Skinner v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 31 January 1872 |
| Citation | 66 N.C. 45 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHARLES SKINNER v. D. G. MAXWELL. |
1. When an infant purchases a stock of goods for the purposes of trade and merchandise, and to secure the purchase money executed a note and mortgage of the stock of goods, such contract is voidable and may be disaffirmad by such infant by any act which manifests such a purpose.
2. The effect of such disaffirmance is to restore the property, which remains, to the person from whom it was obtained.
3. The power to appoint a receiver is necessarily inherent in a Court which possesses equitable jurisdiction, and it is exercised when an estate or fund is in existence, and there is no competent person to hold it, or the person so entitled is in the nature of a trustee, and is misusing or misapplying the property. The Code of Civil Procedure does not materially change the equitable jurisdiction of our Courts on the subject.--C. C. P., Sec. 215.
4. On the principle of protection, a receiver may be appointed of an infant's estate if it be not vested in a trustee; and when there is a mixture of property and the different interests of the parties cannot be ascertained until proper invoices are made, and a division effected under the direction of the Court--Held, to be a clear case for the appointment of a receiver.
Adams' Equity, 352-53.
1 Parsons on Contract, 329.
8 Jones, 125. Cited and approved.
This was a motion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver heard before Logan, Judge, at Fall Term 1871, of Mecklenburg Superior Court.
The facts of the case, upon which the judgment of the court is rendered are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.
From the order of injunction and the appointment of a receiver, the defendant appealed, to the Supreme Court.
Bynum, Jones & Johnston for plaintiff .
Barringer, Vance & Dowd for defendant .
The plaintiff purchased a stock of goods from the defendant for the purpose of carrying on the business of trade and merchandise. He paid a certain amount in cash and executed a note for the balance of the purchase money which he secured by a mortgage on the stock of goods. After this purchase the plaintiff bought other goods, which in the course of his business, were placed in the store with the stock which he had received from the defendant.
The day of redemption, specified in the mortgage, having passed without payment, the defendant as mortgagee, took possession of all the goods in the store, and against the will of the plaintiff, was about to sell the same to satisfy the mortgage debt. This suit was commenced for the purpose of rescinding the contract of purchase and the mortgage, and order for an injunction, and the appointment of a receiver was asked for to prevent the sale, and protect the property until the rights of the parties in this controversy are determined by the Court.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that at the date of his contract with the defendant, he was an infant and still continues of nonage, and demands by way of relief, that said contract and mortgage be entirely rescinded &c. This allegation of infancy is not denied in the answer and is thereby admitted for the purposes of this action.
We will not consider the questions of fraud mentioned in the complaint, or the merits to the controversy, as the plaintiff is entitled to a rescission of the contract on the ground of his infancy.
As a general rule the contract of an infant is not void, but voidable. Such a contract is incapable of being enforced at law by the adult party, if the infant choose to plead his infancy. It is however capable of being ratified by the infant when he attains his majority.
Contracts entered into by infants for the purpose of business and trade are viewed with great suspicion by the Courts, and have been frequently declared absolutely void. The Courts are very watchful over the rights of an...
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Chisum v. Campagna, 16 CVS 2419
...trust as justice and equity may require." Lambeth v. Lambeth, 249 N.C. 315, 321, 106 S.E.2d 491, 495 (1959) (citing Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N.C. 45, 47- 48 (1872) and Lasley v. Scales, 179 N.C. 578, 580, 103 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1920)). See also, Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 576......
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Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc.
...that a Court of Equity has the inherent power to appoint a receiver, notwithstanding specific statutory authorization. Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N.C. 45 (1872). The appointment of receivers is one of the oldest remedies known to chancery, Blum Bros. v. Girard Nat. Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93 A. 940 ......
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Bryan v. Welch, 1136.
...Ex parte Walker, 25 Ala. 81; Calhoun v. King, 5 Ala. 523; Jones v. Dougherty, 10 Ga. 273; Dougherty v. McDougald, 10 Ga. 121; Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45. See also Rogers v. Rogers, 111 N. Y. 228, 18 N. E. 636; Payne v. Morriss (Va.) 5 S. E. 568; Burroughs v. Gaither, 65 Md. 171, 7 A. 2......
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In re Penny
...it. Hurwitz v. Carolina Sand & Gravel Co., 189 N. C. 1, 126 S. E. 171; John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N. C. 22; Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45. Federal court of equity will not entertain a bill if there is an adequate remedy at law. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 497......