Sims ex rel. Sims v. Forehand

• Decision Date: 05 September 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 98-D-623-S.
• Parties: Natalie SIMS, a minor, By and Through her parents and next friends Charles and Sheila SIMS, Plaintiff, v. Ashley FOREHAND, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

112 F.Supp.2d 1260

Natalie SIMS, a minor, By and Through her parents and next friends Charles and Sheila SIMS, Plaintiff, v. Ashley FOREHAND, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 98-D-623-S.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

September 5, 2000.

John L. McClung, Lindsey & McClung, Elba, AL, for plaintiffs.

Bart Gregory Harmon, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Gary Clayborn Sherrer, Farmer, Farmer, Malone & Sherrer, P.A., Dothan, AL, Kendrick E. Webb, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants Ashley Forehand and Jackie Smith's ("Forehand" and "Smith," individually, "Defendants," collectively) Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot."), together with a supporting Memorandum Brief ("Br."), both filed December 28, 1999. Plaintiff Natalie Sims ("Sims"), a minor, by and through her parents, filed a Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment ("Resp.") on January 10, 2000. Defendants filed a Reply on January 18, 2000. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion is due to be denied in part and granted in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from the strip search of Sims, which occurred during the execution of a search warrant at a trailer in Houston County, Alabama, on the evening of May 31, 1996. Smith, a deputy sheriff with the Houston County Sheriff's Department, strip searched Sims, an occupant in the trailer who was not named in the search warrant. In the court's Memorandum Opinion And Order entered in this case on December 9, 1999, the court ruled on Smith and Forehand's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint.¹ In Sims I, the issue before the court was whether Smith and Forehand were entitled to qualified immunity on Sims' § 1983 constitutional claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. In assuming as true the allegations in Sims' Amended Complaint,² the court found that Smith and Forehand were not entitled to qualified immunity on the following three of Sims' constitutional claims: (1) Sims' Fourth Amendment unlawful detention claim; (2) Sims' Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim; and (3) Sims' Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.³

While denying Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint, the court in Sims I noted that "[o]ne of the purposes of ... qualified immunity ... is to protect public officials from the `broad-ranging discovery' that can be `peculiarly disruptive of effective government.'" Sims I, 84 F.Supp.2d at 1284 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646-47 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In order to effectuate this purpose, the court limited discovery "tailored specifically to the question of ... qualified immunity" and whether any genuine issues of material fact existed surrounding the reasonableness of Smith and Forehand's alleged conduct. Id. Thus, the court granted Smith and Forehand leave to file a motion for summary judgment if, after conducting limited discovery, they believed that additional evidence existed outside the pleadings which would entitle them to qualified immunity. Id. Having conducted limited discovery, Smith and Forehand filed the instant Motion and have submitted evidence which they assert demonstrates their entitlement to qualified immunity.

Construed in the light most favorable to Sims, the evidence reveals the following.⁴ On May 31, 1996, Forehand, a deputy sheriff narcotics investigator with the Houston County Sheriff's Department, obtained a search warrant. (Defs.' Ex. B; Forehand's Dep. at 11.) The warrant authorized a search for narcotics "on the person of Christina Jarrard" ("Jarrard") and "in and upon" Jarrard's trailer located in Houston County, Alabama. (Defs.' Ex. B.) The warrant did not authorize the search of any person other than Jarrard. (Id.)

The warrant was issued upon an affidavit by Forehand. (Id.) In his affidavit, Forehand stated that he had received certain information from a reliable informant. The informant told Forehand that Jarrard was keeping marijuana at her trailer and that the informant had, within the past 72 hours, seen Jarrard in possession of marijuana at her trailer. (Id.)

Forehand executed the warrant on May 31, 1996, with the assistance of Smith and deputy sheriffs Tim Miller ("Miller"), Dave Elkins ("Elkins"), and Randy Anderson ("Anderson"). (Forehand's Dep. at 14.) During the execution of the warrant, the assisting officers, including Smith, were acting under Forehand's direction.⁵ (Id. at 12.)

At approximately 6:15 p.m. on May 31, 1996, Forehand, Smith, Miller, Elkins and Anderson proceeded to Jarrard's trailer. (Id. at 13.) Miller knocked on the front door of Jarrard's trailer. (Id. at 14.) Forehand was standing "directly behind" Miller, with Smith and Elkins positioned at the back door. (Id. at 15-16; Smith's Dep. at 10.) After knocking and announcing his presence and purpose, Miller waited approximately 30 seconds before Jarrard opened the door. (Defs.' Ex. A; Forehand's Dep. at 14.) While waiting, Miller and Forehand heard "a lot of movement inside the trailer." (Forehand's Dep. at 15.) Also, through a window in the door, Miller could see "several people moving around inside." (Defs.' Ex. A.)

When Jarrard opened the door, Miller entered the trailer first, followed immediately by Forehand. The front door opened into the living room which adjoined the kitchen. (Smith's Dep., Defs.' Ex. 1.) Miller then walked through the kitchen and to the rear of the trailer, where he unlocked the back door to let Smith and Elkins inside.⁶ (Smith's Dep. at 11.)

Once inside the trailer, Miller and Forehand conducted a protective sweep to determine the number of individuals in the trailer. Two males were sitting on the floor in the living room where Miller and Forehand had entered the trailer, and Forehand also observed two females when he "scann[ed]" the room. (Forehand's...