Simpson v. Commonwealth

Decision Date22 September 2022
Docket Number2021-SC-0344-MR
Citation653 S.W.3d 855
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
PartiesTHOMAS SIMPSON APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen K. Schmidt Assistant Public Advocate.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Robert Lee Baldridge Assistant Attorney General.

OPINION

VANMETER JUSTICE.

Thomas Simpson appeals as a matter of right[1] from the Muhlenberg Circuit Court judgment sentencing him to twenty-years' imprisonment for his convictions of manslaughter second degree (two counts), driving under the influence of controlled substances first offense, and persistent felony offender first degree. On appeal, Simpson raises three claims of error, none of which merit reversal. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of conviction and sentence.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On July 1, 2019, Karen Leach and Linda Embry were travelling along U.S. Route 431. The weather was clear. Simpson was driving in the opposite direction. Near South Carrolton, Simpson's vehicle crossed the center line and collided with the sedan driven by Leach. Leach was killed instantly. Embry was fatally injured and died shortly thereafter. Simpson was apparently unharmed.

As part of the investigation, Kentucky State Police ("KSP") troopers obtained a blood sample from Simpson. The results of the blood test found present in Simpson's blood 36 ng/mL of 7-aminoclonazepam, 99 ng/mL of methamphetamine, and 9.5 ng/mL of amphetamine.[2] Simpson was indicted by a Muhlenberg grand jury on two counts of wanton murder, and a single count of driving under the influence of drugs. By subsequent indictment, Simpson was charged with persistent felony offender first degree.

The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Simpson was impaired as a result of his use of methamphetamine. Simpson's defense was that the collision was a tragic accident due to his vision being diminished by a combination of direct sunlight, bad eyeglasses, and an ill-timed attempt to pull down his minivan's sun visor.

The Commonwealth called the KSP troopers who were present at the scene of the collision. Their testimony will be further described as necessary. The Commonwealth also called Courtney Carver and Dr. Gregory J. Davis to explain the process and meaning of the blood test. Carver, Forensic Scientist Specialist with the Central Forensic Laboratory, testified amphetamine is most likely a metabolite of methamphetamine when the latter drug is present in an individual's blood. Dr. Davis, Professor and Director of the University of Kentucky's Forensic Consultation Service, testified that the amount of methamphetamine present in Simpson's blood was nearly twice the limit of the therapeutic range. Dr. Davis further opined that individuals with high levels of methamphetamine in their bodies are at a higher risk of erratic driving and that the investigative evidence and toxicology laboratory evidence were consistent with Simpson "being under the influence of a combination of methamphetamine/amphetamine and 7-aminoclonazepam at the time of the collision." Dr. Davis reserved his opinion of whether Simpson was impaired at the time of the accident, drawing a distinction between "intoxication" and "impairment."[3]

After a three-day jury trial, Simpson was found guilty of two counts of manslaughter second degree,[4] of driving under the influence of controlled substances, and of persistent felony offender first degree. The jury recommended Simpson be sentenced to two consecutive terms of ten years, a recommendation that was adopted by the trial court in its judgment. Simpson now appeals from that judgment.

I. Analysis

Simpson advances three arguments. First, the KSP failed to give Simpson Miranda[5] warnings prior to questioning him at the scene and had no probable cause to request a blood draw. Second, the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror. And, finally, various errors occurred during the Commonwealth's examination of Detective Brandon McPherson. We address these arguments in turn.

A. Simpson's Blood Draw and Statements.

Simpson first claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the blood draw and the statements he made to McPherson during their interview. Review of a suppression motion involves a two-step process. First, we review the trial court's factual findings, which are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Ky. 2011). Second, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id.; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006) ("When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we utilize a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de novo standard of review for conclusions of law.").

Prior to trial, Simpson moved to suppress any statements he made while at the accident scene as well as the blood draw. Before the trial court, Simpson made much the same argument now before us: that he was in custody when he spoke to the troopers, that he was never read his Miranda rights, and that officers lacked probable cause to subject him to a blood test. The Commonwealth countered that Simpson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and that the blood draw was properly obtained either by Simpson's consent or by probable cause under Kentucky's implied consent law.

The Commonwealth called Sergeant Nick Rice, Detective Brandon McPherson, and Trooper Matt Jordan. Rice was the lead officer at the collision scene. Rice explained KSP policy as it relates to fatal accidents.[6] Following the accident, Rice explained that policy to Simpson and requested a blood draw, to which Simpson agreed. Simpson further agreed to a brief interview prior to transport to the hospital. Rice reiterated to Simpson that he was not under arrest and not in custody. Rice described Simpson as "very cooperative" and admitted it was not obvious that Simpson was intoxicated at the scene.

At Rice's direction, McPherson interviewed Simpson, placing him in the passenger seat of an unmarked official vehicle for that purpose. McPherson sat in the driver's seat, with Rice standing near the open passenger-side door.

During the interview, Simpson admitted taking Wellbutrin, a psychological medication, as well as other medications including Lortabs, Xanax and Klonopin. McPherson noted Simpson's pupils were "small and pinpointed" and his eyes were droopy. The only medication Simpson admitted to taking the day of the accident was a muscle relaxer. The interview with Simpson was brief- lasting approximately nine minutes-as the KSP needed to take Simpson to the hospital for the blood draw. McPherson did not perform any field sobriety tests on Simpson but explained that KSP's policy in a fatal accident is to request all involved drivers to submit to a blood draw.

Trooper Jordan testified that he transported Simpson to the hospital for the blood draw. Jordan did not handcuff Simpson before placing him in the cruiser, as was procedure for individuals under arrest. At the hospital, Jordan read Kentucky's implied-consent warning to Simpson, observed the blood test, and drove Simpson back to his home afterwards.

Based on the testimony of the officers, the trial court overruled Simpson's motion, finding that Simpson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and determining that the question of the blood draw's legality turned on the existence of probable cause. In finding the existence of probable cause, the court pointed to the facts that Simpson had just been involved in a major collision, was unsure of his role in that collision, had admitted to taking some medications, and had pinpoint pupils. All these factors, in the trial court's view, supported a finding of probable cause. The trial court accordingly denied Simpson's motion.

1. Custodial Interrogation. As to whether Simpson was in custody such that he needed to be provided with Miranda warnings prior to his interview, "the question of 'custody' is reviewed de novo." Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 846 (Ky. 2013) (citing Alkabala-Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 255 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2008)).

The Supreme Court "adhere[s] to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, (1980).

Relevant circumstances include the place, time, and duration of the questioning; the questioning's tenor, whether cordial and neutral or harsh and accusatory; the individual's statements; the presence or absence of physical restraints; whether there was a threatening presence of several officers and a display of weapons or physical force; and the extent to which the questioner sought the individual's cooperation or otherwise informed him that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 846.

We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Simpson was not in custody during his interview with McPherson. The interview was brief, only about nine minutes long, and consisted of McPherson asking Simpson general questions regarding where he lived, what he thought happened, and what medications he was on. The interview occurred with McPherson in the driver's seat of an unmarked SUV, Rice near the open passenger door, and Simpson unrestrained in the passenger seat. McPherson reiterated to Simpson prior to the interview that he was not under arrest nor was he being detained. Only when "a reasonable...

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