Simpson v. Thompson
Decision Date | 20 July 2012 |
Docket Number | NO. 2011-CA-001726-MR,NO. 2011-CA-001727-MR,2011-CA-001726-MR,2011-CA-001727-MR |
Parties | MELISSA GAIL SIMPSON, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES FANCHER APPELLANT v. KEVIN THOMPSON; RONDAL SHIRLEY; SCOTT GORDON; JIMMY SHIVE; AND GREG WILSON APPELLEES |
Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS FROM METCALFE CIRCUIT COURT
This matter was originally filed in Metcalfe Circuit Court on March 7, 2008, as a Kentucky negligence action.1 Later on March 4, 2009, this matter was re-filed in the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky, as both a Kentucky negligence action and 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1983 civil rights action based upon the same operative facts.2 On or about October 27, 2010, the Federal Court summarily dismissed the aforementioned 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim but declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining Kentucky negligence claim. See Simpson v. Thompson, No. 1:09-CV-00031-TBR, 2010 WL 4365573 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2010) (slip copy). On January 18, 2011, the remaining Kentucky negligence claim was re-filed in Metcalfe Circuit Court.3 This newaction alleged the same operative facts and the same negligence claim as those asserted in the previous action filed in that court; consequently, the two actions were consolidated.
Finally, after the circuit court dismissed the two consolidated actions through a single order of summary judgment, the appellants filed two notices of appeal (one for each of the consolidated actions). Each notice named as the sole appellant "Melissa Gail Simpson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles David Fancher," and, as appellees, "Kevin Thompson, Rondal Shirley, Scott Gordon, Jimmy Shive, and Greg Wilson."4
With that said, the parties agree that the Federal Court's order of summary judgment in Simpson, 2010 WL 4365573, accurately summarized the relevant facts of this case:
At both the federal and state level, the Estate argued that the manner in which Fancher was restrained was a substantial factor in causing Fancher's death. To that end, the Estate produced the opinion of Dr. Karl Williams, who believed that the method of Fancher's restraint, in conjunction with his intoxication, possible exhaustion from arrest, and what the medical examiner had discovered was Fancher's enlarged heart had resulted in Fancher's "accidental" death from "positional asphyxiation." The Estate also produced an opinion from a private investigator, Eddie Railey, stating Railey's belief that the method used to restrain Fancher was, under the circumstances, a breach of the applicable standard of care.
As noted previously, the Estate's suit began as a Kentucky negligence action, but evolved into a federal suit alleging both a Kentucky negligence claim and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. When the Federal Court dismissed the Estate's action, it dismissed the § 1983 claims with prejudice on the basis of sovereign immunity (to the extent they were asserted against Metcalfe County and its sheriff's office) and qualified immunity (to the extent they were asserted against Thompson, Shirley, Gordon, and Shive in their individual capacities).
When the Estate re-filed its Kentucky negligence action in Metcalfe Circuit Court, the appellees raised the same defenses of sovereign and qualified immunity, along with a defense of res judicata, and moved for summary judgment on those bases. Thereafter, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, but its final order of summary judgment essentially stated nothing more than that (i.e., it specified no basis). This appeal followed.
Summary judgment serves to terminate litigation where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. It is well established that a party responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot merely rest on the allegations in his pleadings. Continental Casualty Co. v.Belknap Hardware & Manufacturing Co., 281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1955). "[S]peculation and supposition are insufficient to justify a submission of a case to the jury, and . . . the question should be taken from the jury when the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to resort to surmise and speculation." O'Bryan v. Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006) (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Yates, 239 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Ky. 1951)). "'Belief' is not evidence and does not create an issue of material fact." Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1990); see also Haugh v. City of Louisville, 242 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Ky. App. 2007) () Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Ky. 1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
On appeal, we must consider the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must further consider whether the circuit court correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving part...
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