to § 1983, that his constitutional rights were violated, as discussed below.

A. False Arrest/Imprisonment

Plaintiff appears to allege that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was seized without probable cause and Defendant falsely arrested him. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show that his constitutional rights were violated because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

Section 1983 actions premised on alleged false arrest and/or false imprisonment claims are analyzed as unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002)(recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001)(claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment").

"The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). A warrantless arrest is valid if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed an offense, and the officer's decision that probable cause is present is reviewed under a totality of the circumstances test. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledgeare "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [individual] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). While probable cause demands "more than a mere suspicion, ... evidence sufficient to convict is not required." Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1996)(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963)). Reasonable law officers need not "resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established." Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991)(citation omitted).

In his affidavit, Defendant presents the information which led him to arrest Plaintiff. Defendant states that he was on routine patrol with his partner Deputy Teddy Scott on January 16, 2009. They were dispatched to a domestic call by radio after a 911 call reporting an assault. They responded to a call at Ruth Street in Estill, South Carolina. Upon arrival at the residence, the deputies were met by Sanders who was the adult complainant. Deputy Scott and Defendant walked up to the door where Sanders was standing in the doorway holding her baby. They walked into the house, and Defendant asked what happened. Sanders reported she had just been assaulted by her father, the Plaintiff in this action. Defendant states he noticed signs of a tussle with stuff thrown around the floor. He also observed injures to Sanders, including that her finger was bleeding, her eye was swollen with a black ring of bruising apparent at the bottom of her eye, the right side of her head had a swollen knot, and a small clump of hair appeared to have been pulled out of her scalp. Sanders stated that her father (Plaintiff), demanded money from her that she obtained in a settlement. When she refused to give him money, Plaintiff jumped on Sanders while her baby was in her arms and assaulted her by pulling her hair and punching her in her face. She stated that Plaintiff stole around $300 cash from her. Defendant Aff., Para. 2.

Def...

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