Simpson v. Pontotoc Common C. Line School Dist. No. 31

• Decision Date: 06 June 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 6846.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 275 S.W. 449
• Parties: SIMPSON et al. v. PONTOTOC COMMON COUNTY LINE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 31 et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 449

275 S.W. 449

SIMPSON et al. v. PONTOTOC COMMON COUNTY LINE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 31 et al.

(No. 6846.)^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

June 6, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Llano County; J. H. McLean, Judge.

Suit by Elmo Simpson and others against Pontotoc Common County Line School District No. 31 and others for a judicial decree. Suit dismissed on demurrer, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

F. J. Johnson, of Llano, and Will G. Barber, of San Marcos, for appellants.

Runge & Runge, of Mason, and C. D. Jessup, of Houston, for appellees.

McCLENDON, C. J.

The Thirty-Eighth Legislature, by special act effective April 4 1923 (Acts 38th Leg. c. 99), created Pontotoc common county line school district No. 31 out of portions of Llano, Mason, and San Saba counties. Besides defining the boundaries of the district, placing its management under the jurisdiction of Llano county, and providing for the first election of trustees and other specified elections, not necessary to enumerate, the act applied the general laws of the state in regard to such districts to the government of the district. The boundaries of the district embraced all of Field Creek district No. 8 in Llano county, a prior district No. 31 in Mason and San Saba counties, and a part of Cold Creek district No. 24 in San Saba county; and the act abolished the first two districts named.

This suit was brought by a large number of plaintiffs made up of: (1) Resident citizens, qualified voters, and property taxpayers in Field Creek district and the portion of Llano county embraced in the Pontotoc district; (2) parents of children of scholastic age residing in the portion of the district in Llano county; (3) minors within the scholastic age residing in Llano county and Field Creek district; and (4) two regularly elected trustees of Field Creek district whose qualification and action as such the act prevented. The defendants were the Pontotoc district and its trustees and the judge and commissioners of Llano county. The relief sought was a judicial decree:

(1) Declaring void and dissolving the Pontotoc district.

(2) Enjoining (a) the exercise of any office or function. (b) the assessment or collection of any tax, and (c) the issue of any bonds or other obligations under the act.

(3) Authorizing the Field Creek district to exercise its duties, powers, and privileges, and the defendant trustees thereof to qualify as such.

There was also a prayer for general relief.

The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition; and plaintiffs declining to amend, the suit was dismissed. From this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.

The first question which plaintiffs present in their petition, and the one upon which the greatest stress is laid, is that the special act creating the district is void in that its necessary effect is to divert the proportionate part of the school fund derived from Llano county school lands to which the Llano county scholastics residing in the district are entitled. The petition alleges, in this connection, that the four leagues of school land allotted to Llano county have never been sold, that such lands are now reasonably worth $500,000, that the present annual revenue therefrom amounts to more than $5 per capita to the scholastics living in the county, and that this value and per capita revenue will increase; whereas, the school lands of Mason and San Saba counties have been sold, the former for $13,260, and the latter for $100,000, the annual revenue from the funds thus created only amounts to 50 cents and $1 per capita for the Mason and San Saba county scholastics respectively, and these principal sums and per capita amounts will not increase. The necessary effect of the act, it is claimed, will be to place the revenues from these funds in one general fund for maintenance of all the schools to be shared in equally by all the scholastics in the district, to the detriment of the scholastics of Llano county. It is further contended that at least a part of these revenues will necessarily be expended in support of a school or schools outside the county to which it belongs, and that this also will constitute an unlawful diversion of such fund.

Appellants' first seven propositions, which raise these contentions, and their supporting authorities, follow:

"1. While the very existence of a municipal corporation (such as a county) is subject to legislative control, yet its property, owned or held for other than strictly governmental purposes, is not so subject, and even more clearly is it fundamentally true that the vested rights of beneficiaries of a trust, of which it may be trustee, are protected by the guaranty of the United States Constitution against impairment of contracts. Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153; Galveston Co. v. Tankersley, 39 Tex. 651; State of Indiana v. Springfield Township, 6 Ind. 83; Davis v. Indiana, 94 U. S. 792, 24 L. Ed. 320; Butler v. Chariton County Ct., 13 Mo. 112; Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 612-614; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dec. 748; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515, and note at 531; Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38; Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515; Plymouth v. Jackson, 15 Pa. 44; 12 C. J. 1003, § 623; Id. 1006, § 628; 15 A. & E. Enc. of Law, 1046-1049; Abbott's Mun. Corp. vol. 1, §§ 96-97; Id. vol. 3, §§ 935-936; Dillon's Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) §§ 66-68.

