Slack v. United Airlines
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:18-cv-00899-GMN-BNW |
| Parties | PETER SLACK, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Pending before the Court is Defendant United Airlines, Inc.'s ("Defendant's") Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 71). Plaintiff Peter Slack ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, filed a Response,1 (ECF No. 78), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 79).
Also pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Surreply, (ECF No. 81). Plaintiff did not file a Response.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Strike.
This case arises from Defendant terminating Plaintiff's employment. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 60, ECF No. 29). Defendant terminated Plaintiff after conducting an internal investigation into Plaintiff for sexual harassment in the workplace. (Id. ¶¶ 34-62).
Defendant's internal investigation began on November 1, 2017, after members of Plaintiff's working group—specifically, Leona Lee and Markisha Jordan—accused Plaintiff of sexual harassment. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34). Upon receiving those accusations, Defendant immediatelysuspended Plaintiff with pay pending the outcome of the investigation. (Id. ¶ 35). As the investigation progressed, Plaintiff alleges that he provided his own evidence to combat the harassment allegations, alongside a statement from another of Defendant's employees stating that Plaintiff was neither a threat nor did he make the employee feel uncomfortable. (Id. ¶¶ 43-45, 52-55). Plaintiff similarly alleges that on December 14, 2017, as part of Defendant's internal investigation, Plaintiff explained to George Bieloszabski, Defendant's General Manager, and Sherida Derby, Assistant General Manager, that Defendant's workplace had a "pervasive culture of inappropriate, sexual, and harassing comments." (Id. ¶¶ 56-59). At that time, Plaintiff also "advised Mr. Bieloszabski and Ms. Derby that Ms. Lee is the employee who regularly made inappropriate comments involving sexual issues, and sexually harasses other employees frequently, including [Plaintiff]." (Id. ¶ 57). Moreover, Plaintiff reported coworkers Monique Willis, Jesus Sosa, and David Jimenez "for inappropriate sexual jokes and commentary to Defendant and, upon information and belief, Defendant did not take any action." (Id. ¶ 32).
Roughly two weeks after that December 14, 2017 discussion, Defendant terminated Plaintiff from his position. (Id. ¶ 60-65). Plaintiff subsequently tried to appeal his termination through Defendant's internal appellate procedures, but without success. (Id. ¶ 67-72).
On February 20, 2018, Plaintiff received a Right to Sue Letter from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in response to his filing of a Charge of Discrimination against Defendant. (Id. ¶ 4). On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges the following three claims for relief: (1) discrimination based on gender in violation of Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") 613.330 et. seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII"); (2) retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and NRS 613.340; and (3) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.§ 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 74-106).2 The instant Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 71), now follows.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could rely to find for the nonmoving party. See id. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). "Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegationsthat are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50.
The Court may strike "from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "[T]he function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. . . ." Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). However, federal courts disfavor motions under Rule 12(f) and generally view them as a drastic remedy. See, e.g., Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. JS Products Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Sorenson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2010 WL 308794, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010). "If the court is in doubt as to whether challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law, the motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the sufficiency of the allegations for adjudication on the merits." Sliger v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. HandiCraft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all three of Plaintiff's claims in his Amended Complaint: (1) sex discrimination; (2) retaliation; and (3) violation of Civil Rights Act of 1871. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1:19-22, ECF No. 71). Defendant asserts that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each claim....
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