Skelton v. Eckstrom
| Decision Date | 13 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | C/A No.: 3:12-1891-MBS-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | James B. Skelton, aka James Bennie Skelton, Plaintiff, v. Daniel Eckstrom, Lexington County Probate Court Judge, Defendant. |
James B. Skelton, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against the Honorable Daniel Eckstrom, who is the Probate Judge for Lexington County. The plaintiff resides at RAPHA Residential Care in Gaston, South Carolina. In the "STATEMENT OF CLAIM" portion of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he is a "prisoner of the probate system[.]" Plaintiff also claims he is being denied the right to "life, liberty, and the ability to be gainfully employed," and maintains the defendant is receiving "kickbacks" from a court appointed fiduciary who is "using [him] as a hostage." Plaintiff wants a federal grand jury to investigate the Lexington County probate system, and engage in a full background check of the defendant.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings. The review1 has been conducted in light of the followingprecedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979) ();2 Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)(per curiam); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(per curiam); and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint or petition, the plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). A litigant must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant or respondent is plausibly liable, not merely possibly liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Even under this less stringent standard, the pleading is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff couldprevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition or complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's or petitioner's legal arguments for him or her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Probate Court for Lexington County is a court in the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system. See Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina (); City of Pickens v. Schmitz, 376 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1989); Spartanburg County Dept. of Social Services v. Padgett, 370 S.E.2d 872, 875-876 & n. 1 (1988); and Cort Industries Corp. v. Swirl, Inc., 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975).
Probate Judges, such as Judge Eckstrom, are judges in the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system. See In re Former Newberry County Associate Probate Judge Allen, 385 S.C. 506, 685 S.E.2d 612 (2009); In re Anonymous Former Probate Judge, 358 S.C. 1, 594 S.E.2d 473 (2004); In the Matter of Brown, 334 S.C. 44, 512 S.E.2d 114 (1999); In the Matter of Johnson, 302 S.C. 532, 397 S.E.2d 522 (1990); and In the Matter of Parker, 313 S.C. 47, 437 S.E.2d 37 (1993).
Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by state court judges. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), where theSupreme Court of the United States held that a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This prohibition on review of state court proceedings or judgments by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the Feldman-Rooker doctrine. See, e.g., Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3rd Cir. 1991). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when a challenge to a state court decision concerns a federal constitutional issue. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, supra, 460 U.S. at 484-486, and Arthur v. Supreme Court of Iowa, 709 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.Iowa 1989). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a State's highest court. Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 & nn. 3-4 (9th Cir. 1986). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (); and Robart Wood & Wire Products v. Namaco Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986).
Thus, the plaintiff may not use a civil rights action to challenge the determinations or rulings of state courts, such as the Probate Court for Lexington County. See Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986)("[I]t is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review."); and Brinkmann v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986), where a pro se plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against his ex-wife, her attorney, and the judge who presided over the divorce action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that characterization of a suit as a civil rights action is ineffective to defeat the well-settled rule that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions byfiling complaints in lower federal courts "cast in the form" of civil rights suits. See also Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 1981); and Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587-588 & nn. 2-4 (4th Cir. 1969)( that federal district courts and United States Courts of Appeals have no appellate or supervisory authority over state courts). Accord Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 219-220 (5th Cir. 1984)(collecting cases); Kansas Association of Public Employees v. Kansas, 737 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (D. Kan. 1990).
This principle was reaffirmed in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)(Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court suit files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself). See also Davani v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2006). Applying these recent holdings to the above-captioned matter, the plaintiff has now filed suit in federal district court seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself. Thus, plaintiff's claim against Judge Eckstrom is also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's allegation that the defendant is receiving "kickbacks" from a court appointed fiduciary who is "using [him] as a hostage," is also plainly without merit, as this allegation is too conclusory to state a factually cognizable claim. Although the "liberal pleading requirements" of Rule 8(a) require a "short and plain"statement of the claim, the plaintiff must "offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, "[t]he presence [] of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal . . . when the facts alleged in thecomplaint do not support the legal conclusion." Id. at 405 n.9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and alterations in original). Here, the plaintiff's allegations fail to give any facts related to the alleged claim and are, therefore, not sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the grounds upon which the plaintiff's claim rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (). Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Finally, because the complaint contains no facts, it should be summarily dismissed because it is frivolous. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (). See also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) ().
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