Singer v. State

• Decision Date: 28 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 08–11–00021–CV.,08–11–00021–CV.
• Citation: 391 S.W.3d 627
• Parties: Craig B. SINGER and Carol G. Singer, Appellants, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

391 S.W.3d 627

Craig B. SINGER and Carol G. Singer, Appellants,

v.STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 08–11–00021–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

Dec. 28, 2012.

Ronald D. Gray, Geary Porter & Donovan, PC, Addison, TX, for Appellant.

Allan David Meesey, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Appellee.

Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, J., and ANTCLIFF, J.

OPINION

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice.

Craig and Carol Singer (the Singers) filed an inverse condemnation claim against the State of Texas (the State). The Singers raise twelve issues on appeal challenging the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the State and assert that the trial court properly denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

On December 31, 1991, the Singers executed two donation deeds conveying 48.327 acres of land in Denton County to the State of Texas for public highway purposes. Each deed included the following provision:

In the event the land herein described is not used for public highway purposes, which includes construction contract letting, on S.H. 121 (Lewisville Bypass) on or before January 1, 2000, then all or that portion of the land not so used, as the case may be, will revert to and be revested in the Grantor named herein or their successors in interest[s].

The SH 121 (Lewisville Bypass) project was to be constructed in two stages. In January 1996, a construction contract for Stage 1 was let. Stage 1 construction built frontage roads with enough space between them to accommodate the future main lanes, ramps to tie into the future main lanes, and a temporary asphalt crossing to allow public travel to and from the frontage roads. The project also built an embankment to act as a flood control levee until the main lanes were constructed and which would then become part of the base of the main lanes. Additionally, Stage 1 consisted of work that accommodated the future main lanes including the excavation of dirt between the frontage roads, the installation of storm drain structures, and the re-vegetation of the area between the frontage roads to reduce erosion and preserve the work that was done in anticipation of the future main lanes. Stage 1 construction started in April 1996, and was completed by March 9, 2001. Two years after Stage 1 had been completed, the State let a construction contract for Stage 2 of the SH 121 (Lewisville Bypass) project. Stage 2 consisted of the construction and completion of the main lanes. Stage 2 construction began in early February 2004, and was completed in October 2006. On May 29, 2008, the Singers filed suit for inverse condemnation. The Singers alleged that because the State had not used portions of the land for public highway purposes and had not let a construction contract as defined in the deeds as of January 1, 2000, the unused portions of the deeded land reverted to them. Further, the Singers asserted that the State's continued dominion over and construction on the unused portions of land after January 1, 2000, constituted a taking for a public purpose which entitled them to adequate compensation under Section 17, Article 1 of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.

Answering the lawsuit, the State filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The State subsequently filed an amended plea to the jurisdiction and also moved for summary judgment on no-evidence and traditional grounds. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and ordered that the Singers take nothing against the State. The trial court granted the State's traditional summary judgment motion on its statute of limitations defense. The trial court also granted the State's no-evidence summary judgment motion on the Singers' inverse condemnation claim without specifying the grounds for doing so. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's summary judgment de novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). Our review is limited to consideration of the evidence presented to the trial court. Mathis v. Restoration Builders, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). When a summary judgment fails to specify the grounds that the trial court relied upon for its ruling, we may affirm the judgment if any of the grounds advanced is meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989); Prize Energy Resources, L.P. v. Cliff Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).

A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a pretrial motion for directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard. Gray v. Woodville Health Care Center, 225 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied). Accordingly, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and disregard any contrary evidence and inferences. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex.2003). A movant for a no-evidence summary judgment must state which essential elements are without any evidentiary support. Aguilar v. Morales, 162 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied). The non-movant must then produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Aguilar, 162 S.W.3d at 834. The nonmovant meets his burden when he produces more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting each challenged element. See Gray, 225 S.W.3d at 616. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence would permit reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751. However, less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak that it does no more than create a surmise or a suspicion of a fact. Id.

A party seeking a traditional summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Diversicare Gen. Partner., Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex.2005). If the movant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex.1979). A defendant who conclusively negates a single essential element of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat. Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex.2010).

Inverse Condemnation

The Texas Constitution prohibits the State from taking, damaging, or destroying an individual's property, for public use, without adequate compensation. SeeTex. Const. art. I, § 17. Inverse condemnation occurs when the government takes property for public use without proper condemnation proceedings, and the property owner attempts to recover some type of compensation for that taking. Park v. City of San Antonio, 230 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, pet. denied). To establish an inverse condemnation claim, the property owner must show: (1) an intentional governmental act; (2) that resulted in the taking, damaging, or destroying of the owner's property; (3) for public use. Id. Accordingly, to assert a valid Article I takings claim, the claimant must first prove an ownership in the property taken. SeeTex. Const. art. I, § 17; State v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

The No–Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment

At the trial level, the State moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on the second element of the Singers' inverse condemnation claim and argued that the Singers produced no evidence that they owned the property in question, and thus could not establish a taking. In Issue One, the Singers contend that the trial court erred in granting the State's no-evidence summary judgment because the evidence showed that a portion of the property automatically reverted to them under the terms of the donation deeds. In the present case, it is undisputed that the parties' claims to the property at issue derive from the donation deeds. The Singers contend that the language in the deeds create a possibility of reverter. The State counters that the language of the deeds creates a condition subsequent which, having been satisfied, cannot have resulted in the automatic reversion and revestment of title in the Singers. Accordingly, we must begin by interpreting the conditions set forth in the deeds and determine whether they created either a condition subsequent or a possibility of reverter.¹

In interpreting the language of deeds, we must ascertain the intent of the parties as set forth within the four corners of the document and attempt to harmonize all portions of the deeds. Bennett v. Tarrant County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. One, 894 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied). In ambiguous cases, the Texas Supreme Court has held that where language in a deed creates doubt as to whether the grantor intended a limitation or a condition subsequent, the language should be construed as a condition subsequent because a condition subsequent is less onerous than a limitation upon the grantee as the estate would not terminate automatically, but would continue until the grantor acts to terminate the estate. Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex.1962). Moreover, when there is doubt in the construction of a deed's language, the doubt is resolved against the grantor. Field v. Shaw, 535 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).

We find that the language of the deeds' conditions is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the Singers intended to create a condition subsequent or a possibility of reverter as the deeds contain language that is generally used to create both.² First, the granting clause of the donation deeds includes the...