Six v. Job Service North Dakota, 3

• Decision Date: 17 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 890077,R,3,890077
• Citation: 443 N.W.2d 911
• Parties: 55 Ed. Law Rep. 296 Tom SIX, Petitioner and Appellant, v. JOB SERVICE NORTH DAKOTA and Solen School Districtespondents and Appellees. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 911

443 N.W.2d 911

55 Ed. Law Rep. 296

Tom SIX, Petitioner and Appellant, v. JOB SERVICE NORTH DAKOTA and Solen School District No. 3,

Respondents and Appellees.

Civ. No. 890077.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 17, 1989.

Dietz & Little, Bismarck, for petitioner and appellant; argued by Larry D. Orvik.

David E. Clinton (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Job Service of North Dakota, Bismarck for respondent and appellee Job Service.

Pearce & Durick, Bismarck, for respondent and appellee, Solen School Dist. No. 3; argued by Gary R. Thune.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

Tom Six applied for unemployment benefits from Job Service of North Dakota claiming that he resigned his teaching position with Solen School District No. 3 upon the recommendation of the superintendent of schools. After conducting a hearing, the Job Service referee concluded that Six had not shown good cause attributable to his employer for leaving and, therefore, was not entitled to job insurance benefits. Six appealed and Job Service affirmed the referee's decision. Six then appealed to the district court which affirmed the decision of Job Service. Six has now appealed to this Court. We affirm.

Our review of administrative agency decisions is governed by section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., and involves a three-step process: (1) Are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence? (2) Are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact? (3) Is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law? Falcon v. Williams Cty. Social Serv. Bd., 430 N.W.2d 569 (N.D.1988). When an administrative agency decision is appealed to the district court and then to this Court, we review the decision of the agency and not the decision of the district court. Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144 (N.D.1988). We review the record compiled before the agency rather than the findings of the district court. Falcon v. Williams Cty. Social Serv. Bd., supra. In determining whether or not the agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but determine only whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have determined that the factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence. Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979).

Six was employed by Solen School District No. 3 in August of 1987 to teach during the 1987-1988 academic year. Apparently some tension developed between Six and the school board regarding his methods of teaching and disciplining students. Although Six had originally been assigned coaching responsibilities, that assignment was withdrawn by the school board.

In late March of 1988, Six met with two officials from the school district, Bruce Meland, the superintendent of schools, and Mr. Hauck about resigning his position. On March 30, 1988, Six submitted a letter of resignation effective May 20, 1988, the last day of school. In the hearing held by the Job Service referee on August 22, 1988, in response to questions posed by the referee, Meland testified in part as follows:

"Q. Was he requested to resign?

"A. He and I and Mr. Hauck talked one day, I suppose about a week before this resignation letter, about probably for his best interests it would be a decision that he ought to consider, yes.

* * * * * *

"Q. Was it made clear to him that he would be nonrenewed if he did not resign?

"A. It was made clear, I believe to Tom, what procedures would, you know, would take place if a nonrenewal were entered into. So--so that he and I, I think, were both clear on that what would take place if it was a nonrenewal procedure. We felt, and I think Tom would agree, in his best interest for his career and what not, it looks better not to have had to go through such a thing as that.

"Q. How's that?

"A. A nonrenewal.

"Q. I see. A resignation looks better.

"A. Looks a lot better, yes."

The Job Service referee states in his decision that

"[a]lthough the superintendent of schools recommended to the claimant that he resign, the claimant was not required to resign. By law, he was entitled to a hearing which would require the school board to show good cause for not renewing his contract. The claimant failed to avail himself of the protection offered by the law and, therefore, did not take the necessary steps to protect his employment.

"I conclude the claimant has not shown good cause attributable to the employer for leaving and, therefore, is not entitled to job insurance benefits."

An employee who leaves employment "voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer" is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Section 52-06-02(1), N.D.C.C. " '[W]hether a person left employment "voluntarily" is a mixed question of fact and law, where the evidence must support findings of fact which, in turn, must sustain the conclusion of "voluntariness." ' But, 'it is not possible to determine accurately whether the act of a worker in leaving his job was voluntary unless one takes account of the causes which led to his action.' " Wahlstrom v. Job Service North Dakota, 406 N.W.2d 693, 694-5 (N.D.1987).

This Court has previously considered this issue under similar circumstances. In Carlson v. Job Service North Dakota, 391 N.W.2d 643 (N.D.1986), Barbara Carlson sought unemployment compensation, claiming that she quit her civilian secretarial job with the United States Air Force only because she was being discharged. Carlson resigned after reading a note on a supervisor's desk which recommended that removal proceedings be started against her. Job Service denied benefits, concluding that Carlson had voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. We reversed the decision of Job Service and held that "an employee who resigns rather than awaiting certain discharge is not disqualified from unemployment compensation." Carlson v. Job Service North Dakota, supra, 391 N.W.2d at 646.

At the time the decision in Carlson was rendered, section 52-06-02(1), N.D.C.C., provided that an individual is disqualified for benefits after leaving his employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. The 1987 Legislative Session passed Senate Bill No. 2225, which amended section 52-06-02(1), N.D.C.C., to include the following language:

"For the purpose of this subsection, an individual who left the most recent employment in anticipation of discharge or layoff must be deemed to have left employment voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer."

Six argues that this amendment does not preclude him from qualifying for unemployment benefits. He asserts that "the statute applies to those employees who resign because they 'expect' that they will be discharged, and not to situations such as this, where discharge is a certain result."

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully reviewable by this Court. State v. Bower, 442 N.W.2d 438 (N.D.1989). Our primary objective in the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Peterson v. Heitkamp, 442 N.W.2d 219 (N.D.1989). We look first to the language of the statute. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151 (N.D.1989). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc., 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985). If a statute's language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, along with the language of the statute, to ascertain legislative intent. First Sec. Bank, Underwood, N.D. v. Enyart, 439 N.W.2d 801 (N.D.1989).

We believe the intent of the legislature is clear from the language of the statute but it is interesting to note that legislative history also supports the view of Job Service. Mike Wilma, an attorney with Job Service, testified in support of SB 2225 before the House Committee on Industry, Business, and Labor, in pertinent part as follows:

"Job Service has consistently interpreted the voluntary leaving disqualification provision to require a disqualification in cases where an individual leaves employment because the individual anticipates being discharged or laid off. The added language which you find at lines 25 to 29 on page 2 of the bill specifically states this interpretation. We are asking you to consider the addition of this language because of a decision rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court last July involving a claim for unemployment benefits.... Job Service does believe that this decision changes the application of this law section. Although this is only one decision, it must be noted that this is a North Dakota Supreme Court decision and it does become a precedent which must...