Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-428,71-428 |
| Citation | 267 So.2d 379 |
| Parties | Ben SKILES, Appellant, v. RYDER TRUCK LINES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
William R. Hapner, Jr., of Rood & Hapner, and Richard E. Leon, Tampa, for appellant.
Thomas A. Clark, A. Broaddus Livingston, and William F. McGowan, Jr., of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for appellee.
The question presented on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in granting a new trial to the Defendant, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., on the ground that concealment alone, by a prospective juror, whether intentional or not, of material information sought by questions propounded on voir dire, deprives the parties to the action of the opportunity to exercise challenges either peremptory or for cause.
Appellant's principal contention is that in order to grant a new trial there must be a showing of prejudice on the part of the juror in question. Appellant maintains that the trial judge should have made a factual determination as to whether the presence of juror Mesa on the jury, under the circumstances, was unfair, and that appellee was, therefore, prejudiced. Appellant maintains that without such a factual determination by the trial judge the granting of the new trial was improper; that there must be a determination of actual prejudice before a new trial can be granted. Appellant quotes specifically Florida Statute § 59.041, 1970, F.S.A., which reads as follows: ((sic) citation and quotation taken from appellant's brief.)
Appellee asserts that the Florida position is that three requirements must be met in order to require a new trial in this situation: (1) a Material (2) Concealment of some fact by the juror upon his voir dire examination, and (3) the failure to discover this concealment must not be due to the Want of diligence of the complaining party, and that these requirements were met here. We agree with Appellee's assertion.
was injured as a result of a collision between the pickup truck he was driving and a semi tractor-trailer owned by Defendant and operated by its employee, Walter High. The two trucks sideswiped each other, and Plaintiff's left arm was so severely mangled that it had to be amputated. At the trial, commencing March 1, 1971, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $200,000.00.
Following the trial it was discovered that one of the jurors, Fernando Mesa, had been a client of attorney Ed Rood, partner of one of Plaintiff's attorneys, William R. Hapner, Jr. Mr. Rood did not participate in the trial, nor was he ever present at trial. Mr. Rood had represented juror Mesa in a suit as a result of a claim for $13,000.00 filed in an estate for services rendered. Judgment for Mesa was entered in 1968.
The record reflects that Mr. Hapner asked the prospective jury panel whether any of them knew Mr. Rood, Mr. Hapner, associated counsel Mr. Leon, attorney for the Defendant, Mr. Clark, or any member of Mr. Clark's firm. There was no apparent affirmative response from any of the jury panel. Mr. Hapner then specifically asked each of the panel whether or not they had ever been involved in accident cases to which Mr. Mesa replied, 'Just a car.' Mr. Mesa was then asked, 'You have never been a party to a lawsuit, one way or the other?', to which he replied, 'No.' The jury was thereafter selected, and Mr. Mesa was a member. The case was tried, verdict returned and judgment entered for Plaintiff in the amount aforesaid.
Defendant filed its motion for new trial stating several grounds all of which were considered without merit by the trial court except ground '$(11) the failure to juryman Fernando Mesa to respond truthfully to questions on voir dire.' The trial court heard argument of counsel and inquired of juror Mesa, under oath, (1) 'as to whether he was the same person who was the Plaintiff in the . . . action against the First National Bank of Tampa as Executor, etc.' and (2) 'whether he was represented in that action by the said Ed Rood, Esq.' Juror Mesa answered affirmatively to both questions. The motion for new trial was thereupon granted on the basis that Mesa's...
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State v. Scher
...Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 86, 860 P.2d 466, 478, (1993); Harris v. United States, 606 A.2d 763, 766 n. 5 (D.C.1992); Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 267 So.2d 379, 380 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1972), cert. denied, 275 So.2d 253 (Fla.1973); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 386 S.E.2d 316, 335 (1989), cert. de......
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Banther v. State
...374 A.2d 1, 2 (Del.1977). 16. Id. (citing Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215, 224 So.2d 247, 251 (1969); Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 267 So.2d 379, 381-82 (Fla. App.1972); State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 169 S.E.2d 833, 837-39 (1969); C.T. Foster, Annotation, Juror's Voir Dire Denial or......
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Banther v. State
...1, 2 (1977). 8. Id. at 2. See generally Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215, 224 So.2d 247, 251 (1969); Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Fla. Dist. Ct.App., 267 So.2d 379, 381-82 (1972); State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 169 S.E.2d 833, 837-39 (1969); C.T. Foster, Annotation, Juror's Voir Dire ......
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Companioni v. City of Tampa
...new trial when one party claims juror nondisclosure, basing its reasoning on the three-part test enunciated in Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 267 So.2d 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972): First, the complaining party must establish that the information is relevant and material to jury service in th......
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Voir dire necessities: the Florida Supreme Court clarifies when trial counsel's investigation of the venire must be undertaken.
...right to challenge a juror based on his or her litigation history is basic to the jury trial right itself, Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, 267 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) ("When the right of challenge is lost or impaired [due to nondisclosure], the ... conditions and terms for setting u......