Singleton v. State, CR

Citation274 Ark. 126,623 S.W.2d 180
Decision Date26 October 1981
Docket NumberNo. CR,CR
PartiesCharles Lavern SINGLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 80-69.
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

Robert B. Wellenberger, Monticello, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

ADKISSON, Chief Justice.

On October 30, 1979, after a trial by jury, appellant, Charles L. Singleton, was sentenced to death by electrocution for capital felony murder, and life imprisonment for aggravated robbery.

We affirm the conviction and sentence for capital felony murder, but set aside the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-105(1) (a), (2)(a) (Repl.1977) prohibits the entry of a judgment of conviction on capital felony murder and the underlying specified felony. Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981). Generally, this Court will not consider errors raised for the first time on appeal; however, we note that the judgment in this case was entered before our decision in Swaite. In death penalty cases we will consider errors argued for the first time on direct appeal where prejudice is conclusively shown by the record and this Court would unquestionably require the trial court to grant relief under Rule 37.

The victim, Mary Lou York, was murdered in York's Grocery Store at Hamburg on June 1, 1979. She died from loss of blood as a result of two stab wounds in her neck.

The evidence of guilt in this case is overwhelming. Patti Franklin saw her relative Singleton enter York's Grocery at approximately 7:30 p. m. on the day of the crime. Shortly after he entered Patti heard Mrs. York scream, "Patti go get help, Charles Singleton is killing me." Patti then ran for help. Another witness, Lenora Howard, observed Singleton exit the store and shortly thereafter witnessed Mrs. York, who was "crying and had blood on her," come to the front door. Police Officer Strother was the first to arrive at the scene and found Mrs. York lying in a pool of blood in the rear of the store. The officer testified Mrs. York told him that Charles Singleton "came in the store, said this is a robbery, grabbed her around the neck, and went to stabbing her." She then told Officer Strother that "there's no way I can be all right, you know I'm not going to make it. I've lost too much blood." Mrs. York was taken to the hospital in an ambulance and was attended by her personal physician, Dr. J. D. Rankin. While enroute to the hospital, she told Dr. Rankin several times that she was dying and that Singleton did it. Mrs. York died before reaching the emergency room of the hospital. Officer Strother also testified that during examination of the premises, he found a money bag on the floor near the cash register which was empty, except for about $2.00 in change. He also stated that the cash register had only a small amount of change in it.

Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse for cause veniremen Waldrup, Goyne, Taylor, and Estelle. Appellant exercised a peremptory challenge on each of these prospective jurors but made no showing of record that he would have struck any other juror who actually sat on the trial of the case had he had a peremptory challenge remaining. Under such circumstances we have consistently held that appellant has shown no prejudice since he is unable to show that an objectionable juror was forced upon him without his having the privilege of exercising a peremptory challenge. Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980); Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Dalrymple, 252 Ark. 771, 480 S.W.2d 955 (1972); Green v. State, 223 Ark. 761, 270 S.W.2d 895 (1954). In Glover v. State, 248 Ark. 1260, 455 S.W.2d 670 (1970) the defense in exhausting his peremptory challenges used some of his challenges to remove unacceptable veniremen, then stated for the record that had he not been required to use his challenges on jurors that should have been excused for cause, a particular juror who was seated and actually served would have been challenged. In Glover we found that the error had been preserved and reversed the judgment.

Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that he would have exercised peremptory challenge on two specific jurors had the court granted his challenges for cause. The record does not reflect that the two jurors specified were biased or otherwise unqualified to serve. This Court has consistently held that it will not consider alleged errors raised for the first time on appeal. Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting as hearsay the statements made by the victim. The statements of the victim were admissible under two separate exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Rule 803(2), Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl.1979) provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

....

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

And, Rule 804(b)(2), Uniform Rules of Evidence provides:

(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

....

(2) Statement under belief of impending death. A statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death.

All of the victim's statements were related to Singleton cutting her throat and, as a result, her dying. These statements clearly fall under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay since they were made under the stress of the event.

The victim cried out to Patti Franklin that Singleton was killing her. She told Officer Strother that she was not going to make it because she had lost too much blood, and she repeatedly told her physician, Dr. Rankin, that she was dying. It is clear that all of her statements were made under the dying declaration exception to the rule against hearsay. Each of these statements were made concerning the cause or circumstances of what she believed to be her impending death.

It is argued that there was no showing by the state that Mrs. York had firsthand knowledge of the identity of the appellant. This is unsupported by any reasonable view of the evidence.

Finally, appellant asserts the trial court erred in its rulings regarding photographs of the crime scene and the victim. Appellant seems to base his argument on two primary allegations: (1) that it was error to allow Chief Kennedy to refer to photographs of the crime scene previously held inadmissible as inflammatory and, (2) that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in attempting to introduce a photograph of the victim's body after the trial court had ruled it inadmissible, defense counsel having stipulated to the cause of death.

Chief Kennedy testified that he took the photographs when he arrived at the crime scene. He referred to the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • Ruiz v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1983
    ...petition for post-conviction relief denied, 273 Ark. 508, 621 S.W.2d 482 (1981). (Robbed and killed a storekeeper.) Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1996, 72 L.Ed.2d 458 (1982). (Robbed and stabbed a storekeeper, killing Hayes v.......
  • Singleton v. Lockhart
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • August 28, 1986
    ...Arkansas Supreme Court, but the aggravated robbery conviction and sentence were vacated on double jeopardy grounds. Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981). Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner then sought permission to proceed under Rule 37 o......
  • Singleton v. Norris
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • February 10, 2003
    ...that she was dying and that Singleton did it. Mrs. York died before reaching the emergency room of the hospital. Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180, 181 (1981). Singleton's conviction and sentence for capital felony murder were affirmed, but his conviction for the underlying f......
  • Hill v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1982
    ...felony murder and the underlying specified felony or felonies. Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981); Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981). Generally, this Court will not consider errors raised for the first time on appeal; however, as we stated in Singleto......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Executing the insane: a look at death penalty schemes in Arkansas, Georgia and Texas.
    • United States
    • Suffolk Journal of Trial & Appellate Advocacy No. 12, January 2007
    • January 1, 2007
    ...Singleton's sentences of death for capital felony murder and life imprisonment for robbery). (108) Id.; see also Singleton v. State, 623 S.W.2d 180 (Ark. 1981) (holding that defendant failed to show trial court committed irreversible error in failing to excuse for cause three veniremen and ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT