Skrynnikov v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 08 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–0609 (GK).
• Parties: Timothy SKRYNNIKOV, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

943 F.Supp.2d 172

Timothy SKRYNNIKOV, Plaintiff,

v.FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–0609 (GK).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

May 8, 2013.

Micah Salb, Lippman, Semsker & Salb, LLC, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiff.

Damien G. Stewart, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Timothy Skrynnikov (“Plaintiff” or “Skrynnikov”) brings this action against Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (“Defendant” or “Fannie Mae”) alleging retaliation under the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and interference with his rights under both the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the related District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act (“DCFMLA”), D.C.Code § 32–501 et seq.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Its Motion to Compel Arbitration [Dkt. No. 26]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition [Dkt. No. 29], and Reply [Dkt. No. 30], and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion to compel arbitration is granted.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored corporation chartered by Congress, with its headquarters in the District of Columbia. SAC § 5. Skrynnikov was employed by Fannie Mae as a Senior Financial Analyst from October 9, 2007 until November 13, 2009, when his employment was terminated. SAC ¶¶ 6, 38. Skrynnikov alleges that Fannie Mae eliminated his position in retaliation for his investigation into and disclosure of purported falsehoods in executive compensation data that Fannie Mae reported to the United States Senate Committee on Finance in March 2009. SAC ¶¶ 11–17, 38–42. Skrynnikov also alleges that the elimination of his position interfered with his rights under the FMLA and DCFMLA because it came at the conclusion of an approved medical leave of absence. Id. ¶¶ 26–38, 43–50.

When Skrynnikov applied for his job in October 2007, he signed an application form acknowledging that “as a condition of employment, all Fannie Mae employees must agree to be bound by Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy, which requires that certain employment-related claims be submitted to arbitration before a suit can be brought on them in court.” Def.'s Mem. P. & A., Ex. 1 (“Employment Application”) at 4 [Dkt. No. 26–1]. Similarly, when Skrynnikov signed and accepted Fannie Mae's offer of employment, he did so subject to the understanding that FannieMae's Dispute Resolution Policy required him “to submit certain employment-related claims to the mandatory arbitration process for final resolution prior to filing these claims in a court of law.” Def.'s Mem. P. & A., Ex. 2 (“Offer Letter”) [Dkt. No. 26–2].

The Dispute Resolution Policy, a copy of which accompanied Fannie Mae's Offer Letter, provides that a Fannie Mae employee is required to arbitrate “all claims ... against Fannie Mae ... involving a legally-protected right, that directly or indirectly relate to his or her employment or the termination of that employment[.]” Def.'s Mem. P. & A., Ex. 3 (“Dispute Resolution Policy” or “Policy”) § 2 [Dkt. No. 26–3]. The Policy elaborates that the claims to which it applies may “involv[e] rights protected by any federal, state, or other governmental constitution [sic], statute, ordinance, regulation, or common law.” Id. The Policy also states that “[t]he arbitrator will resolve all disputes over the interpretation and applicability of the Policy, and over the arbitrability of all matters presented under it.” Id. § 16.

On March 23, 2011, Skrynnikov filed this case against Fannie Mae asserting a qui tam claim under the FCA on behalf of the United States, as well as various employment-related claims on his own behalf. [Dkt. No. 1]. On March 27, 2012, Skrynnikov's qui tam claim was dismissed on motion of the Government pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). [Dkt. Nos. 17, 18]. In his Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 23], Skrynnikov brings claims solely on his own behalf for retaliation under the FCA, and for interference with his rights under the FMLA and DCFMLA. SAC §§ 39–50. It is undisputed that Skrynnikov did not submit these claims to arbitration before commencing this action.

On November 6, 2012, Fannie Mae moved to dismiss the FMLA and DCFMLA claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to compel arbitration of the FCA claim. [Dkt. Nos. 26, 27–1]. Fannie Mae also requested that if the Court did not dismiss the FMLA and DCFMLA claims, it compel arbitration as to those claims as well. On January 7, 2013, Skrynnikov filed his Opposition to Fannie Mae's Motion [Dkt. No. 29], and on January 14, 2013, Fannie Mae filed its Reply [Dkt. No. 30].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW²

A motion to compel arbitration is effectively “a request for summary disposition of the issue of whether or not there ha[s] been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate[,]” and therefore such a motion is properly reviewed under the summary judgment standard of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Aliron Int'l, Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc., 531 F.3d 863, 865 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Under this standard, the party seeking to compel arbitration must first present ‘evidence sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.’ ” Fox v. Computer World Servs. Corp., No. 12–0374(ABJ), 920 F.Supp.2d 90, 96 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Hill v. Wackenhut Servs. Int'l., 865 F.Supp.2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. June 7, 2012)). The burden then shifts to the opposing party “to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the making of the agreement[ ]” so as to preclude the court from deciding the motion to compel as a matter of law. Haire v. Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP, No. 12–749(JDB), 925 F.Supp.2d 126, 129, 2013 WL 751035, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2013) (citing Hill, 865 F.Supp.2d at 89). To sustain its burden, the nonmoving party must “ ‘go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Amirmotazedi v. Viacom, Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 256, 260 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987)).

III. ANALYSISA. Legal Standard Under the Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governs the enforcement of an arbitration agreement such as the one at issue in this case. ³ The FAA provides, in relevant part, that “[a] written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Although “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit[,]” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960), the FAA “establishes a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 665, 669, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, as our Court of Appeals has emphasized, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” Wolff v. Westwood Mgmt., LLC, 558 F.3d 517, 520 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). This principle applies “even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ ” CompuCredit Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 669 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987)).

Although the Supreme Court has long recognized and enforced a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, it has also made clear that there is an exception to this policy: the question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the “ question of arbitrability ” is “an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise[.]” AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (emphasis added). As the court will discuss infra at III.B.1., in this case, the actual language in the Policy is clear and unmistakable.

B. The Dispute Resolution Policy Requires Each of the Pending Disputes to Be Submitted to Arbitration

When a party invokes the FAA to compel arbitration, the Court first must determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Johns v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 90, 97 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Nelson v. Insignia/Esg, Inc., 215 F.Supp.2d 143, 150 (D.D.C.2002)). The Court then must assess whether the specific dispute falls within its scope. Id. In answering these questions, ordinary state-law contract principles apply. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995).⁴

1. There Is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

In support of its Motion to Compel, Fannie Mae has submitted copies of Skrynnikov's Employment Application, Fannie Mae's Offer Letter, and its Dispute Resolution Policy. Skrynnikov's signature on the Employment Application and Offer Letter evidences his acceptance of the Dispute Resolution Policy, particularly because these documents emphasize the Policy's requirement that he submit “certain...