Skaff v. Small Claims Court for Los Angeles Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 17 January 1968
• Parties: , 435 P.2d 825 George SKAFF, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SMALL CLAIMS COURT FOR the LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 29465.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 65

65 Cal.Rptr. 65

68 Cal.2d 76, 435 P.2d 825

George SKAFF, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SMALL CLAIMS COURT FOR the LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29465.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Jan. 17, 1968.

Silverton & Silverton, Lester A. Berman and Ronald R. Silverton, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Donald K. Byrne and Ronald D. Aubert, Deputy County Counsel, for defendant and respondent court.

No appearance for defendant and respondent corporation.

TOBRINER, Justice.

George Skaff filed an action in the small claims court, a division of the Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles, against the Holiday Car Leasing Corporation, seeking recovery of $250 ¹ which he allegedly extended to Holiday as a deposit for the delivery of a 1965 Chevrolet Impala Coupe automobile. Holiday counterclaimed against Skaff for $175, the amount allegedly due for rental and insurance coverage of a 1964 Chevrolet Impala Coupe automobile that Holiday had leased to Skaff. After a hearing on July 19, 1965, the judge of the small claims court denied plaintiff's complaint but awarded Holiday a $175 judgment on its counterclaim.

Skaff in due time attempted to appeal from the judgment. After the clerk of the small claims court advised him that he had no right of appeal, Skaff, on September 16, 1965, filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a writ of mandate to compel the respondent small claims court to permit the filing of the appeal. The superior court denied the writ on September 21, 1965, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

Although Skaff sought no relief in this court, probably because of the small amount in controversy, we granted a hearing on our own motion (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 28(a)) to decide a novel and important question in the day-to-day operations of small claims courts. Specifically, we must decide whether the party who initially brings an action in the small claims court may appeal from an adverse judgment on the opposing party's counterclaim or cross-complaint.

Section 117j of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for appeals from the judgment of small claims courts, reads as follows: 'The judgment of said court shall be conclusive upon the plaintiff. If the defendant is dissatisfied, he may, within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment, appeal to the superior court of the county in which said court is held.' Since a party possesses no right of appeal except as provided by statute (People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720, 12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587; Trede v. Superior Court (1943) 21 Cal.2d 630, 634, 134 P.2d 745; In re Conley (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 755, 759, 53 Cal.Rptr. 321), the issue before us narrows to whether a party against whom a successful counterclaim has been filed should be regarded as a 'plaintiff' or a 'defendant' for purposes of section 117j.

As we shall explain in more detail infra, we believe Skaff should be regarded as a 'defendant' and entitled to appeal from the judgment on the counterclaim for the following reasons: (1) Since decisions of this court characterize a counterclaim as a separate, simultaneous action, the plaintiff in the original action becomes a defendant in the cross action and acquires the appellate remedies of a defendant; (2) The underlying reasons which support a denial of an appeal to the plaintiff in the prime action do not apply to the cross-action; (3) The denial of an appeal on the counterclaim would tend to discourage the use of the small claims court; (4) The denial of appeal on the counterclaim would pivot the right to appeal upon a fortuity.

Although section 117j is susceptible to differing literal interpretations, the historical characterization of the counterclaim as a separate, simultaneous action supports Skaff's position that he is, for its purposes, a defendant. In analyzing counterclaims and cross-complaints, this court has recognized that 'these cross-actions * * * are still distinct and independent causes of action, so that when properly interposed and stated the defendant becomes in respect to the matters pleaded by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant.' (Pacific Finance Corp. v. Superior Court (1933) 219 Cal. 179, 182, 25 P.2d 983, 984. See also Case v. Kadota Fig Assn. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 596, 603, 220 P.2d 912.) So interpreted, section 117j would allow Skaff to appeal from the judgment on Holiday's counterclaim.

The reasons for denying a plaintiff the right of appeal on his original demand do not apply to the situation in which the plaintiff has been transformed into a defendant on a counterclaim. In Superior Wheeler Cake Corp. v. Superior Court (1928) 203 Cal. 384, 264 P. 488, this court posited the constitutionality of the denial to plaintiff of a right of appeal upon plaintiff's choice of this particular forum. Because he elects 'a quick and inexpensive method of trial and judgment' he forfeits the normal protection of jury trial and appeal; plaintiff 'comes under the yoke of this system voluntarily, but the defendant comes thereunder only by the strong arm of the law.' (P. 387, 264 P. 489.) ² When plaintiff becomes metamorphosed into a defendant the situation is reversed: he does not choose the quick but nonappealable route of recovery; defendant, by filing the counterclaim, does so; ³ plaintiff should no more become the victim of defendant's choice than defendant should become the victim of plaintiff's choice on the original claim.

To lock the plaintiff into a nonappealable judgment of the small claims court on a counterclaim, which may impose a liability upon him in excess of his own original demand, is to discourage litigation in that potentially useful court. Nonappealability of the counterclaim would expose the moving party to the possibility of the conversion of his claim into a quite unexpected adverse judgment which he could neither discharge, because he lacks the funds, nor challenge on appeal. Many potential plaintiffs might prefer to forego legitimate claims rather than invite such risks. By assuring possible claimants that initiation of a case in the small claims court will only impose an irretrievably binding judgment on a cause of action voluntarily submitted to that court, we preserve its usefulness. Since resolution of disputes by small claims courts conserves the resources of both the parties and the state, we seek within the statutory framework to encourage their utilization; our interpretation fulfills that purpose.

Finally, the recognition of plaintiff's right of appeal on a counterclaim avoids a ruling which would pivot that right upon the fortuity of the manner of a party's presentation of his claim: whether he proceeded by an original complaint or by a counterclaim. It avoids the anomaly of awarding to a party a premium--the right of appeal from an adverse judgment--because he had the foresight or good fortune to file a cross-demand in the small claims court...