Skinner v. Skinner
| Decision Date | 19 July 1966 |
| Citation | 221 A.2d 848,154 Conn. 107 |
| Parties | Gordon J. SKINNER v. Margaret W. SKINNER. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Adam Mantzaris, Meriden, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph M. Delaney, Wallingford, for appellant (defendant).
Donald T. Dorsey, Meriden, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before KING, C.J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, HOUSE and THIM, JJ.
The plaintiff husband sought and was granted a divorce from the defendant wife on the ground of intolerable cruelty. The court found that during the marriage the plaintiff had caused certain real property to be conveyed to the defendant in consideration of the love and affection which he had for her at the time. Section 46-22a of the General Statutes provides that the court granting the divorce may provide, as part of its decree, that an estate so acquired, or any part thereof, shall belong to the spouse granted the divorce. The court ordered the title to the interest in realty so acquired to pass to the plaintiff. General Statutes § 52-22.
The defendant's appeal challenges the basis for the order and the formula the court employed in determining the extent of the interest, if any, which the defendant acquired in the realty in consideration of love and affection.
The finding recites these facts: The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Kensington in 1944. In 1946, they purchased a building lot on Fairmont Avenue in Meriden. Title to the property was taken in both their names. A house was subsequently constructed on the lot. The parties occupied this house until 1956, when they sold the premises. The proceeds of the sale were used to acquire a lot at 37 Fremont Street in Meriden and to start construction of a house thereon. The title to this property was taken in the name of the defendant alone, although both parties signed the note and the mortgage deed to secure the balance of the purchase price. Just prior to the acquisition of the Fremont Street property, the plaintiff had planned a new business venture. During the trial the plaintiff gave conflicting testimony as to what motivated him to have the Fremont Street property taken solely in his wife's name. At one point he testified that the prime reason he put the property solely in his wife's name was because he had love and affection for her and trusted her implicitly. He testified that he regarded her as his partner for life. At another point, during cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that the prime consideration for putting the property in his wife's name was to immunize it from possible claims of creditors.
The defendant contends the latter admission so taints the conveyance with fraud that, under the doctrine of Gest v. Gest, 117 Conn. 289, 167 A. 909, the court should leave the plaintiff in the position in which he had placed himself. This contention presupposes that the court was required to believe the latter admission and to disbelieve the prior, inconsistent testimony of the plaintiff. The court, in its memorandum of decision, mentions the conflict in the evidence on this crucial point. Its findings indicate that it was satisfied that the plaintiff's real reason for placing the title in the defendant's name was because of the love and affection the plaintiff had for the defendant and that there was no intent on his part to defraud his creditors.
A husband has an undisputed right to transfer property to his wife without adequate consideration so long as he is not thereby disabled from paying his obligations and the transfer is not made with the fraudulent intent of concealing the property from his creditors or of avoiding their claims. Seigel v. Heimovitch, 121 Conn. 207, 211, 183 A. 741. The court found that, when the plaintiff went into business, a short time after the title to the Fremont Street property was taken in the defendant's name, he had no creditors. Under these circumstances, a gratuitous conveyance to a spouse will be fraudulent only if an actual intent to defraud future creditors is shown. State Finance Corporation v. Ballestrini, 111 Conn. 544, 545, 150 A. 700. Whether such a fraudulent intent existed is a question of fact for the trier. Balzano v. Balzano, 135 Conn. 584, 591, 67 A.2d 409; Gest v. Gest, supra, 117 Conn. 300, 167 A. 909; Mathews v. Converse, 83 Conn. 511, 513, 77 A. 961. Here, the trial court believed that love and not fraud motivated the the plaintiff. The testimony of the plaintiff to that effect is certainly not incredible in view of the fact that at the time the Fremont Street property was taken in the defendant's name the parties had been married about twelve years and had two children and that the acts of the defendant which ultimately caused the marriage to fail had not yet begun. In any event, it was the province of the court to determine which, if either, of the plaintiff's conflicting statements was correct. Andrea v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 144 Conn. 340, 345, 131 A.2d 642.
The defendant seeks to raise an evidential question, contending that certain testimony of the plaintiff was given...
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