Singleton v. City of Georgetown Bldg. Stephen Stack
Decision Date | 06 February 2019 |
Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-050,Appellate Case No. 2016-000251 |
Parties | Willie Singleton and Julia Thomas, Heirs at Law of Victoria Gadson, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. City of Georgetown Building Official Stephen Stack, Mayor Lynn Wood Wilson, Mayor Pro Temp Brendon M. Barber, Sr., Council Member Peggy P. Wayne, Council Member Clarence Smalls, Council Member Paige B. Sawyer, III, Council Member Rudolph A. Bradley, Council Member Jack Scoville, Director of Building Planning Sabrina Morris, Steve Thomas, City Administrator, and The City of Georgetown, Defendants, Of whom Willie Singleton is the Appellant/Respondent, and The City of Georgetown is the Respondent/Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Bonnie Travaglio Hunt, of Hunt Law LLC, of North Charleston, for Appellant/Respondent.
Douglas Carter Baxter, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, of Myrtle Beach, and Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant.
Willie Singleton argues the circuit court erred in (1) denying his motion for recusal and (2) directing a verdict in favor of the City of Georgetown (the City) on his claim for damages related to the demolished house. In this cross-appeal arising from an action for damages related to the demolition of a house and the destruction of personal property therein, The City argues the circuit court erred in (1) denying its motion for a directed verdict as to damages for Singleton's personal property, (2) denying its motion for a new trial absolute, (3) denying its motion for remittitur, and (4) admitting into evidence a consent agreement disciplining a City building official (the Consent Agreement). We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
I. Singleton's Appeal
1. The circuit court properly denied Singleton's motion for recusal because Singleton failed to provide any supporting evidence that would cause the circuit court's impartiality to be reasonably questioned. See Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 156, 666 S.E.2d 230, 234 (2008) (); Rule 3(E)(1), CJC, Rule 501, SCACR ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ."); Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 74, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1996) (); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 524, 599 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2004) (); id. ().
2. The circuit court did not err in directing a verdict for the City as to Singleton's claim for damages regarding the demolished house because Singleton failed to provide any evidence he owned the house. See Rule 50(a), SCRCP (); Winters v. Fiddie, 394 S.C. 629, 644, 716 S.E.2d 316, 324 (Ct. App. 2011) (); McKaughan v. Upstate Lung & Critical Care Specialists, P.C., 421 S.C. 185, 189, 805 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ct. App. 2017) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-101 (Supp. 2018) (); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-102 (Supp. 2018) (); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-103 (Supp. 2018) ( ).
II. The City's Appeal
1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Singleton, the evidence supports the circuit court's denial of the City's directed verdict motion regarding Singleton's personal property. See Winters, 394 S.C. at 644, 716 S.E.2d at 324 (); Roddey v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 415 S.C. 580, 588, 784 S.E.2d 670, 675 (2016) (); Fickling v. City of Charleston, 372 S.C. 597, 603, 643 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 2007) (); McClary v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 291 S.C. 506, 511, 354 S.E.2d 405, 408 (Ct. App. 1987) (); Cisson Constr., Inc. v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc., 311 S.C. 499, 503, 429 S.E.2d 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1993) (); Roddey, 415 S.C. at 588, 784 S.E.2d at 675 ().
2. The circuit court did not err in denying the City's motion for a new trial absolute. See Rule 59, SCRCP ("A new trial may be granted . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the State."); Brinkley v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 386 S.C. 182, 185, 687 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ct. App. 2009) (); Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 57, 710 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Ct. App. 2011) () ; Brinkley, 386 S.C. at 185, 687 S.E.2d at 56 (); Burke, 393 S.C. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 .
3. The circuit court did not err in denying the City's motion for remittitur because the City did not demonstrate the verdict was excessive, nor did it provide a compelling reason for the circuit court to invade the jury's province. See Proctor v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 368 S.C. 279, 320, 628 S.E.2d 496, 518 (Ct. App. 2006) (); Burke, 393 S.C. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 (...
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