Simpson v. State
| Decision Date | 08 March 1921 |
| Citation | 81 Fla. 292,87 So. 920 |
| Parties | SIMPSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Bay County; C. L. Wilson, Judge.
Joe Simpson was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit rape, and he brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Presumption of criminal intent from commission of unlawful act inapplicable to crimes involving specific intent; where specific intent necessary burden is on state. A presumption of a criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of an unlawful act, but the general rule that, if it is proved that the accused committed the unlawful act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, does not apply in the case of crimes like burglary, assault with intent to kill or rape, for which a specific intent is necessary. Here the burden is on the state to prove affirmatively either by direct or circumstantial evidence that the act was done with the requisite specific intent.
Commission of act does not raise presumption of specific intent in offenses where such intent necessary. Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense, the doing of the act does not raise a presumption that it was done with that specific intent.
Where statute makes offense to consist of act combined with particular intent such intent must be proved. Where a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent is just as necessary to be proven as the act itself, and must be found by the jury as a matter of fact before a conviction can be had, and especially, when the offense created by the statute consisting of the act and the intent, constitutes substantially an attempt to commit some higher offense than that which the defendant has succeeded in accomplishing by it.
Where defendant indicted for commission of one offense with intent to commit another, prosecution must prove such intent. Where a defendant is indicted for the commission of an offense with intent to commit another, as for instance rape, it devolves upon the prosecution to prove some act or deed evidencing such intent in order to warrant conviction of the defendant.
Allegation and proof of intent essential in prosecution of breaking and entering with intent to commit rape. The allegation of the intent in this case was an essential and material allegation and it was necessary for the prosecution to prove facts in order to show beyond a reasonable doubt what that intent was.
Evidence insufficient to sustain conviction for breaking and entering dwelling house with intent to rape. In a prosecution for breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit rape, evidence held insufficient to show the specific intent.
Mathis & Weeks, of Bonifay, for plaintiff in error.
Van C Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and D. Stuart Gillis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The assignments of error present two questions. The first challenges the verdict as being 'a meaningless mixture of misspelled words and signs conveying no idea or intention.' The original verdict is before us, and, while the writing is not modeled on Spencerian lines, and its orthography not sanctioned by Worcester or Webster, it can nevertheless be interpreted as: --which is sufficient.
The defendant was convicted on a charge of breaking and entering a dwelling house 'with intent to commit a felony, to wit, the crime of rape,' etc. From the agreed statement of facts set out in the bill of exceptions it appears that Will Brown, the husband of the lady against whom it is claimed the attempted assault was directed, while working at a turpentine camp, because dangerously ill, and upon his wife being notified by wire she came with her children to the place where her husband was employed. A shanty at the camp was provided for the temporary occupation of Mrs. Brown and children. Joe Simpson, the defendant, only a few months before the alleged offense, had lived in and occupied the same shanty. Simpson got drunk frequently, and was drunk the early part of the night of the alleged offense. He testified that he was drinking on the night of the alleged offense and that he had no recollection of going to the shanty occupied by Mrs. Brown or to his own home; that he had no recollection of opening the window; that when he lived in that shanty he often opened a window after his return home to avoid arousing his wife; and that he had no recollection of entering or attempting to enter the shanty occupied by Mrs. Brown.
With regard to what happened the statement recites:
'Mrs. Brown was awakened by some one attempting to enter her bedroom through a window to the shanty occupied by her; that she saw a man in the window in the act of entering the room where she was; that the window had been closed prior to the time that she had retired and fastened from the inside; that the fastening was such that in opening the window the house was shaken, awakening Mrs. Brown; that she struck a light only a few inches from the face of the man in the window; that, seeing a man entering her bedroom, she immediately raised an alarm by screaming several times; that the man who had climbed into the window and was in the act of entering the room immediately receded and left the window and premises and disappeared; that she recognized the defendant, Joe Simpson, as being the person who was in the act of entering her bedroom through the window.'
This is all the testimony as to what happened at the house occupied by Mrs. Brown.
The breaking into the dwelling and the attempt to enter were proven. What his intention was in breaking and attempting to enter has to be presumed, as there is not a particle of evidence direct or circumstantial to prove the intent, independent of the acts of breaking and attempting to enter.
There are many felonies, any one or all of which he may have intended to commit, but the prosecution selected rape, and so charged him.
If the evidence is sufficient to support that charge, it would support a charge of intent to commit murder, arson,...
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Jones v. State
...defendant told police that he fired his gun into the ground and not at deceased; manslaughter conviction reversed); Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920 (1921) (state's evidence deemed insufficient to establish that defendant had a specific criminal intent to commit rape when he broke ......
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United States v. Henderson, 7793.
...Criminal Law, 8 Harv.L.Rev. 317; Puttkammer, Consent in Criminal Assault, 19 Ill.L. Rev. 617. Specific Intent: See, e. g., Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920. Breaking and Entering: 4 Bl.Comm., Cooley's 4th Ed.1899, *226, *227. Taking and Carrying Away: See, e. g., State v. Rozeboom,......
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State v. Waters
...from the circumstances presented here. However, another logical inference might be that Mr. Waters intended to commit some other offense. Simpson, supra. [Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920 (1921).] That being the case, his conviction for attempted burglary with the intent to commit ......
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State v. Daniels
...intent, i.e., the intentional pulling of the trigger.) Cf., also, State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14. The case of Simpson v. State, 1921, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920, 922, furnishes a pertinent illustration of the appellate review of proof of specific intent. In that case, a conviction of ......