People v. Pieters

• Decision Date: 07 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. S014257,S014257
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 802 P.2d 420 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Errol PIETERS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 918

276 Cal.Rptr. 918

52 Cal.3d 894, 802 P.2d 420

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Errol PIETERS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S014257.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 7, 1991.

Handy Horiye, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White and Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Harley D. Mayfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert M. Foster, Raquel Gonzalez and Carl H. Horst, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

We granted review to consider (i) whether "drug quantity" enhancements imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 hereafter section 11370.4) ¹ were impliedly excepted from the double-base-term limitation of former Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g) (hereafter former Penal Code section 1170.1(g)) ² prior to the effective date of the present explicit exception and, if so, (ii) whether the enhancements are triggered by the weight of drugs in their pure form only or by the total weight of a mixture containing the drug (i.e., the weight of a "cut" or adulterated drug). We conclude the enhancements are impliedly excepted from the double-base-term limitation and are imposed according to the total weight of any compound or mixture containing a drug enumerated by section 11370.4.

I. FACTS

Defendant Errol Pieters arranged a sale of cocaine to an undercover police officer in July 1987. He was arrested in a vehicle containing just over 11 pounds of a white, powdery substance, later proved to be 83 percent cocaine. A jury convicted defendant of violating Health and Safety Code section 11352 (offer to sell or transportation of a narcotic; hereafter section 11352) and Penal Code section 182.1 (conspiracy), and found true the allegation that the substance containing cocaine weighed more than 10 pounds (§ 11370.4, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of eight years in state prison, consisting of a mitigated base term of three years for the section 11352 violation and a consecutive term of five years for the section 11370.4 enhancement.

Defendant appealed, contending that his sentence violated the double-base-term limit and that because he possessed less than 10 pounds of pure cocaine, insufficient evidence supported the quantity enhancement. The Court of Appeal held sufficient evidence supported the quantity enhancement but agreed that such an enhancement imposed prior to 1988 could not exceed the double-base-term limit. Accordingly, it affirmed the conviction for the section 11352 violation, but remanded for resentencing as to the quantity enhancement.

II. THE DOUBLE-BASE-TERM LIMITATION

Quantity enhancements under section 11370.4 were enacted in 1985. (Stats.1985, ch. 1398, § 3, pp. 4948-4949.) The express legislative purpose in adding this section was "to punish more severely those persons who are in the regular business of trafficking in, or production of, narcotics and those persons who deal in large quantities of narcotics as opposed to individuals who have a less serious, occasional, or relatively minor role in this activity." (Stats.1985, ch. 1398, § 1, p. 4948.)

The double-base-term limitation, on the other hand, first became operative in 1977. (Former Pen.Code, § 1170.1a, as added by Stats.1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 5140; renumbered as Pen.Code, § 1170.1 and amended by Stats.1977, ch. 165, § 17, p. 649.) In cases involving multiple sentences, this rule limits the maximum term to twice the number of years imposed as the base term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). Then, as now, the rule admitted specific exceptions. Quantity enhancements pursuant to section 11370.4, however, were not explicitly included among those exceptions until 1988--after defendant had committed the crimes charged. (Stats.1987, ch. 1423, § 3.7, No. 5 Deering's Adv.Legis.Service, p. 5431.) Because defendant's eight-year sentence is more than double his three-year base term, the issue before us is whether section 11370.4 created an implied exception to the double-base-term limit even before the 1988 amendment to former Penal Code section 1170.1(g).

The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 559, 224 Cal.Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.) In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 658, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.) But "[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014, citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted; see also People v. Davis (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 760, 766, 212 Cal.Rptr. 673 [although reasonable doubts as to ambiguous criminal statute should normally be resolved in favor of defendant, rule does not apply where result is absurd or contrary to legislative intent].) Thus, "[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act." (Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) Finally, we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute "with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness." (Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Board (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 814, 114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d 617.) With these principles in mind, we examine the probable intent of the Legislature in enacting section 11370.4.

The People concede the literal language of section 11370.4 is unambiguous. As originally enacted, enhancements under this section applied only if three conditions were satisfied: (i) the defendant was convicted of violating Health and Safety Code section 11351 or 11352; (ii) such violation involved "a substance containing heroin or cocaine"; and (iii) the substance must have exceeded three, ten, or twenty-five pounds. If all three conditions were met, the defendant was subject to a three-, five-, or ten-year enhancement. The statute made no reference to the double-base-term limitation. The People argue, however, that unless we imply such an exception, section 11370.4 would be rendered essentially nugatory as applied to pre-1988 offenses.

In support of this argument, the People draw our attention to People v. Carvajal (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 487, 249 Cal.Rptr. 368. There the Court of Appeal initially observed that section 11352 provides allowable base terms of three, four, or five years. (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 501, 249 Cal.Rptr. 368.) The court reasoned that if section 11370.4 were subject to the double-base-term limitation, only the three-year enhancement could be applied regardless of the chosen base term: a five-year enhancement could be imposed only if the defendant received the upper, five-year base term, and a ten-year enhancement "could never be imposed." (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 501, 249 Cal.Rptr. 368, italics in original.) The court concluded it would have been absurd for the Legislature to have created a provision that could never be given effect, especially when such an interpretation would frustrate the Legislature's express purpose of punishing drug dealers in proportion to the amount of drugs possessed. (Id. at pp. 501-502, 249 Cal.Rptr. 368.) It therefore held the double-base-term rule inapplicable to enhancements under section 11370.4, "despite the Legislature's initial, inadvertent failure to include such enhancements among the enumerated exclusions." (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 502, 249 Cal.Rptr. 368; see also People v. Garcia (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1096, 1101, 260 Cal.Rptr. 71 [applying Carvajal's analysis in deciding former Pen.Code, § 1170.1(g) does not apply to three-year enhancements under Health & Saf.Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a) ].) ³

We employed similar reasoning in People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 837-839, 210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736, in which we held the double-base-term limitation inapplicable to five-year enhancements imposed for prior serious felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667. We noted that if former Penal Code section 1170.1(g) applied, the five-year enhancements under Penal Code section 667 could only rarely be imposed. In the case of a prior burglary conviction (one of the "serious felonies" enumerated in Pen.Code, § 667), for instance, we acknowledged that the full five-year enhancement could be given effect only if a defendant received the aggravated base term of six years. (37 Cal.3d at p. 838, 210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736.) In order to carry out the apparent intent of Penal Code section 667, we regarded the failure to amend former Penal Code section 1170.1(g) as a "draftsman's oversight." (37 Cal.3d at p. 838, fn. 15, 210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736.)

The Court of Appeal in the present case rejected and distinguished the reasoning of Carvajal and Jackson. It first contested the assertion in Carvajal that 10-year enhancements could never be imposed. The court explained that the quantity enhancement could always be "imposed"; only that portion of the enhancement exceeding the double-base-term would need to be stayed. (See Cal.Rules of Court, rule 447; People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 103, 161 Cal.Rptr. 12.) Furthermore, the full enhancement could be enforced whenever another exception listed in former Penal Code section 1170.1(g) applied. (See generally People...