Simpson v. Loftin
| Decision Date | 09 January 1948 |
| Parties | SIMPSON et al. v. LOFTIN et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; A. D. McNeill Judge.
J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., T. Paine Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J Henry Blount, of Jacksonville, Co. Atty., for appellants.
Russell L Frink and Samuel Kassewitz, both of Jacksonville, for appellees.
Appellees as complainants filed their amended bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Duval County to restrain appellants as defendants, from collecting taxes levied and assessed by them against certain tangible and intangible personal property held by complainants on the first day of January 1942 in their capacity as Trustees for the Esat Coast Railway Company. Epitomizing from the amended bill of complaint, the chancellor in his final decree catalogued said assessments as follows:
(1) '1942 Intangible Property Tax:
Amount
Value of Tax
Class A ........ $2,311,110.00 $115.55
Class B ........... 769,150.00 769.15
Class D ........... 557,030.00 557.03
Total ................. $1,441.03
(2) 1942 Tangible Personal Property Tax:
10% Penalty (Failure Amount
to Value the of Tax
Return) ........... $2400.00 36.01
3.60
Total ................. $39.61
and for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 as follows:
(3) 1943 Intangible Property Tax:
Amount
Value of Tax
Class A ........ $7,305,660.00 $365.28
Class B ........... 766,220.00 766.22
Class D ........... 941,870.00 941.87
Total ................. $2,073.37
(4) 1944 Intangible Property Tax:
Amount
Value of Tax
Class A ........ $18,330,140.00 $916.50
Class B ............ 766,330.00 766.33
Class D .......... 1,016,920.00 1,016.92
Total .................. $2,699.75
(5) 1945 Intangible Property Tax:
Amount
Value of Tax
Class A ........ $24,121,520.00 $1,206.08
Class B ............ 759,270.00 759.27
Class D .......... 1,252,950.00 1,252.95
Total .................. $3,218.30
Motions to dismiss the amended bill were overruled and separate answers were filed by each defendant in which all material allegations were denied. The answer of the Comptroller denied that the intangible personal property held by the plaintiffs as trustees were assessed by him as Comptroller or by the Railroad Assessment Board of which he was a member. A Master was appointed to take testimony and make findings of law and fact. In one of the most comprehensive reports we have had occasion to examine the master found both law and fact to be in favor of the plaintiffs and held the assessments to be illegal and void.
Exceptions to the Master's report were overruled and a final decree was entered by the chancellor confirming the master's report. The final decree not only adjudicated the intangible personal property assessments for the years 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 to be illegal and void, it enjoined the Tax Collector of Duval County from issuing any process or otherwise attempting the collection of said taxes. This appeal is from the final decree.
It may be stated at the outset that there is no attempt here to evade payment of the taxes in question, neither is there any dispute about the amount or classification of the taxes. It appears admitted that the amounts assessed are perhaps correct. The whole controversy here revolves around that of who should legally impose and collect the taxes in question, the taxing officers of Duval County, or the Comptroller or the Railway Assessment Board.
The Comptroller was made a party to the amended bill of complaint because the original bill prayed cancellation of the second item listed above, being a $36.01 assessment on personal property. The said property was furnishings in the general offices of the Trustees for the East Coast Railway Company and their Counsel in the Graham Building in Jacksonville. Section 200.40, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S. A., contemplates that when personal property of this class is in litigation on account of taxes, the comptroller be made a party thereto and there was no objection to making him a party to this suit. In his report the Master held that the tangible personal properties represented by item 2 above, were owned and held by the East Coast Railway exclusively for railroad purposes and under the law were assessable by the Comptroller or the Railway Assessment Board. The Chancellor approved the Master's findings and in his final decree voided the assessments, no assignment of error having been based thereon, the Chancellor's decree became final as to this item.
The question of taxability of the item of tangible personal properties being concluded, there remains nothing to be adjudicated but the assault on the assessment of intangible personal properties detailed in items one, three, four and five above. In our view these items represent properties held and used exclusively for operating purposes and the taxes on them must be assessed and imposed by the Comptroller or the Railroad Assessment Board, and the County taxing authorities of Duval County have no authority whatever to impose taxes on them.
This affirmation is predicated on Section 195.01, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., under which what is commonly known as the unit system for taxing railroad properties was inaugurated. In so far as applicable here, this act requires every
The act further provides that if such returns are not made to the Comptroller in the manner provided, then the Comptroller, Attorney General and the State Treasurer (Railroad Assessment Borad) shall assess the properties from the best information available and specify the value thereof to each county and the value of the locomotives, engines, passenger, parlor freight, platform, construction and other cars and appurtenances shall be apportioned by the Comptroller, pro rata to each mile of main track, branch, switch, spur track and side track and the Comptroller shall notify the County Tax Assessor of each county through which such railroad runs, the number of miles of track and the value thereof,...
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