"2. The grant by the state of Texas to Llano county of the four leagues of school land, being complete and executed, became and is a contract within the purview of article 1, § 10, of the United States Constitution, denying to the states power to pass any law `impairing obligation of contracts.' Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153; Galveston Co. v. Tankersley, 39 Tex. 651; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. Ed. 650; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, 3 L. Ed. 735; Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 697-698, 4 L. Ed. 629; Graded School v. Trustees, 95 Ky. 436, 26 S. W. 10; R. C. L. vol. 6, p. 338, § 331.

"3. In applying the prohibition of the United States Constitution as to impairment of contracts, a voluntary grant by the state stands on no different footing than a similar grant by an individual. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440; In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435; Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467, 475, 20 A. 820, 10 L. R. A. 405, and note; Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 410; State v. Whitney, 66 Wash. 473, 120 P. 116; State v. Board, 183 Ala. 565, 567, 63 So. 76; State v. Westerfield, 23 Nev. 468, 49 P. 119.

"4. A state may no more impair the obligation of a contract through its Constitution than through legislative acts. Wright v. Giles, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 550, 129 S. W. 1168; Grigsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 149; Vorhies v. Mayor, 70 Tex. 339, 7 S. W. 679; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 623, 21 L. Ed. 212; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 652, 20 L. Ed. 685; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 515, 19 L. Ed. 997; U. S. v. Jefferson Co., Fed. Cas. No. 15,472, 1 McCrary, 362; Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 410; Wade on Retroactive Laws, 53, 56; 12 C. J. p. 988, § 595; Elliott on Contracts, § 2717; R. C. L. vol. 6, p. 331, § 323.

"5. The cited provision of the United States Constitution is violated whenever there is any invasion of the effect of the asserted contract `in however small a particular,' and it is not required that the contract be entirely or even materially impinged upon. Story on the Constitution, vol. 2, § 1385; Sutherland's Stat. Const. § 474; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327, 12 L. Ed. 447; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 2, 5 L. Ed. 547; Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190, 54 Am. Dec. 379.

"6. By virtue of the provision of the state Constitution of 1876, the four leagues of land became `of right' the property of Llano county, with legal title vested in it, but with provision that `said lands and the proceeds thereof, when sold, shall be held by said counties alone as a trust for the benefit of the public schools therein'; and the reasonable, natural and necessary result of the facts alleged in plaintiffs' original petition is to divert part of this fund belonging to Llano county from the `public schools therein,' and to apply same to education of children of Mason and San Saba counties. (Emphasis ours.) Constitution of Texas 1876, art. 7, § 6; State of Indiana v. Springfield Township, 6 Ind. 83; Butler v. Chariton Co. Ct., 13 Mo. 112; Graded School v. Trustees, 95 Ky. 436, 26 S. W. 10; People v. Board, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 400; Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608; Board of Education v. Bakewell, 122 Ill. 339, 351, 10 N. E. 378; Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush (Ky.) 259; State v. Westerfield, 23 Nev. 468, 49 P. 119; Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758; Davis v. Indiana, 94 U. S. 792, 24 L. Ed. 320; Springfield Township v. Quick, 22 How. 68, 56 L. Ed. 16.

"7. The effect of the grant to Llano county of the four leagues of land, when read in connection with section 6, art. 7, of the Constitution of the state, was (as to said lands and all income therefrom) to make same of right (1) the property of said county as distinct from the state, (2) a trust fund for benefit alone of the public schools to be conducted in that county, and (3) for benefit only of scholastics residing within Llano county. Board of Trustees v. Webb County (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. 486; Elwood v. Stallcup, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 347, 122 S. W. 906; Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 111 S. W. 726; Comanche County v. Burks (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 470."

With the exception of the underscored portion of appellants' sixth proposition, these propositions from 1 to 7 inclusive are well supported by authority and are sustained. The history of the four-league county land grants and their legal status are set forth in Milam County v. Bateman and the other Texas cases cited. It will not be necessary to restate these matters, as the effect of these grants as deduced from...