Sims v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. S90A1666,S90A1666 |
| Citation | 399 S.E.2d 924,260 Ga. 782 |
| Parties | SIMS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
David F. Dickinson, Monroe, for Sims.
John M. Ott, Dist. Atty., Alan A. Cook, Asst. Dist. Atty., Monroe, for State.
Albert Sims was convicted of sexually molesting a three-year-old child, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Jurisdiction in this court is predicated on the defendant's constitutional challenge to OCGA § 24-9-5(b).
The evidence showed that the victim lived near the defendant. On the day in question the victim was playing with the step-granddaughter of the defendant. The defendant's wife told the victim to go home because she and the grandchild needed to go into Atlanta. The victim left, but it is not disputed that she returned on her own to continue playing with the grandchild's toys.
When the defendant's wife returned that evening the victim was playing in the living room. All exterior doors to the home were locked. The defendant was undressed in the bathroom. The defendant told his wife that the victim had suddenly appeared and seen him undressed. The defendant's wife then sent the victim home.
Later that evening the victim told her mother that the defendant had exhibited his genitals to her, and asked her to touch them, but that she had refused. She also stated that the defendant had inserted his finger in her vagina and moved it around. The victim's mother testified that she examined the victim's vaginal area and found it to be red. The victim was examined by a physician the following day, but no medical evidence was presented at trial.
The court called the victim as a witness under the procedures outlined in Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298, 357 S.E.2d 562 (1987). While the victim was not questioned specifically about the molestation, she did testify that the defendant had never done anything to harm her.
1. The defendant first argues that OCGA § 24-9-5(b) violates due process and equal protection principles.
In pertinent part, the statute provides that notwithstanding the provision of OCGA § 24-9-5(a) that a child who does not understand the nature of an oath is an incompetent witness, "in criminal cases involving child molestation ... any such child shall be competent to testify, and his credibility shall be determined as provided by Article 4 of this chapter." OCGA § 24-9-5(b)
The defendant maintains that OCGA § 24-9-5(b) singles out child molesters from other accused criminals, and allows them to be convicted on the basis of evidence which could not be used to convict others of crimes. He additionally argues that the statute allows child molesters to be convicted on the basis of evidence which would not be admissible in civil suits.
To successfully launch an equal protection attack on a statutory provision, a claimant must initially show that he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him. Stuart-James Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ga. 289, 380 S.E.2d 257 (1989). The defendant has failed to make a showing that child molesters are similarly situated to all other criminals or to civil litigants.
The defendant also argues that the statute violates equal protection because a child whose competency has not been proved may testify against an accused child molester, but may not testify in his behalf. However, the statute applies equally to all those accused of child molestation, and therefore it does not create disparate classifications among similarly situated persons. See, Stegall v. Leader National Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 765, 353 S.E.2d 484 (1987).
Relying on these same arguments the defendant argues that the statute violates due process because it denies a fair trial to one accused of child molestation. We agree with the state that it is not fundamentally unfair to require one accused of child molestation to face his accuser, even if the accuser is unable to articulate the meaning of an oath. Under the procedure set out in Sosebee, supra, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the child witness, and test his credibility before the jury. Further, because there is no fundamental right to testify, Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989), the legislature may set threshold requirements for a witness who wishes to testify, OCGA § 24-9-5(a), as well as except them when circumstances dictate it, OCGA § 24-9-5(b).
2. We have examined the record in this case and conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
3. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in qualifying a DFCS caseworker as an expert in the area of child sexual abuse because the witness lacked academic credentials in this area.
The witness testified that she has had 15 years experience in the area of child abuse, and has investigated over fifty cases involving sexual abuse of children. The witness testified that she...
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...situated defendants charged with molestation, some of whom must defend against more evidence than others). See also Sims v. State, 260 Ga. 782(1), 399 S.E.2d 924 (1991) (statute which applies equally to all persons accused of child molestation does not create disparate classifications among......
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... ... State , 264 Ga. 466, ... 466-467 (488 S.E.2d 189) (1998) ("Since Reed failed to ... satisfy the threshold obligation in his equal protection ... challenge, we do not consider whether the statute is ... rationally related to a legitimate state interest."); ... Sims v. State , 260 Ga. 782, 782-783 (399 S.E.2d 924) ... (1991) ("To successfully launch an equal protection ... attack on a statutory provision, a claimant must initially ... show that he is similarly situated to members of the class ... who are treated differently from him.") ... ...
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