Singh v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 12 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. B187797.,B187797.
• Citation: 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 348,140 Cal.App.4th 387
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Parminder SINGH, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent, UHS of Delaware, Inc. et al., Real Parties in Interest.

44 Cal.Rptr.3d 348

140 Cal.App.4th 387

Parminder SINGH, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent UHS of Delaware, Inc. et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. B187797.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7.

June 12, 2006.

Initiative Legal Group, Mark Yablonovich, Los Angeles, and Marc Primo for petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Cotkin, Collins & Ginsburg, William D. Naeve, Ellen M. Tipping and Terry L. Kesinger, Santa Ana, for Real Parties in Interest.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Paul M. Gleason, Los Angeles, and Dominick C. Capozzola for Torrance Memorial Medical Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties.

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons and Derek R. Havel, Los Angeles, for California Hospital Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties.

ZELON, J.

This petition for writ of mandate asks us to determine when health care employees working beyond an alternative workweek schedule of three 12-hour days are entitled to receive overtime pay. To answer that question, we must decide whether the regulatory authority for such overtime is section 3(B)(1) or section 3(B)(8) of the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 5-2001 (Wage Order 5; found at Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 3(B)(1), (8).).¹ Because the plain language of Wage Order 5 supports the superior court's determination that section 3(B)(8) controls, we deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. Real parties UHS of Delaware, Universal Health Services of Delaware, and Universal Health Services operate Lancaster Community Hospital (jointly "Lancaster"). Pursuant to existing wage laws, in November 2000, two-thirds of Lancaster's Medical/Surgical Unit nurses elected by secret ballot an alternative workweek schedule² of three 12-hour days (3/12).

In April 2001, Lancaster employed petitioner Parminder Singh as a registered nurse. Singh signed an agreement in accordance with the adopted alternative workweek schedule that he would be bound by the following terms: the regular rate of pay (regular pay) for work performed within the 3/12 alternative workweek schedule; one and one-half times the regular rate of pay (time-and-a-half pay) for work performed beyond 40 hours in the workweek; and double the regular rate of pay (double time pay) for work in excess of 12 hours in a workday. In August 2003, Singh resigned "due to circumstances that [were] beyond [his] control."

In September 2004, Singh sued Lancaster for violation of Labor Code sections 201-202, 226, 511 and 1198, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and conversion and theft of labor. Among other remedies, Singh sought unpaid overtime compensation for all hours worked on days other than those scheduled by the alternative workweek schedule.

Lancaster moved for summary adjudication, contending that, for health care employees on a 3/12 alternative workweek schedule, section 3(B)(8) mandates time-and-a-half pay only after 40 hours of work have been performed. Singh argued that the general overtime provision under section 3(B)(1) mandates time-and-a-half pay for all hours worked beyond the regularly scheduled alternative workweek schedule, including hours 37 to 40. At hearing, the court found that summary adjudication was not appropriate, because the issue to be determined was the scope, rather than the existence, of Lancaster's duty to pay overtime. (Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 435, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, and Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Associates (1998) 62 Cal. App.4th 508, 518, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 708.) With the parties' agreement, the motion for summary adjudication was deemed a motion for determination of a legal issue. The court then ruled that section 3(B)(8) governs overtime pay for health care employees on the 3/12 alternative workweek schedule, making overtime due only after 40 hours of work in a week, or over 12 hours in a given day.

Singh sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its ruling; we issued an order to show cause. While the petition was pending, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 166.1, Singh moved for, and the trial court issued, an interlocutory order expressing the view that appellate resolution of the controlling question of law would advance the litigation.³

DISCUSSION

We are asked to decide a question of first impression: whether section 3(B)(1) or section 3(B)(8) of Wage Order 5 regulates overtime pay for health care employees on the 3/12 alternative workweek schedule. Lancaster contends that, under section 3(B)(8), health care employees on the 3/12 alternative workweek schedule are entitled to time-and-a-half pay only after performing 40 hours of work. Singh maintains that, section 3(B)(8) notwithstanding, the general overtime provision under section 3(B)(1) entitles Lancaster's nurses to time-and-a-half pay for every hour worked beyond their regularly scheduled alternative workweek schedule.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As quasi-legislative regulations, wage orders are to be construed in accordance with the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. (Collins v. Overnite Transportation Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 171, 178-179, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 254.) "The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.) To determine the intent, the court turns first to the words, attempting to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of the language and to avoid making any language mere surplusage. (Brewer v. Patel (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 65; Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 601, 607, 224 Cal.Rptr. 631, 715 P.2d 590.) When the language is clear, we must apply that language without further interpretation. (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, `then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.'" (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976.)

Only when the statutory language is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation do "we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]" (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857, 92 P.3d 350.)

Furthermore, we must select a construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57.) "And, wherever possible, `we will interpret a statute as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize Constitution and statute.' [Citation.]" (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 193, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686.)

II. REGULATORY HISTORY

Pursuant to constitutional and statutory authority, the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) is empowered to promulgate administrative regulations known as "wage orders" to regulate wages, work hours, and working conditions with respect to various industries and occupations. (See Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1; Lab.Code, §§ 70-74, 1173, 1178, 1178.5, 1182, Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (Morillion); Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 561-562, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296.) The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) enforces the state's labor laws, including the IWC wage orders. (See Lab.Code, §§ 61, 95, 98-98.8, 1193.5, Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 561-562, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296.)

"`IWC has promulgated 15 [industry and occupation wage] orders — 12 orders cover specific industries and 3 orders cover occupations — and 1 general minimum wage order which applies to all California employers and employees (excluding public employees and outside salesmen). [Citations.]' (Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Service, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 16, 29, 273 Cal.Rptr. 615 (Monzon).)" (Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 581, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139.) Wage Order 5 governs the "Public Housekeeping Industry," which includes "[h]ospitals, sanitariums, rest homes, child nurseries, child care institutions, homes for the aged, and similar establishments offering board or lodging in addition to medical, surgical, nursing, convalescent, aged, or child care." (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 2(P)(4).)

A. From 1986 to 1993, Former Wage Orders Provided Premium Pay for Hours 37-40 under a 3/12 Alternative Workweek Schedule

Former Wage Order 5-80 permitted employers to establish a regularly scheduled workweek of "not more than four (4) working days of not more than ten (10) hours each" (4/10) with a structure for paying premium wage rates for excess hours and days worked.⁴ (Former Cal.Code Regs tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 3(B), Register 84, No. 23 (Jun. 9, 1984) p. 774.)

In 1986, the IWC amended Wage Order 5-80 and extended the policy to a 3/12 regularly scheduled workweek for hospital workers for the first time. (Former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 3(K)(1)(a)-(b), Register 86, No. 12 (Mar. 22, 1986) p. 776.) The amendment entitled hospital workers on the 3/12 schedule to...