Sims v. Douglass
Decision Date | 13 April 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 7842.,7842. |
Parties | SIMS v. DOUGLASS. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
F. H. Lyman, Henderson Stockton, Emmett R. Feighner, and Eli Gorodezky, all of Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant.
Thomas W. Nealon and Alice M. Birdsall, both of Phœnix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before WILBUR, MATHEWS, and HANEY, Circuit Judges.
From a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover an unlawful preference made by a receiver of bankrupt to defendant, the latter appeals.
Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 143 the terms of court controlling this case begin "on the first Mondays in April and October." The judgment was entered on July 2, 1934, during the April, 1934, term.
The certificate to the bill of exceptions does not contain any statement that the bill of exceptions was settled within the term in which the judgment was rendered, or within such term as extended by order of the court, nor does the certificate contain any words or language from which such facts might be inferred. Orders extending the term do not appear in the bill of exceptions.
The District Court rules for Arizona provide as follows:
"Motions for new trial * * * shall * * * be filed * * * within 15 days after entry of judgment. * * *" (Rule 37)
(Rule 38)
We find from the transcript, but not in the bill of exceptions, that appellant filed a motion for new trial on July 23, 1934; that a minute order was entered on August 13, 1934; "that said motion be * * * by the court taken under advisement." On September 29, 1934, a minute entry was entered continuing all pending matters in the case to the October, 1934, term.
It also appears from the transcript, but not in the bill of exceptions, that a minute order was entered on October 1, 1934, overruling the motion for new trial. Timely orders were entered which extended the April, 1934, term to May 1, 1935. These orders were dated October 1, 1934, November 26, 1934, January 3, 1935, and February 25, 1935, successively extending the time for filing the bill of exceptions, the last one extending the time to April 22, 1935. The bill of exceptions was actually approved and filed on April 9, 1935.
A few days before the argument of the cause in this court, there was filed by appellee a motion to strike the bill of exceptions, and another motion to dismiss the appeal or affirm the judgment. Over a month after the argument, appellant filed a petition in this court to return the bill of exceptions to the trial court to afford him an opportunity to make an application to the trial judge for a nunc pro tunc order amending the certificate to the bill so as to show that the bill was presented, approved, and settled within the term as extended by orders.
It is a general rule that if a bill of exceptions is not filed within the term, or within the term as extended by order of court or standing rule, although copied into the record, cannot be considered by the appellate court as a part of the record. Muller v. Ehlers, 91 U.S. 249, 23 L.Ed. 319; Jones v. Grover & B. Sewing Machine Co., 131 U.S. cl Appx., 24 L.Ed. 925; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U.S. 293, 12 S.Ct. 450, 36 L.Ed. 162; Hume v. Bowie, 148 U.S. 245, 253, 13 S.Ct. 582, 37 L.Ed. 438; U. S. v. Jones, 149 U.S. 262, 13 S.Ct. 840, 37 L.Ed. 726; Morse v. Anderson, 150 U.S. 156, 14 S.Ct. 43, 37 L.Ed. 1037; Jennings v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 218 U.S. 255, 31 S.Ct. 1, 54 L.Ed. 1031; O'Connell v. U. S., 253 U.S. 142, 40 S.Ct. 444, 64 L.Ed. 827; Exporters of Mfrs.' Products v. Butterworth-Judson Co., 258 U.S. 365, 42 S.Ct. 331, 66 L.Ed. 663, and in Taylor v. U. S., 286 U.S. 1, 5, 52 S.Ct. 466, 467, 76 L.Ed. 951, where a bill was filed one day late, and there were exceptional circumstances, the court said: "And negativing any intent to relax the general rule, we accept it as adequate and properly incorporated in the record."
The reason for the rule is stated in Muller v. Ehlers, supra, 91 U.S. 249, at page 250, 23 L.Ed. 319, as follows:
Upon the adjournment for the term the parties were out of court, and the litigation there was at an end. The plaintiff was discharged from further attendance; and all proceedings thereafter, in his absence and without his consent, were coram non judice."
In Shallas v. United States (C.C.A.) 37 F.(2d) 692, 693, this court said:
The first,1 fifth,2 sixth,3 seventh,4 and eighth5 circuits have adopted this rule.
These cases, however, do not clearly state whether the term in which the judgment was rendered is automatically extended by the pending motion see In re Bills of Exceptions (C.C.A.6) 37 F.(2d) 849 or whether the judgment, although entered at an earlier term, is considered for purposes of appeal as having been entered at the term in which decision is given on the motion see Marion Steam Shovel Co. v. Reeves (C.C.A.8) 76 F.(2d) 462.
In Aspen Mining & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U.S. 31, 36, 14 S.Ct. 4, 6, 37 L.Ed. 986, it is said:
And in Voorhees v. John T. Noye Manufacturing Co., 151 U.S. 135, 137, 14 S.Ct. 295, 38 L.Ed. 101, it is said:
."
The same rule should govern motions for rehearings and motions for new trials. It thus appears that the date of entry of the judgment, although it may actually be entered at a prior date, is not, for purposes of appeal, considered as having been entered at the earlier date, but is considered as having been entered on the date when the motion for new trial is disposed of by the lower court.
It frequently happens that an order is entered extending the time within which a bill of exceptions may be filed, but no order is entered extending the term. In Morrissey v. U. S., 67 F.(2d) 267, 268, this court said:
See, also, U. S. v. Tucker (C.C.A.4) 65 F.(2d) 661.
Few cases discuss the question as to whether or not such an order has the same effect as a pending motion for new trial, although the quotation would indicate that it is the term in which the judgment is rendered which is extended.
However that may be, it is clear that the trial court in this case had not lost jurisdiction. Although orders extended the April, 1934, term, it was the October, 1934, term which last had jurisdiction, because the motion for new trial was continued to and decided in the October, 1934, term. There was no necessity for extending the April, 1934, term. The orders extending the time for filing the bill of exceptions entered thereafter, operated to extend the October, 1934, term, and therefore the bill was filed in time.
Two questions immediately arise. The first is: Must such fact affirmatively appear from the record? The second is: If the fact, that the bill of exceptions was filed in time, must affirmatively appear from the record, just what constitutes the record?
This court has held that "it must affirmatively appear from the record that the trial court had jurisdiction to approve the bill of exceptions." U. S. v. Payne, 72 F.(2d) 593, 594, certiorari granted 295 U.S. 722, 55 S.Ct. 642, 79 L.Ed. 1675, and dismissed per stipulation of counsel 56 S.Ct. 87, 80 L.Ed. ___. This seems to be the rule in the second,6 seventh,7 eighth,8 and tenth,9 circuits also.
We pass to a consideration of the second proposition which is: What constitutes the "record" on appeal?
In 4 C.J. 98, § 1073, it is said:
"* * * In an ordinary civil action the record proper consists of the process, with the return thereon, the pleadings, and verdict, if tried by a jury, or the decision if tried by the court, and the judgment. * * *"
See, also, Cassatt v. Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. (C.C.A.3) 150 F. 32, 81 C.C.A. 80, ...
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