Simpson v. Matesanz

• Citation: 29 F.Supp.2d 11
• Decision Date: 12 November 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97-11017-NG.
• Parties: William Harry SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. James MATESANZ, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

29 F.Supp.2d 11

William Harry SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. James MATESANZ, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 97-11017-NG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 12, 1998.

William Harry Simpson, Norfolk, VA, pro se.

Pamela L. Hunt, Attorney General's Office, Criminal Bureau, William J Duensing, Assistant Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Respondent.

ORDER

GERTNER, District Judge.

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum and Order, the Petitioner's Motion for Habeas Corpus [docket # 1] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a case in which every single attempt to define reasonable doubt in the jury instructions was, by current constitutional standards, problematic, and in which the instructions as a whole were very likely to have conveyed to the jury an unconstitutional conception of the government's burden of proof. If we are to mean it when we say that such errors are fundamentally at odds with a fair trial, then we must apply current norms retroactively and unflinchingly. No matter how heinous the crime, or how daunting the prospect of staging a new trial, a proper conviction was never rendered, and a new trial must be ordered.

Petitioner William Harry Simpson ("Simpson"), here challenges the reasonable doubt instructions given at his 1974 state trial for first degree murder, armed robbery and breaking and entering. Because the errors in the instructions are so profound, and are so central to the fairness of his trial, Simpson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 31, 1974, Simpson was convicted in Worcester Superior Court of first degree murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering. He was sentenced to life without parole. Simpson filed a timely notice of appeal. Then, on March 21, 1975, Simpson filed a motion for a new trial. The new trial motion was denied one week later, and Simpson appealed that denial as well. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") heard the appeal of both the conviction and the denial of the new trial motion under the authority of M.G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. Simpson did not challenge the jury instructions in either appeal. The SJC affirmed the conviction and denial of the motion for a new trial on April 9, 1976. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 120, 345 N.E.2d 899 (1976).

Simpson moved for a new trial five more times. The first time he complained that the reasonable doubt instruction was in error, however, apart from his objection at trial,¹ was in his third new trial motion, made on April 25, 1988. That motion was denied on September 19, 1988. He raised the issue again in his fourth motion for a new trial, made on November 3, 1988. When that motion too was denied he sought leave to appeal from a single justice of the SJC, as required by M.G.L. c. 278, § 33E. On October 15, 1990, Justice Greaney denied his motion for leave to appeal, claiming that he was "persuaded by the arguments in the Commonwealth's opposition memorandum that the defendant has not demonstrated that any of the issues which he now seeks to raise are new or substantial." Commonwealth v. Simpson, SJC for Suffolk County No. 90-274.

After Justice Greaney denied him leave to appeal, Simpson again moved for a new trial, again claiming jury instruction errors, in 1992 and in 1994. Both motions were denied. He moved for reconsideration of the denial of the sixth motion twice. Leave to appeal was again denied, for the final time, by a single justice of the SJC on October 30, 1997.

This is Simpson's first habeas petition before this Court. He argues that he has exhausted his state remedies, and that this Court should consider his challenge to the reasonable doubt instructions given to the jury at his trial. The judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, which Simpson contests, read as follows (with the sentences numbered, and phrases that are the subject of this challenge underlined and lettered):

Now, the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" are a legal shorthand expression that stand for the degree of certainty that is required before a jury may convict a person, any person, of a crime, any crime. [2] It means that after weighing the testimony, evaluating whether you are going to believe any, part, all or none of any witness' story, after examining the exhibits, after hearing the whole case, the evidence that you have heard discussed amongst yourselves, you must, all 12 of you, [a] be sure that he is guilty. [3] Otherwise, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and must be acquitted.

Now, when I say sure, I don't mean that the commonwealth has to prove a defendant's guilt to an absolute or mathematical certainty. [5] That is not what we mean by beyond a reasonable doubt .[6] But what we mean rather is that when all is said and done in your jury room, after you have gone over the testimony, the exhibits, after you have taken into consideration the law as I explain it to you, [b] you must be sure to a moral certainty, [c] to that same degree of certainty which you would want when you have had to make decisions of importance in your own lives. [7] After you have discussed the evidence thoroughly amongst yourselves, [d] if you have any serious unanswered questions about the defendant's guilt, then he must be given the benefit of the doubt.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Out of consideration for comity and federalism, a federal court will not engage in habeas review when the petitioner is being held pursuant to a state court judgment that is based on an independent and adequate state-law ground. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). A petitioner's procedural default in state court is a "typical" example of an independent and adequate ground that bars federal habeas review. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 118 S.Ct. 478, 480, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997).

1. Waiver

Simpson argues that the Commonwealth has waived its procedural default argument by failing to raise it in its initial motion to dismiss in this case, filed on October 8, 1997. Simpson correctly points out that the petitioner's procedural default is an affirmative defense that the state normally must raise or lose. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165-66, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). But the Commonwealth cannot be said to have waived its procedural default defense by focusing exclusively on Simpson's failure to exhaust state remedies since such a focus was obviously warranted at the time.

In footnote one in its initial motion before this Court, the Commonwealth said: "Since it is clear from the face of the petition that the petitioner has failed to exhaust available state remedies, the Superintendent and the Commissioner will not, in the interest of economy, address any additional defenses." Federal courts generally are barred from granting writs of habeas corpus to persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of state courts unless the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available in state courts. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).² See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-69, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).

The Commonwealth's focus on the exhaustion issue was entirely appropriate. When Simpson filed his habeas motion, in April 1997, his application for leave to appeal the denial of his second motion for reconsideration (of the denial of his sixth motion for a new trial) was still pending. It was not denied by a single justice of the SJC until October 30, 1997, almost three weeks after the Commonwealth filed its initial motion to dismiss on exhaustion grounds. Had Simpson's final state court motion not been denied, thereby effecting the exhaustion of Simpson's state remedies, I would have been constrained to allow the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth's choice to focus only on the non-exhaustion issue was a perfectly reasonable attempt to deal with an obvious threshold issue. Since it has not prejudiced Simpson in any way, I will not penalize the Commonwealth for it.

2. Procedural Default

a. Failure to Pass the Gatekeeper

The Commonwealth argues that Simpson procedurally defaulted because he failed, on three separate occasions, to demonstrate to a "gatekeeper" justice of the SJC that his claims were "new" and "substantial." See Leaster v. Commonwealth 385 Mass. 547, 432 N.E.2d 708 (1982) (first describing the single justice's power, under M.G.L. c. 278 § 33E, to grant or deny leave to appeal capital cases after the first appeal as a "gatekeeper" function). See also M.G.L. c. 278 § 33E, which reads in relevant part as follows "If any motion [in a capital case] is filed in the superior court after rescript [by the SJC], no appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice of the [SJC] on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question which ought to be determined by the full court."

The Commonwealth correctly points out that the gatekeeper's role is to "screen out appeals that lack merit," Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 584, 583 N.E.2d 849 (1992), and that within the state system, the gatekeeper's denial of a defendant's petition for leave to appeal to the SJC is final and unreviewable, Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397 Mass. 705, 710-11, 493 N.E.2d 837 (1986) (citing Leaster). Nevertheless, it wrongly infers that the gatekeeper's denial of leave to appeal always amounts to a procedural default for habeas purposes.

The Commonwealth cites my opinion in Andrews v. Matesanz to support the proposition that a gatekeeper's denial of leave to appeal can be a "clear independent and adequate state ground for denying the petitioner's motion for a new trial." U.S.D.C. No. 96-11859-NG, slip op. at 9 (May 1, 1997) (internal quotations omitted)...