Sinclair v. Sinclair

• Decision Date: 10 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 7140,Docket No. P,7140
• Parties: Linwood L. SINCLAIR et al. v. Rita M. SINCLAIR. DecisionLawen-94-103.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 438

654 A.2d 438

Linwood L. SINCLAIR et al. v. Rita M. SINCLAIR.

Decision No. 7140.

Law Docket No. Pen-94-103.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued June 24, 1994.

Decided Feb. 10, 1995.

Lara M. Nomani (orally), Perkins, Townsend, Shay & Brown, P.A., Skowhegan, for plaintiffs.

Brett D. Baber (orally), Rudman & Winchell, Bangor, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Linwood L. and Edith M. Sinclair appeal from a summary judgment entered in the District Court (Newport, Hjelm, J.) in favor of Rita M. Sinclair. The court determined that foreclosure proceedings against her were ineffective because the Sinclairs failed to comply with the notice requirement of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Supp.1993). The Sinclairs contend that the court erred in concluding (1) that the Legislature intended section 6111 to apply to mortgages executed before its effective date and (2) that such an application of the statute did not result in an unconstitutional impairment of their contract. We reject the Sinclairs' contentions and affirm the judgment.

I.

In February 1982 Gary Sinclair and his wife, Rita, purchased real estate in Corinna from Gary's parents, Linwood and Edith Sinclair. Gary and Rita executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage of the real estate. The note required Gary and Rita to pay the Sinclairs $25,000 in 180 monthly installments of $224.71. Each payment was due on or before the 15th day of each month. In the event of a default, Gary and Rita could "ma[k]e good prior to the due date of the next installment." Otherwise, the entire principal sum and accrued interest were immediately payable without notice, at the Sinclairs' option.

Gary and Rita were divorced in February 1990. In the divorce judgment the court awarded Rita exclusive possession of the property until the couple's daughter Joy reached the age of eighteen. The court ordered Rita to assume the mortgage during her period of exclusive occupancy of the home. In March 1991 the Sinclairs, through their attorney, notified Rita that further late payments would place her at risk of foreclosure. Nonetheless, on September 15, 1992, she first attempted to deliver the payment that was due on August 15, 1992. The parties dispute whether the payment was finally tendered on September 18 or September 21, 1992.

The Sinclairs instituted foreclosure proceedings. Rita responded that, inter alia, the Sinclairs had failed to give sufficient notice of her right to cure the default as required by 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111. Both the Sinclairs and Rita moved for a summary judgment.

After a hearing, the court determined there were no genuine issues of material fact as to either the breach of the condition of timely payment or the Sinclairs' failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 6111. The court concluded that because the statute "evinced no exceptions to its application" it applied to the Sinclair mortgage, despite the fact that the mortgage was executed prior to the statute's effective date. The court further stated its belief that the contract clause analysis set forth in Portland Sav. Bank v. Landry, 372 A.2d 573 (Me.1977), was no longer valid. It reasoned that pursuant to the framework set forth in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 103 S.Ct. 697, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1978), the application of section 6111 to the Sinclair mortgage did not result in an unconstitutional impairment of the contract. Following the court's decision, the Sinclairs filed a timely notice of appeal directly to the Law Court pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 1901 (Supp.1993).

II.

One of the more perplexing problems encountered in interpreting legislation is the temporal application of new or amended statutes. We have recently clarified the impact of 1 M.R.S.A. § 302 (1989) when a proceeding is pending on the effective date of new legislation. See Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626 (Me.1994); Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Constr. Corp., 612 A.2d 874 (Me.1992); DeMello v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 611 A.2d 985 (Me.1992).

