Singleton v. Stegall

• Decision Date: 03 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-CA-0061,90-CA-0061
• Citation: 580 So.2d 1242
• Parties: Daniel I. SINGLETON v. Earl B. STEGALL.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1242

580 So.2d 1242

Daniel I. SINGLETON v. Earl B. STEGALL.

No. 90-CA-0061.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 3, 1991.

Daniel I. Singleton, pro se.

No Brief Filed for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ROBERTSON and McRAE, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiff alleges that he engaged the services of the defendant lawyer, paid his fee, and that the lawyer wholly failed to pursue his interest with competence, diligence, or good fidelity. The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on its face. Upon review, we find that it more than stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

We reverse.

II.

Daniel Israel Singleton resides in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman. Singleton stands finally convicted in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, of the crime of armed robbery, upon which the Court sentenced him to thirty-five years imprisonment. On September 24, 1986, this Court affirmed Singleton's conviction and sentence. Singleton v. State, 495 So.2d 14 (Miss.1986).

In October of 1987, Singleton wrote to Earl B. Stegall, a lawyer and member in good standing of the Mississippi State Bar, who maintains his office in Gulfport, Mississippi. Singleton asked that Stegall represent him in pursuing a claim for post-conviction relief. See Rule 22, Miss.Sup.Ct.Rules; Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp.1990). Stegall quoted Singleton a fee of $5,000.00 which Singleton says he has paid. For reasons not apparent, Singleton says he has paid Stegall another $500.00 "as a bonus."

Time passed and little happened. It appears that Singleton may have been returned to the Harrison County Jail at one point, but he says he never got a hearing. Singleton concedes Stegall "has, admittedly, made two attempts to have something accomplished, but to no avail." More to the point, Singleton charges that Stegall never performed the fundamental task for which his services were engaged, to-wit, filing and pursuing an application for post-conviction relief. The matter is particularly serious in that the three-year statute of limitations may now have run. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-5(2) (Supp.1990).

On May 4, 1989, Singleton commenced the present civil action by filing his complaint in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. He named Stegall as defendant and charged Stegall with fraud, breach of trust, breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and "pseudo-statements to the plaintiff." Singleton proceeds pro se and without apparent assistance of counsel. His complaint is inartful; at points, colorful. It charges, without doubt, that Stegall accepted employment as Singleton's lawyer and failed substantially to perform the duties thereby incumbent upon him. Singleton sues for return of the fee he paid, for compensatory damages for mental anguish and distress and severe anxiety. He seeks as well punitive damages.

Belatedly, Stegall answered and has admitted paragraph one wherein Singleton charges:

1. On July 29, 1987, the defendant stated a fee of $5000.00 (FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS) for a motion for Post Conviction Relief. On October 27, 1987, the Plaintiff retained the Defendant for Post Conviction Relief. A total of $5500.00 (FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS) was given to the Defendant.

With this exception, Stegall denies the essential allegations of the complaint.

Inexplicably thereafter, the Circuit Court entered its order on December 19, 1989, holding that the complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" and finally dismissing same.

Singleton now appeals to this Court.

III.

When a lawyer undertakes to serve a client, he or she assumes duties sounding in a blend of contract, tort and much more. ¹ The first step is finding that a lawyer-client relationship has come into being. Bass v. Montgomery, 515 So.2d 1172, 1174 (Miss.1987); Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 633-34 (Miss.1987). The client's payment of a lawyer's fee cinches the point, although we have never held it a sine qua non the relationship has arisen. ² See Winstead v. Berry, 556 So.2d 321, 323 (Miss.1989); Gold v. LaBarre, 455 So.2d 739, 748 (Miss.1984). Today, Stegall has admitted Singleton paid his fee. A lawyer-client relationship existed for purposes of Singleton's pursuit of a claim for post-conviction relief.

Our law has long held lawyers to tripartite duties of "care, skill and dispatch." Fitch v. Scott, 4 Miss. (3 How.) 314, 317 (1839), quoted in Thompson v. Erving's Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So.2d 756, 757 (Miss.1966). We have likened the duty unto that of physicians and surgeons. ³ Dean v. Conn, 419 So.2d 148, 150 (Miss.1982); Nause v. Goldman, 321 So.2d 304, 308 (Miss.1975). Of late we have spoken of a negligence standard, e.g., Bass v. Montgomery, 515 So.2d at 1174; Thompson v. Erving Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So.2d at 759, but obviously more need be said.

