Sinley v. Safety Controls Tech., Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 109065,109065 |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 4068 |
| Parties | STEVEN SINLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAFETY CONTROLS TECHNOLOGY, INC., ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Appearances:
Scanlon & Elliot, and Michael J. Elliot; Elvin, Klingshirn, Royer & Torch, and Christina M. Royer, for appellee.
Haneline Pryatel Law, and Keith L. Pryatel, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Superior Dairy, Inc. ("Superior"), appeals from the trial court's judgment denying its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellee, Steven Sinley ("Sinley"), filed a six-count complaint against Safety Controls Technology, Inc., Rotogran International, Inc., the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, and Superior.1 Sinley's complaint alleged that he was employed in the maintenance department at Superior on May 11, 2019, when a grinder machine malfunctioned, and that he responded to the maintenance call for the grinder. He alleged that by the time he arrived at the machine, Superior had removed or disabled certain safety guards and equipment on the grinder, including a mechanism that shut down the machine's power once it had been disassembled. According to Sinley, while he was working on the machine with his hands in the interior part of the grinder, a supervisor intentionally and without warning activated the machine by triggering its reset button, thereby causing four fingers of Sinley's right hand to be amputated. Sinley's complaint asserted an employer intentional tort claim in violation of R.C. 2745.01 against Superior.2
{¶ 3} In response to the complaint, Superior filed a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.02(B) and 2711.03(B) of Ohio's Arbitration Act, and 9 U.S.C 1, et seq., the Federal Arbitration Act. Superior argued that during his employment with Superior, Sinley was a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman and Helpers of America, Local 92 (the "Union") which, as Sinley's collective bargaining agent, had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA" or "agreement") with Superior regarding the terms and conditions of Sinley's employment.3
{¶ 5} The CBA provided further that if the Union decided not to file a grievance on an employee's behalf or pursue a grievance to arbitration, "then the employee, or the employee along with his/her chosen representative, shall be entitled to utilize the above Article IX and X to resolve any and all employment-related disputes, including without limitation, those set forth in Section 4 above." Article X, Section 6.
{¶ 6} Superior argued that as a member of the Union, Sinley had agreed to use the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the CBA as the "sole and exclusive" means of settling any alleged violation by Superior of "any employment-related law or statute," and therefore, the trial court should stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of Sinley's statutory employer intentional tort claim against Superior.
{¶ 7} In his brief in opposition, Sinley asserted that a union-negotiated waiver of an employee's statutory right to a judicial forum must be "clear and unmistakable" pursuant to the standard announced in Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998). He contended that the CBA between Local 92 and Superior did not "clearly and unmistakenly" require him to arbitrate his R.C. 2745.01 claim because although the arbitration agreement referred to various statutes, it did not explicitly refer to R.C. 2745.01 or to bodily or personal injury claims, and the agreement's reference to "the violation of employment-related laws or statutes" was too ambiguous to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" standard.
{¶ 8} Sinley also argued that employer intentional tort claims are not arbitrable because willful and intentional misconduct by an employer that leads to an employee's injury is outside the accepted workplace relationship. Sinley argued that his employer intentional tort claim was analogous to the claims raised in Arnold v. Burger King, 2015-Ohio-4485, 48 N.E.3d 69 (8th Dist.), in which this court held that the plaintiff's claims against her employer and supervisor for sexual harassment, negligent retention, emotional distress, assault, intentional tort, and discrimination, all of which arose out of a workplace rape of the employee by the supervisor, were not subject to the arbitration agreement between the employee and company because "a rape is an outrageous tort that is legally distinct from the contractual relationship between the parties." Id. at ¶ 35.
{¶ 9} Sinley argued that employer intentional torts are not a foreseeable result of employment and thus, as in Arnold, his claim arose independent of the employment relationship and could "be maintained without reference to the contract or relationship at issue." Id. at ¶ 65. Sinley pointed to the Ohio's workers' compensation system as support for this conclusion, asserting that employer intentional torts would be governed by the remedies afforded under R.C. Chapter 4123, Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act, and not subject to the special remedies of R.C. 2745.01, if they were in fact considered to be injuries arising out of the employment relationship.
{¶ 10} Finally, Sinley argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because (1) the timing requirements of the various steps in the grievance procedure gave Superior "discretion to prolong events and force arbitration"; (2) the arbitration provision impermissibly shortened the statute of limitations for claims by requiring employees to request arbitration within 30 days after the grievance procedure; and (3) the arbitration provision was "vague and lack[ed] critical details" because it did not give specific details concerning the arbitration process.
{¶ 11} After Superior filed a reply to Sinley's brief in opposition, the trial court denied Superior's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration without opinion. This appeal followed.
{¶ 12} An order "that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration * * * is a final order that may be reviewed * * * on appeal." R.C. 2711.02(C). When we review the scope of an arbitration agreement, and specifically whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to arbitration, we employ a de novo standard of review. Avery v. Academy Invest., L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107550, 2019-Ohio-3509, ¶ 9, citing Seyfried v. O'Brien, 2017-Ohio-286, 81 N.E.3d 961, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). Under a de novo standard, we afford no deference to the trial court's decision. Brownlee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97707, 2012-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9.
{¶ 13} In its first assignment of error, Superior contends that the trial court erred in not compelling arbitration under R.C. Chapter 2711, Ohio's Arbitration Act. In its second assignment of error, Superior argues that the trial court erred in not compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq. We consider these assigned errors together because they are related.
{¶ 14} The FAA manifests "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Likewise, Ohio's "public policy favors arbitration." Wright State Univ. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2016-Ohio-35, ¶ 11. "Arbitration 'provides the parties with a relatively speedy and inexpensive method of conflict resolution and has the additional advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets.'" Cleveland v. Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Assn., 2016-Ohio-702, 47 N.E.3d 904, ¶ 21 (8th...
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