We have sometimes applied a presumption that procedural or remedial enactments are presumed to apply retroactively and that statutes affecting substantive rights are presumed to apply only prospectively. See Riley, 639 A.2d at 628. As some courts and commentators have recognized, however, labels such as retroactive, prospective, substantive, and procedural are subject to manipulation. See Rhodes v. Eckelman, 302 Or. 245, 728 P.2d 527, 529 (1986) ("as is usual with labels, we find them less than dispositive"); Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or. 475, 632 P.2d 782, 790 (1981) (all statutes operate prospectively by prescribing legal consequences after enactment, and retroactively by affecting a state of affairs formed to some extent by past events) (Linde, J., concurring); 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.01, at 337 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (concepts of prospective and retrospective not subject to clear characterization); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 379, 436 (definition of retroactivity has proved elusive). Our own struggle with these concepts has not always resulted in clearly defined pathways. See, e.g., Riley, 639 A.2d 626; Danforth v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 624 A.2d 1231 (Me.1993); Schlear v. Fiber Materials, Inc., 574 A.2d 876 (Me.1990); Commissioner, Dep't of Human Servs. v. Massey, 537 A.2d 1158 (Me.1988); Atlantic Oceanic Kampgrounds, Inc. v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 473 A.2d 884 (Me.1984); Michaud v. Northern Maine Medical Ctr., 436 A.2d 398 (Me.1981).

The issue before us today is a prime example of the limitations of an analysis that relies on the elusive distinction between substance and procedure. We could declare that section 6111 affects the substantive rights of the mortgagee of a preexisting mortgage and presumptively will not apply to a preexisting mortgage. On the other hand, we could declare that section 6111 affects only the procedural mechanism of a foreclosure action commenced after its effective date and presumptively will apply to that action. Applying a label foretells the result but does not materially contribute to a principled decision.

As in Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc., 511 A.2d 1056 (Me.1986), and Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me.1982), an examination of legislative purpose helps to resolve the issue. The limitation of section 6111 to private residential mortgages suggests that its purpose is to protect homeowners from noncommercial lenders that are not otherwise subject to regulation. At the same time, the Legislature must have recognized that a limitation of the section's application to future mortgages would leave some homeowners unprotected for nearly 30 years. That limitation would frustrate the legislative purpose. We conclude therefore that the Legislature intended section 6111 to apply to mortgages executed prior to the effective date of the statute.

III.

Our interpretation of legislative purpose results in a prospective operation by prescribing the method of judicial foreclosure initiated after its effective date. Our decision will also have a retroactive effect on mortgagor/mortgagee contractual relationships that antedate the effective date of the statute. That is not an unusual result. See, e.g., American Republic Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., 647 A.2d 1195 (Me.1994); Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc., 511 A.2d 1056; Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932. The retroactive aspect of the statute nonetheless requires us to examine whether the impact on contractual rights is unconstitutional. The statute exceeds constitutional limitations if its effect on contractual rights is both substantial and unwarranted by legitimate state interests. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704; American Republic Ins. Co., 647 A.2d at 1197.

We conclude that both parts of the constitutional inquiry can be answered in the negative. The notice requirement introduced a minimum delay in the process of protecting the mortgagees' interest. We do not necessarily agree with the mortgagees' argument that the notice requirement adds at least an additional 30-day period beyond the grace period contained in the note. Even if the mortgagees are correct, however, or even in instances where no grace period is provided, neither the delay nor the procedure required by the statute constitutes a substantial impairment of the mortgagees' rights.

Although noncommercial mortgage activity per se has not been highly regulated, the process by which mortgages are foreclosed has been the subject of regulation since Maine became a state. See R.S. ch. 39 (1821). Moreover, the purpose of the statute is to prevent the unnecessary loss of a mortgagor's home. That is a significant and legitimate public purpose. Moreover, the adjustment of the rights of the parties is reasonable and of a character appropriate to the public purpose. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 412, 103 S.Ct. at 705; American Republic Ins. Co., 647 A.2d at 1197. Contrary to Rita's contention, our decision today does not require that we overrule Portland Savings Bank. Both the extent of impairment of the mortgagor's rights and the nature of the public purpose considered therein differed from those factors we address in the present case. See Portland Sav. Bank, 372 A.2d at 577-78.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

WATHEN, C.J., and GLASSMAN, and CLIFFORD, JJ., concurring.

CLIFFORD, Justice, with whom WATHEN, Chief Justice, joins, concurring.

I agree that the notice requirement of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Supp.1994) applies to the mortgage in this case and that we should affirm the Superior Court. That conclusion can be reached, as the court did, by discernment of legislative intent. The same result is reached by a...