Singer v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County

• Decision Date: 15 June 1960
• Citation: 54 Cal.2d 318,353 P.2d 305,5 Cal.Rptr. 697
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 353 P.2d 305 John SINGER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; Parr-Richmond Terminal Company (a Corporation), Real Party in Interest. S. F. 20384

Page 697

5 Cal.Rptr. 697

54 Cal.2d 318, 353 P.2d 305

John SINGER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent Parr-Richmond Terminal Company (a Corporation), Real Party in Interest.

S. F. 20384.

Supreme Court of California

June 15, 1960.

As Modified July 14, 1960.

Jay A. Darwin and Kenneth W. Rosenthal, San Francisco, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Taft, Wright & Hopkins, Cranson L. Hopkins and James H. Robinson, Vallejo, for real party in interest.

PETERS, Justice.

Petitioner (hereafter referred to as 'plaintiff') seeks by mandate to compel the real party in interest (hereafter referred to as 'defendant') to answer certain interrogatories which it refused to answer, and which respondent court ruled it did not have to answer. It is our conclusion that the writ should issue.

Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. § 688) against several parties, of which defendant is one. The complaint alleges, among other things, the fact of plaintiff's employment as a seaman on the S.S. Ocean Deborah, the relationship of each of the named defendants to the cause of action, the negligence (or breach of legal duty) of each such defendant in failing to furnish safe working conditions, the injuries received by plaintiff when he fell from the dock, and the causal connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injuries.

This defendant, who is the owner and operator of the dock in question, filed an answer. Included therein are the pleaded defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. These, as permitted by law, are pleaded in general terms. Plaintiff then served and filed written interrogatories under the provisions of section 2030 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including therein three interrogatories as follows:

'21) Please state what fact or facts form the basis for the allegations set forth in defendant's Answer * * * that 'plaintiff himself was negligent and careless and did not use due, proper or appropriate care for his own safety.'

'22) Please state what fact or facts form the basis for the allegations set forth in defendant's Answer * * * that 'said negligence and carelessness and lack of due, proper and appropriate care on the part of plaintiff himself was a direct and proximate and contributing cause of the accident' herein.

'23) Please state what fact or facts form the basis for the allegations set forth in defendant's Answer * * * that 'plaintiff assumed the risk, if any, attendant to his undertakings' herein.'

Defendant answered all but the three quoted interrogatories, justifying its refusal by the following statement:

'21, 22 & 23. Contain interrogatories appertaining to the pleadings, are too uncertain to require answers, and appertain solely to pleadings on file with the Court.'

Plaintiff then filed an application under the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 2034, Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an order requiring defendant to answer interrogatories Nos. 21, 22 and 23. The record does not indicate that defendant offered any defense to this motion, other than the matter set forth in its reply to the interrogatories and quoted above. The trial court denied the application, its minute order reading as follows:

'Motion for order to require Parr-Richmond Terminal Co. to give further answers to interrogatories 21, 22 and 23 denied.'

In its return to the alternative writ, defendant, for the first time, in justification of its refusal to answer the three challenged interrogatories, alleged that 'as trial preparation it is further alleged that Parr-Richmond has answered general interrogatories providing explicit factual information on every inquiry where facts were available; that in addition thereto Ocean Transportation Co., a co-defendant has provided facts on each inquiry where information was available including names of all known witnesses to the event leading to instant litigation; that compelling answer to interrogatories Nos. 21, 22, 23 calls for the opinions and conclusions of defendant and invades the province of the jury in determining issues from all the parties; that this defendant would be unduly restricted in its defenses by limitations imposed by requiring answers which would foreclose this defendant in from (sic) actual development by other parties to the action.'

