Banther v. State

Decision Date21 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 69,1999.,69,1999.
Citation823 A.2d 467
PartiesBruce R. BANTHER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Edward Gill, Esquire (argued), Georgetown, Delaware, and Kevin M. Howard, Esquire, Young & Malmberg, Dover, Delaware, for appellant.

John Williams, Esquire (argued) and Marie O'Connor Graham, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee.

Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH,1 HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). HOLLAND, Justice.

This is the direct appeal of the defendant-appellant, Bruce R. Banther. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Banther was convicted of Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Forgery in the Second Degree and Felony Theft. The Superior Court sentenced Banther to life in prison for the Murder in the First Degree conviction.2

Banther has raised five issues on appeal. First, he alleges that the Superior Court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence statements obtained from him by the police in violation of his Miranda3 rights. Second, Banther asserts that the Superior Court committed reversible error in its rulings regarding redaction of his video recorded statements. Third, Banther contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his right to compulsory process by failing to allow him to call John Schmitz as a witness. Fourth, Banther alleges that the Superior Court committed reversible error by allowing the admission of evidence of his indebtedness as a motive for the murder of Dennis Ravers, and by allowing the admission of other evidence of prior bad acts. Finally, Banther submits that the forelady of the jury had improper influences upon her performance as a juror and was not competent to serve as a juror.

This matter has been remanded to the Superior Court three times. The purpose of those remands was to develop a record to determine whether a new trial should be granted based upon newly discovered evidence. Some of the newly discovered evidence called into question the mental capacity of the jury forelady, Jane Smith,4 to serve as a juror. Other newly discovered evidence reflected that the forelady was under investigation for embezzlement and also alleged that she was using cocaine during Banther's trial. The dispositive issue in this appeal, however, involves the lack of candor in the forelady's negative answer to the voir dire question during the jury selection process about whether she had been the victim of a violent crime.

The expanded record reflects that Banther's constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury was violated by Jane Smith's participation as a juror. Therefore, the judgments of conviction must be reversed. Bather's other claims of error will be addressed during the course of this opinion, since there will be a new trial.

Procedural History

Banther was charged in a multiple count indictment as the result of the death of Dennis Ravers on or about February 12, 1997. Banther's attorney filed a motion to suppress, from the evidence at trial, statements made by Banther to the Delaware State Police and Maryland State Police. An evidentiary hearing regarding Banther's Motion to Suppress was held March 2, 1998 through March 13, 1998.

The Superior Court issued a written opinion dated September 24, 1998. The trial judge granted Banther's Motion to Suppress with respect to his February 25, 1997 statement to the Delaware State Police. The trial judge denied Banther's motion with respect to statements made on February 26, 1997, March 5, 1997, March 6, 1997, March 12, 1997, March 13, 1997, March 14, 1997 and July 30, 1997.

Jury selection was conducted on September 21, 1998 and September 22, 1998. Trial of the matter began on September 28, 1998. On October 27, 1998, the jury found Banther guilty of Murder in the First Degree, not guilty of Conspiracy to commit Murder in the First Degree, guilty of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, guilty of Forgery in the Second Degree and guilty of Felony Theft.

A penalty hearing was held on October 29, 1998, through November 4, 1998. The jury found by a vote of eleven to one that the murder was not premeditated and the result of substantial planning. The jury also determined by a nine to three vote that the murder was not committed for pecuniary gain. By an eleven to one vote, the jury found that the aggravating factors determined to exist did not outweigh the mitigating factors found to exist.

Banther was sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for the charge of Murder in the First Degree. He was sentenced to twenty years for the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. He was sentenced to probation at Level III and Level II, respectively, for the charges of Forgery in the Second Degree and Theft. Banther filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

Facts5

The case involves the murder of Dennis Ravers ("Ravers"). In the early morning hours of February 12, 1997, Ravers made a series of telephone calls to the Harrington Police Department dispatcher. Ravers explained that he was about to meet a man named "Charles" and that he was fearful for his life. Ravers further explained that if he should turn up dead he wanted to go on record as reporting who would be responsible for his death.

Ravers then briefly met with the police dispatcher. The dispatcher took note of Ravers' glasses and clothing. Ravers later informed both the Harrington Police dispatcher and a Delaware State Police/911 dispatcher that he was going to meet Banther in front of the Farmington Fire House.

At 6:15 a.m. on February 12, a person traveling along Messobov Road in Harrington noticed two small fires burning. The person extinguished the fires and the property owner was notified. The Delaware State Fire Marshall and State Police were also contacted.

Blood and brain tissue were discovered at the site of the fire, as well as keys and eyeglasses that were later identified by the Harrington dispatcher as being similar to those worn by Ravers during their meeting. The Medical Examiner later determined that the blood and brain tissue found at the site was human. The Medical Examiner also concluded that the evidence found at the fire site was consistent with a homicidal assault. A casting was made from a tire print found at the scene.

The Delaware State Police learned that Banther and Ravers had been together two days before the fire was discovered, when they drove to the Dover Air Force Base. Ravers had earlier notified the military police that they were coming to the base and that Banther's car was not properly registered. When they arrived, the car was stopped by military police at the gate.

Because the proper ownership and registration of the vehicle was unclear, the two men were detained. Although Ravers remained on base and received a citation, Banther fled on foot. The vehicle he left behind was impounded on a military lot.

Later, the military police officers informed the Delaware State Police of a relationship among Ravers, Banther and John Schmitz ("Schmitz"). Schmitz was on active duty in the military, while both Ravers and Banther were retired from the military. In order to locate Banther and question him about Ravers, Schmitz was placed under surveillance.

The Delaware State Police eventually observed Banther and Schmitz traveling in separate vehicles west toward Maryland on February 25, 1997. The pair then split up and Banther proceeded south on U.S. Route 301. Having determined that Banther and Schmitz were driving with their licensees suspended, Detective John Evans of the Delaware State Police contacted the Maryland State Police and asked them to follow the vehicles and attempt to establish probable cause to stop them.6

Banther's vehicle was stopped by Deputy Michael Branham of the Queen Anne's County Sheriff's Department after he observed Banther driving erratically and his vehicle repeatedly crossing the center line without signaling. To safely stop Banther on an adequate shoulder of the road, Deputy Branham followed him across the Chesapeake Bay Bridge into Anne Arundel County before making the stop. Upon being stopped, Banther failed to produce a driver's license and he identified himself as "Jeffrey Ray Eldridge."

With Banther's consent, Deputy Branham searched the interior of the vehicle. He discovered a wallet containing Banther's military identification. This allowed Deputy Branham to accurately identify Banther and to determine that Banther had given false information about his identity.

At 7:30 p.m., Banther was arrested at the scene for driving with a suspended/revoked license and for giving fictitious information to a police officer by Trooper Mark Bailey of the Maryland State Police. Trooper Bailey read Banther his Miranda rights. Banther stated that he understood his rights and voluntarily commented that he gave a false name because he believed the police officer who was following him was from the military. Trooper Bailey issued a criminal summons to Banther on the false statement charge, but detained him on the driving during suspension charge.

Banther was transported to the Maryland State Police barracks in Centreville, Maryland. Without being questioned, Banther volunteered other statements to Trooper Bailey, as he was being processed at the barracks, concerning items found in the car which included Ravers' military identification and vehicle registration card. Banther described a conversation he had with Ravers and explained that Ravers had left on a plane without the documents.

In the meantime, Schmitz had also been arrested by the Maryland State Police. At 10:15 that evening, he was interviewed by Detectives John Evans and Gary Cicchini of the Delaware State Police. Schmitz invoked his rights and questioning ceased.

The...

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