Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Fleming

• Citation: 39 Neb. 679,58 N.W. 226
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. FLEMING.
• Decision Date: 06 March 1894
• Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska

39 Neb. 679

58 N.W. 226

SINGER MANUF'G CO.

v.FLEMING.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 6, 1894.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The act to provide for the better protection of the earnings of laborers, servants, and other employes of corporations, firms, or individuals engaged in interstate business, (Laws 1889, c. 25,) is not in conflict with the constitution of Nebraska, either as being broader than its title or as being prohibited class legislation.

2. Nor does the act seek to impose a penalty for the benefit of an individual. The recovery provided for in the act of the debt, costs, expenses, and attorney's fee is simply a recovery of compensatory damages, and not a penalty.

3. Whether the act is valid in so far as it makes its violation a crime is not decided; that portion of the act not being so connected with the rest as to affect the validity of the whole act.

4. Nor is the act in conflict with section 1 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, requiring that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.

5. A foreign corporation having a place of business in Nebraska, which institutes, in another state, attachment proceedings, and seizes the earnings of a citizen of Nebraska, exempt under the laws of Nebraska, is subject to the operation of the act; the contract out of which the proceedings arose having been made in Nebraska, and being here performable.

6. While, under the laws and decisions of Iowa, a judgment in a proceeding by foreign attachment, whereby earnings of the defendant, a resident of Nebraska, earned in Nebraska and payable there, are seized and applied to the payment of the defendant's debt, must be treated as within the jurisdiction of the Iowa courts, still, the situs of said earnings, for the purpose of determining the right to exemption, is Nebraska. Mason v. Beebee, 44 Fed. 556, followed.

Error to district court, Douglas county; Doane, Judge.

Action by Charles R. Fleming against the Singer Manufacturing Company. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.Breckenridge, Breckenridge & Crofoot, for plaintiff in error.

Kennedy, Gilbert & Anderson, for defendant in error.

IRVINE, C.

The plaintiff in error is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey. It has a place of doing business, styled a “general agency,” at Denver, Colo. It has also agencies in Iowa and Nebraska, and does business in both of those states. The agents there report to the general agent at Denver. The defendant in error is a resident of Nebraska, the head of a family, and an employe of the Union Pacific Railway Company, whose lines extend into both Iowa and Nebraska. Fleming bought from the Singer Company a sewing machine upon credit. The agent of the Singer Company in Omaha, after some efforts to collect the bill, returned it to the general agent at Denver, who in turn sent it to the agent in Council Bluffs, Iowa. The agent at Council Bluffs brought an action in Pottawattamie county, Iowa, against Fleming, on behalf of the Singer Company, proceeding by process of foreign attachment, and garnished the Union Pacific Railway Company. The result of this proceeding was that wages of Fleming, to the amount of $38.05, due him from the railroad company, were seized by the Iowa court, and appropriated to the payment of the judgment there rendered against Fleming. Fleming then instituted this action in Douglas county, Neb., under sections 531c-531f of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover from the Singer Company the debt so garnished, with costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. The wages reached by garnishment were earned within 60 days prior to the commencement of the action in Iowa. Judgment was rendered in favor of Fleming in the district court of Douglas county in the sum of $95.55 and costs, from which the Singer Company prosecutes error. No question is raised as to the sufficiency of evidence to support a judgment for that amount, but the judgment is sought to be reversed upon three grounds: First, that the statute under which the action was brought is contrary to the constitution of Nebraska; second, that it conflicts with section 1 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, requiring that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state; third, that, if the law be constitutional, it does not apply to foreign corporations.

The statute referred to is as follows: “That it be, and is hereby declared, unlawful for any creditor, or other holder of any evidence of debt, book account, or claim of any name or nature against any laborer, servant, clerk, or other employe of any corporation, firm, or individual, in this state, for the purpose below stated, to sell, assign, transfer, or by any means dispose of any such claim, book account, bill, or debt of any name or nature whatever, to any person or persons, firm, corporation, or institution, or to institute in this state, or elsewhere, or to prosecute any suit or action for any such claim or debt against any such laborer, servant, clerk, or employe by any process seeking to seize, attach, or garnish the wages of such person or persons earned within sixty days prior to the commencement of such proceeding for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the laws of the state of Nebraska concerning exemptions. That it is hereby declared unlawful for any person or persons to aid, assist, abet, or counsel a violation of section one of this act for any purpose whatever. In any proceeding, civil or criminal, growing out of a breach of sections one or two of this act, proof of the institution of a suit or service of garnishment summons by any persons, firm, or individual, in any court of any state or territory other than this state or in this state to seize by process of garnishment or otherwise, any of the wages of such person as defined in section one of this act, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of an evasion of the laws of the state of Nebraska and a breach of the provisions of this act on the part of the creditor or resident in Nebraska causing the same to be done. Any persons, firm, company, corporation or business institution guilty of a violation of sections one or two of this act shall be liable to the party injured through such violation of this act, for the amount of the debt sold, assigned, transferred, garnished, or sued upon, with all costs and expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state; and shall further be liable by prosecution to punishment by a fine not exceeding the sum of two hundred dollars and costs of prosecution.”

1. Three arguments are made upon the proposition that the statute is in conflict with the constitution of Nebraska. In the first place, it is said that the act is broader than its title. The title is as follows: “An act to provide better protection for the earnings of laborers, servants and other employes of corporations, firms or individuals engaged in interstate business.” We are somewhat at a loss to appreciate the argument based on this proposition. It seems to be the theory of counsel that that portion of the act which provides for the recovery of the debt, costs, expenses, and attorney's fee, and which enacts a penalty for the violation of the law, is not expressed in the title. These features are not distinctly expressed; but the title to the act need not amount to an analysis or complete abstract of its text. It is sufficient if the title, by general language, fairly expresses its subject-matter. Where a bill has but one general object, it will be sufficient if the subject is fairly expressed in the title. People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182;State v. Ream, 16 Neb. 681, 21 N. W. 398. The title of this act is comprehensive. Merely to declare the doing of certain acts unlawful would be nugatory, unless the act itself, or other provisions of the law, provided a redress for injuries inflicted by reason of its violation. Without the section providing a remedy, the act would not provide “for the better protection of the earnings” of the persons sought to be protected. Both a substantial enactment of law and a remedy for its violation are fairly included in the title, and the act would not be complete in the absence of either provision.

It is next urged that the act is unconstitutional because imposing a penalty which does not go to the school fund. The last section of the act undertakes to provide two remedies. One is that the person violating it shall be liable, by prosecution, to punishment by fine. It is not necessary to here consider whether that portion of the act is valid. If it is, the fine imposed is like all other fines in criminal cases, and is not subject to the objections urged. If it be not valid, the whole act is not, therefore, unconstitutional. Where a part of an act is void, and a part in its nature valid, the whole is not void unless it appears, from an examination of the act itself, that the invalid portion was designed as an inducement to pass the valid, so that the whole, taken together, will warrant the belief that the legislature would not have passed the valid portion alone. State v. Lancaster Co., 6 Neb. 474;State v. Lancaster Co., 17 Neb. 85, 22 N. W. 228;Trumble v. Trumble, (Neb.) 55 N. W. 869. But counsel say the provision permitting the recovery not only of the debt, but of costs, expenses, and attorney's fees, is in the nature of a penalty; and we are cited, upon that subject, to Railroad Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37. In that case an act was held void because it sought to give, to the owner of live stock injured upon a railroad, double the value of his property. This double recovery was clearly in the nature of a penalty. It had no element of compensation, but, in the statute we are considering, the damages awarded are...