Today a lawyer owes his client duties falling into three broad categories: (a) the duty of care, (b) a duty of loyalty, and (c) duties provided by contract. First, each lawyer, by virtue of the positive, substantive law of this state, has a duty of care consistent with the level of expertise the lawyer holds himself out as possessing and consistent with the circumstances of the case. Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 928 (Miss.1982). This duty is non-delegable. It is owing to each client he or she undertakes to serve, and in that regard the client has a correlative right. The lawyer's duty of care imports not only skill or expertise but diligence as well. Both our rules of professional conduct, and our positive law charge that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. ⁴ One of the clearer cases where a lawyer may breach his duty of diligence occurs when, through neglect, he allows the statute of limitations to expire so that the client's claim is barred. See Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d at 636.

Each lawyer owes each client a second duty, not wholly separable from the duty of care but sufficiently distinct that we afford it its own label, viz. the duty of loyalty, or, sometimes, fidelity. We speak here of the fiduciary nature of the lawyer's duties to his client, see Lowrey v. Will of Smith, 543 So.2d 1155, 1161-62 (Miss.1989); Gold v. LaBarre, 455 So.2d at 748, of confidentiality and of candor and disclosure. See Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney D, 579 So.2d 559 (Miss.1991). Third, a lawyer owes any duties created by his contract with his client.

The proposed Restatement Of The Law Governing Lawyers distills these duties:

Sec. 28. Lawyer's Duties to Client in General

Subject to the other provisions of this Restatement, a lawyer must:

(1) In matters covered by the representation, act in a manner reasonably calculated to reach a client's objectives, as defined by the client after disclosure and consultation, to the extent consistent with the lawyer's legal duties to others;

(2) So act with reasonable competence and diligence; ⁵

(3) Safeguard the client's confidences and property, avoid conflicting interests that might impair the representation, and not employ adversely to the client powers conferred by the client-lawyer relationship; and

(4) Comply with any valid contract with the client.

American Law Institute, Restatement Of The Law: The Law Governing Lawyers Sec. 28 (Prelim.Draft No. 6, July 25, 1990).

That an action may lie for the lawyer's breach of these duties is settled. Recovery, however, requires proof of proximate cause, see Stewart v. Walls, 534 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Miss.1988); Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d at 633-34; Nause v. Goldman, 321 So.2d at 307-08, a point we perceive problematical, to be tailored to the injury the client claims and the remedy he elects.

IV.

Our question today is a narrow one: whether Singleton's complaint states a claim, under the foregoing standards, upon which relief may be granted.

Our procedural posture is important. The rules require only that the plaintiff provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief. Rule 8(a)(1), Miss.R.Civ.P.; see also, Rule 8(e)(1), Miss.R.Civ.P. Our former requirements for detailed fact pleadings have long been dispatched. Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 221 (Miss.1988); Comet Delta, Inc. v. Pate Stevedore Co. of Pascagoula, Inc. 521 So.2d 857, 859 (Miss.1988); Luckett v. Mississippi Wood, Inc., 481 So.2d 288, 290 (Miss.1985); Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Co., Inc., 464 So.2d 499, 505 (Miss.1985). When a complaint is tested on its face, we must take its well-pleaded allegations as true. Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Miss.1990); Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Association, 520 So.2d 1333, 1339 (Miss.1987). Today's complaint is by one incarcerated and acting pro se, and here we have said:

Where, as here, a prisoner is proceeding pro se, we take that fact into account and, in our discretion, credit not so well pleaded allegations, [citations omitted] to the end that a prisoner's meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully drafted.

Moore v. Ruth, 556 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Miss.1990); see also, Terrell v. State, 573 So.2d 732, 733 (Miss.1990).

These thoughts in mind, the law obliged the Circuit Court to review Singleton's complaint and ask whether it suggested a set of facts which might support relief. The Court had no authority to dismiss the complaint unless it may fairly and objectively be said that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Overstreet, 570 So.2d at 1197; McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 874-75 (Miss.1989); Stanton & Associates, Inc., 464 So.2d at 505.

We review the Circuit Court's dismissal of the complaint de novo. We apply the standards...