Singletary v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1950
• Docket Number: No. 16376,16376
• Citation: 217 S.C. 212,30 A.L.R.2d 326,60 S.E.2d 305
• Parties: , 30 A.L.R.2d 326 SINGLETARY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 305

60 S.E.2d 305

217 S.C. 212, 30 A.L.R.2d 326

SINGLETARY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

No. 16376.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 29, 1950.

Hagood, Rivers & Young, Charleston, Marion F. Winter, Moncks Corner, for appellant.

Joseph A. Newell, Moncks Corner, Norval N. Newell, Moncks Corner for respondent.

BAKER, Chief Justice.

On the morning of May 28, 1947, the respondent, an experienced traveler by train, was a passenger on appellant's train from Sumter to Moncks Corner. Upon reaching his destination, and in attempting to alight from the train, the respondent, who describes himself in his complaint as being 'visibly deformed and a crippled midget,' fell and suffered some personal injury.

In his complaint against the appellant railroad it is alleged that the conductor on appellant's train, although aware of respondent's handicaps, negligently, carelessly wilfully and wrongfully caused him to suffer a fall by not assisting him from the train to the stool placed beneath the train steps for passengers of ordinary stature to alight upon and step to the ground; and that after he fell, the said conductor wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully ridiculed and laughed at him because of his slight stature. We have set out only such allegations of acts of omission and commission as the respondent relied upon for a recovery in the trial of the case. (In testifying the respondent stated that upon the train stopping at Moncks Corner, 'the conductor took the little box (stool) and carelessly threw it off,' which is at variance with the allegation thereabout contained in his complaint.)

The answer of the appellant denied all allegations of negligence, wilfulness and wantonness on its part, and further, alleged that the contributory negligence, recklessness, wilfulness and wantonness of the respondent, combining and concurring with the alleged negligence, recklessness, wilfulness and wantonness of the appellant was the proximate cause of the accident resulting in such injuries as the respondent suffered, and without which the accident would not have occurred.

Upon the trial of the case at the September, 1948, term of the Court of Common Pleas for Berkeley County, and at the conclusion of the respondent's testimony, the appellant moved for a nonsuit, on the grounds: (1) That there was no evidence of actionable negligence on the part of the appellant that proximately caused respondent's injury; (2) That the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony was that the sole proximate cause of respondent's injury was the negligence, wilfulness and recklessness of the respondent, who in broad daylight, and with knowledge of his physical limitations, attempted to alight from the train (unassisted) under conditions known to him, and which would bar a recovery; (3) That the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony was that, even if there were some evidence of negligence, wilfulness and recklessness on the part of the appellant, the respondent failed to exercise the slightest care and caution for his own safety, and was guilty of such gross contributory negligence, contributory wilfulness and contributory recklessness as would bar a recovery; and (4) That there was no evidence of any conduct on the part of the appellant that would sustain a verdict for punitive damages.

The motion for a nonsuit was refused, and at the conclusion of all of the testimony, the appellant moved for a direction of verdict in its behalf on the same grounds as it had moved for a nonsuit, and on additional grounds which in effect are encompassed by the grounds stated on the motion for a nonsuit.

The motion for a direction of verdict as to actual and punitive damages was likewise refused, and the case submitted to the jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of the respondent for Two thousand ($2000.00) Dollars actual and Five hundred ($500.00) Dollars punitive damages, the full amount demanded in the complaint.

Appellant then made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, and failing in this, for a new trial. This motion was based on grounds embodied in the former motions for nonsuit and direction of verdict, and further, that there was no evidence of wantonness or wilfulness on the part of the appellant to justify a verdict for punitive damages; and that the verdict for the full amount sued for in view of the slight injury sustained by the respondent showed passion and prejudice and a complete disregard of the evidence by the jury. This motion was refused, and judgment on the verdict was duly entered.

