Simpson v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civ. A. No. 87-460.
Decision Date | 28 June 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-460. |
Citation | 688 F. Supp. 765 |
Parties | Cheryl SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Ronald Gilchrist, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Fredric H. Schuster, Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
Presently before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. In consideration of defendant's motion, the opposition thereto, the entire record of this case, and for the following reasons, the Court shall grant defendant's motion.
On February 24, 1984, plaintiff stepped off a subway train operated by defendant, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), and fell through the gap between the subway car and the platform of the Judiciary Square Station. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in "permitting the gap to remain for a long time." Complaint ¶ 5. Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to properly inspect and maintain the train alignment and platform position in a safe condition. Plaintiff demands $1 million in damages for injuries including "acute lubosacral sic strain, contusion, hematoma, left knee, thigh and leg and other physical injuries." Complaint ¶ 11.
Given the sparseness of the allegations in the complaint, at the hearing considering the summary judgment motion, the Court specifically questioned plaintiff's counsel concerning the theories under which plaintiff was pursuing her case. Counsel indicated that plaintiff alleged negligent design, failure on the part of defendant to adequately control the crowds, and the driver inattention to plaintiff's plight. The Court will address plaintiff's allegations of negligent design. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to maintain the platform and train's alignment. Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8. The Court specifically questioned plaintiff's counsel regarding exactly in what manner plaintiff alleges that WMATA failed in operating and maintaining the subway system allegedly causing plaintiff's injuries. Counsel replied that WMATA failed to maintain and operate the system by permitting the subway car to become overcrowded. As such, the Court will liberally construe paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint as alleging failure on the part of defendant to control the crowd which allegedly resulted in plaintiff's inability to discern the gap. Finally, plaintiff never properly pled the allegation of driver inattention to her plight. As such, the allegation is not truly before the Court. However, in fairness to plaintiff, the Court will address the issue.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) a court shall render summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." The United States Supreme Court recently provided significant guidance as to those circumstances in which summary judgment is appropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court stated that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issues of material fact." Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (emphasis in the original). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of fact. Id. at 2514. The party opposing the summary judgment motion, however, must present "affirmative evidence" in order to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. Id. The Court shall grant a properly supported summary judgment motion if the moving party demonstrates a lack of genuine triable issues of material fact. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2555.
In this jurisdiction, courts have interpreted this section to mean that the signatories to the Compact—Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia—have "conferred their respective sovereign immunities ... on WMATA, and those entities had then partially waived those immunities in Section 80 of the Compact ... and the question whether the function in question is `governmental' or `proprietary' under Section 80 is one of federal law." Sanders v. WMATA, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.Cir. 1987) ( ); see Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 73-74 (D.C.Cir. 1987) ( ); Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 220 (D.C.Cir.1986) ( ). Discretionary decisions or planning decisions constitute governmental functions for which WMATA is immune from suit. See Nathan v. WMATA, 653 F.Supp. 247, 248 (D.D.C.1986) ( ).
It is clear that WMATA's design decision concerning the distance of the gap between the platform and the subway train constitutes a discretionary decision and falls squarely within the parameters of WMATA's governmental functions. See Dant, 829 F.2d at 74-75 ( ); Nathan, 653 F.Supp. at 248 ( ). As such, the Court shall grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of negligent design.
Section 76 of the Compact enables and authorizes WMATA to maintain a police force with significant police power to protect passengers and property. Furthermore, the Compact grants WMATA the power to promulgate rules and regulations to assure the safety and protection of the riding public which are enforceable by the WMATA police force. WMATA's operation of its police force and those police activities are governmental functions and, as such, are immune from suit. Dant, 829 F.2d at 74-75; Morris, 781 F.2d at 220; Heffez v. WMATA, 569 F.Supp. 1551, 1553 (D.D.C.1983), aff'd, 786 F.2d 431 (D.C.Cir. 1986); Gillot v. WMATA, 507 F.Supp. 454, 456-57 (D.D.C.1981) ( ). Crowd control certainly falls squarely within the functions of the WMATA police force. Plaintiff alleges that WMATA failed to adequately control the crowds on the evening in question. Affirmative actions as well as omissions by the WMATA police are generally immune from suit. See Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir.1981). As such, the alleged failure to adequately control crowds is immune from suit.
Finally, the Court notes that the present allegation is analogous to the Gillot case. 507 F.Supp. 454 (D.D.C.1981). In Gillot, one of plaintiff's allegations was that WMATA failed to monitor the WMATA parking lot in which an assailant abducted and raped her. The Court found that plaintiff's allegation of inadequate monitoring of the parking lot amounted to a claim of inadequate police protection. The Gillot court found that because this claim attacked police protection, which is a governmental function, WMATA was immune from suit. In the present case, similar reasoning is applicable. Plaintiff alleges that WMATA failed to protect plaintiff by inadequately monitoring the crowds in the station. WMATA is immune from suit on such an allegation since monitoring crowds for the protection of the riding public is a governmental function.
The Court notes, however, that even if it were to address the substantive issue of crowd control, summary judgment for defendant still is appropriate because plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence to rebut defendant's evidence that the crowds were within the safe limits. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 ( ). Defendant included with its motion for summary judgment a complete Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Dispute ("Defendant's Statement"). Each paragraph included references to parts of the record to support each statement as required by Local Rule 108(h). Plaintiff filed an untimely Statement of Facts in Genuine Dispute ("Plaintiff's Statement"). Plaintiff's Statement fails to comply with Rule 108(h) in that it does not include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statements. As such, under the Local Rules, the Court may assume that the facts are...
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