In its points and authorities filed with the return defendant attempts to justify its refusal to answer the interrogatories on three grounds. It first asserts that 'plaintiff himself has better knowledge of his own acts leading up to the incident.' Next, reliance is had on a statement made in 2 DeMeo on California Deposition and Discovery Practice, page 34, to the effect that a party should not be required 'to state fully and in detail' what act or acts caused the injury. In the third place, reliance is had on the case of Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C., 5 F.R.D. 399, which holds that a defendant should not be foreclosed by its answers to interrogatories from subsequently relying upon further evidence regarding the cause of the injury which may be produced at the trial by any party to the action. The case also implies that interrogatories calling for opinions may be improper.

Thus, in its return and points and authorities defendant contends that, on five separate grounds, the three questioned interrogatories seek information that is beyond the limits of the scope of the discovery statute.

1. The three questions pertain only to the pleadings;

2. They are too uncertain to require answers;

3. Plaintiff is in a better position to know the answers than is defendant;

4. To require defendant to state 'fully and in detail' all facts upon which it bases its allegations of contributory negligence and assumption of risk would have the effect of unfairly limiting defendant from relying upon any other acts or evidence which might subsequently come to its knowledge, or which might be produced at the trial by other parties 5. The interrogatories call for opinion, rather than fact.

It should be noted that, as far as the trial court is concerned, only points 1 and 2 were urged as justification for not answering the questions. Before this court, however, the other three points have been raised, and, in our opinion, should be discussed.

There is no merit at all in the assertion that interrogatories should not be answered merely because they pertain to the pleadings. In the ordinary usage of the phrase, every factual issue must 'pertain to the pleadings' or be subject to a claim of irrelevancy. Subdivision (b) of section 2016 of the Code of Civil Procedure (incorporated by reference into § 2030) provides that the interrogatories may cover 'any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party, or to the claim or defense of any other party * * *.' It follows that interrogatories, in order to be proper, must, of necessity, 'pertain to the pleadings.' It may be that defendant means to argue that the specific interrogatories in question call for opinions and conclusions, and are not matters of evidence. Several federal cases, interpreting Federal Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 33, 28 U.S.C.A., indicate that interrogatories calling for the opposing party's opinions, conclusions or contentions may be improper. Bailey v. General Sea Foods, Inc., D.C., 26 F.Supp. 391; Doucette v. Howe, D.C., 1 F.R.D. 18; Tudor v. Leslie, D.C., 1 F.R.D. 448; Ryan v. Lehigh Velley R. Co., supra, 5 F.R.D. 399; Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 596. But these federal cases are not necessarily controlling. The federal and state procedures as to pleading, and the rules for testing the pleadings, are not similar. It is true that Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030, is identical in all pertinent respects to Federal Rule 33, but there are important distinctions to be found in the rules of pleading in the two jurisdictions. Under the Federal Rules pleading is informal, and not subject to demurrer. Instead, motions for more definite statement, and similar proceedings, allow a party to determine his opponent's contentions. Thus, it is not necessary for a party to seek information about such contentions by way of interrogatories. In adopting the federal rules of discovery, the California Legislature did not adopt the federal system of pleading. In California, a party may plead negligence and contributory negligence in general terms (Perry v. McLaughlin, 212 Cal. 1, 297 P. 554), and, when so pleaded, a demurrer will not lie to require a more definite statement. Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 428, 229 P. 30. It is true, of course, that the defendant is required to plead the facts upon which he relies to support his defense of contributory negligence, and must allege the causal connection between those facts and the injury. But this simply means that a defendant may allege that the plaintiff was negligent in and about those matters alleged in the complaint, and that such negligence proximately contributed to his injury. Such allegations, under the cases cited, are not subject to a special demurrer. Such general allegations do not apprise the plaintiff of matters which may lead him 'to the discovery of admissible evidence' (Code Civ.Proc., § 2016, subd. (b)). It follows that, in California, discovery proceedings provide a most important method of obtaining knowledge of such facts as may exist and on which the protagonist relies. Since this is not necessarily true under the federal system, authorities from such jurisdictions may be helpful, but cannot be considered as binding. Moreover, even under the federal practice the later federal cases hold that questions relating to the facts underlying the contentions of the parties are proper and should be answered (McElroy v. United Air Lines, D.C., 21 F.R.D. 100; Kyker v....