In the appeal to this Court from the judgment, appropriate exceptions have been taken to said adverse rulings of the trial Judge, and which exceptions make it necessary for us to give a brief summary of the testimony relied upon by the respondent to prove negligence, wilfulness and wantonness on the part of the appellant, and that such was the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the respondent.

The respondent is four feet tall, his legs being very short, about eighteen inches long, and he weighs ninety pounds. At the time of the trial, he was forty-eight years old. His physician and witness described him as being very abnormal in his anatomical construction, and in being more specific, stated that he is of the dwarfish type, that his muscular contour is abnormal and irregular, that he is physically handicapped in comparison to a normal person in getting about and propelling himself forward, and very must so in the use of his legs. But there is no suggestion that he has any mental impairment.

The respondent testified that when he boarded the train in Sumter, it being scheduled to leave at 7:10 o'clock that morning, he was helped on the train by the conductor; that the train reached Moncks Corner at around 9 o'clock; that when the station signal blew for Moncks Corner, he was sitting about midway the coach, and the conductor was passing through; that he inquired of the conductor as to which door of the coach or car he should get off, and was told 'straight ahead.' We here quote from respondent's testimony: 'So as not to be in the way of the other people getting off, I went up to the front seat of the coach, to be ready to get off. When the train stopped I got up to get off. The conductor was in front of me and several people behind me getting off. The conductor took the little box and carelessly threw it off, knowing I was getting off. I walked down to the bottom step, and I didn't know whether I could reach it or not. As there was two prople behind, I took a chance and stepped off, and I just did touch the corner of it, and it slipped out from under me, and I slipped, and it threw me over on the rocks.'

At the time the respondent 'took a chance and stepped off' the train, the conductor of the train was standing about five or six feet away from the train door, and within easy calling distance if the respondent had desired assistance in getting off the train, but he did not seek assistance although in a better position to know than anyone else his physical limitations.

The evidence of wilfulness and wantonness mainly relied upon by the respondent for the recovery of punitive damages is his testimony that after be had fallen and had been helped to his feet by the conductor, the conductor said to him, 'Shorty, I hope you are not seriously hurt,' at which time the conductor was 'smiling, laughing,' and his attitude 'wasn't so pleasing.'

We have necessarily stated the testimony in the light most favorable to the respondent--have followed his own testimony. While we cannot let the testimony on behalf of the appellant influence us in passing upon whether the trial Judge should have granted appellant's motion for a direction of verdict, yet it is but fair to the appellant to herein state that the conductor testified that the respondent was the only (white) passenger whose destination was Moncks Corner; that he was standing by the steps of the white coach to assist (white) passengers (presumably the respondent) coming down the steps; that he saw the respondent coming down the steps, but didn't have time to assist him because when the respondent got to the bottom step, he turned his back to him, caught the grab-iron (on the steps) and 'slid down'; and that when the respondent 'slid down' to the bottom of the grabiron, he turned loose and fell on the ground; that he assisted the respondent to his feet, and his glasses having dropped off when he fell, picked up his glasses and returned them to respondent, inquired if he was hurt, and received a reply in the negative; that he at no time addressed the respondent as 'Shorty,' nor did he smile or laugh at him.

It appears to be undisputed that the train was stopped at Moncks Corner at the usual place, and that the distance from the bottom step on a passenger car to the step box placed for passengers to step on in alighting therefrom is eleven inches, and from the bottom step to the ground it is twenty-three inches. These are approximately the measurements at the place where the respondent was detraining.

There are three postulates which we will keep in mind. (1) A common carrier of passengers is due such passengers the highest degree of care, but is not an insurer of the safety of passengers under all circumstances. (2) If a passenger is handicapped by physical disability which should be reasonably apparent to the employees of the carrier, or of which they have notice, it then becomes its duty to render such assistance to the passenger in boarding and slighting from trains as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, but the passenger must give the employees of the carrier a reasonable opportunity of rendering such needed assistance. (3) In an action in tort based on negligence, the negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Even though there may be some testimony from which it could be inferred that a...