Dade County v. Dupont Plaza, Inc., 59-611

• Decision Date: 11 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. 59-611,59-611
• Parties: DADE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. DUPONT PLAZA, INC., a Florida corporation, and Silver Sands Motel, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 849

117 So.2d 849

DADE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. DUPONT PLAZA, INC., a Florida corporation, and Silver Sands Motel, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 59-611.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 11, 1960.

Rehearing Denied March 2,1960.

Darrey A. Davis and William W. Gibbs, Miami, for appellants.

Sibley, Grusmark, Barkdull & King, Miami Beach, for appellees.

CARROLL, CHAS., Judge.

The interlocutory order appealed from by the county granted the application of certain taxpayers to restrain certification of the tax roll for 1959 as to certain real estate owned by those taxpayers, thus preventing the assessment on their property from becoming final.

The alleged invalidity of the assessment was not that it was void, for which suit could be filed at any time (Hackney v. McKenney, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524), but that it was arbitrarily and grossly excessive, ¹ for which claim of invalidity the time for filing suit was limited by statute to suits instituted 'within sixty days from the time the assessment shall become final.' Sec. 192.21, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. ² Certification of the roll by the county commissioners and delivery of the assessment roll to the tax collector and state comptroller, which the injunctive order prevented, would have conferred finality on the roll, under §§ 193.29 and 193.30, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

In seeking reversal of the restraining order the appellants placed their principal reliance and arguments on two points. They contended that there was no basis to halt the completion of the assessment and that a suit to invalidate the assessment on the plaintiffs' real estate could only be filed within a period of 60 days from the time the assessment became final; and that the assessment in question has not yet become final. Appellants also contended that the injunctive order should be reversed for failure to join the state comptroller, whose presence as a party was made a condition of maintenance of such a suit, by statute.

It was contended by the appellees that the 60 day period for filing suit under § 192.21, means only that suit can not be filed after 60 days from the date the roll becomes final, but that the statute does not prohibit such suits when filed before the 60 day period limited for suit by the statute. That argument is without support. We hold, on our own construction of the meaning and intent of the statute, and on the authority of Rudisill v. City of Tampa, 151 Fla. 284, 9 So.2d 380, that a suit to avoid an assessment on the ground asserted in this case may be filed only during the 60 dayhs period 'from the time the assessment becomes final,' and not before that prescribed period. See, also, Nash v. Merritt Island Lumber Co., Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 677.

In the Rudisill case, where the claim was that an assessment was so grossly excessive as to constitute a fraud, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the restricted period allowed by statute for such suits, and said:

'Property owners are obligated to know that their property is liable for taxes. Property owners are afforded a method of law to appear before administrative officers and obtain a fair and just assessment of their property.

'It is indispensable to government that taxes be assessed and collected. The legislature is charged with the duty of providing a uniform and equal rate of taxation. Section 1, Article IX, Florida Constitution [F.S.A.] The legislature is necessarily vested with power to enact necessary laws to secure a prompt collection of the annual tax. In the exercise of such powers they must not invade the constitutional rights of the property owner. Provision is made here however, for the owner to make return of his property and value same for taxation. He has further remedy to petition the equalization board for appropriate relief. He is allowed a minimum of thirty days ³ from the final act of the administrative officers to resort to the courts if he feels aggrieved by the administrative taxing authorities. While the time may appear relatively short, nevertheless it cannot be said that the time fixed by the legislature is so unreasonable as to amount to depriving him of his property without due process.

'The legislature perhaps realized that unless the assessment was made final within a relatively short period of time the collection would be impaired thereby resulting in further inequalities in the burdens of taxpayers to sustain the cost of government.'

These pronouncements by the court in the Rudisill case, expressing as they do the reasons for prompt disposition of such questions, and for restricting the time for filing suits seeking to have assessments declared invalid, show even more reason why such a suit to enjoin an assessment for claimed excessiveness should not be allowed in the form of an effort to prevent the making and completion of the assessment. By suing before the assessment is final, a taxpayer could avoid the requirement that the amount which he concedes to be proper shall be filed or paid in advance, and, more...