Slamow v. Delcol
| Decision Date | 24 June 1991 |
| Parties | Michael SLAMOW, et al., Appellants, v. John DELCOL, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Granik Silverman Sandberg Campbell Nowicki & Resnik, New City (Robert M. Lefland and David W. Silverman, of counsel), for appellants.
Matthew D. Arkin, Astoria, for respondent.
Before THOMPSON, J.P., and KUNZEMAN, SULLIVAN and BALLETTA, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In an action for the return of a down payment under a residential real estate contract of sale, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Burrows, J.), entered January 23, 1990, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion is denied, the plaintiffs' cross motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of an appropriate judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
The parties entered into a residential real estate contract of sale containing a mortgage contingency clause wherein the plaintiffs' obligation to purchase was made contingent upon their obtaining, by a specified date, a written commitment from an institutional lender to make a loan to the purchasers "of not less than $201,375". After the purchasers' mortgage application for $241,650 had been rejected and their request pursuant to the terms of the contingency clause for the return of the down payment declined, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover the down payment. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion, finding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs breached the contract by applying for a mortgage that was approximately $40,000 more than that "required" under the terms of the contingency clause. The plaintiffs now appeal on the grounds, inter alia, that the court ignored the plain meaning of the contract terms and effectively rewrote them in favor of the defendant. We agree.
It is the primary rule of construction of contracts that when the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found within the four corners of the contract, giving a practical interpretation to the language employed and the parties' reasonable expectations (see, W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 566 N.E.2d 639; Fried v. Picariello, 158 A.D.2d 511, 512, 551 N.Y.S.2d 274; Mazzola v. County of Suffolk, 143 A.D.2d 734, 735, 533 N.Y.S.2d 297; Tantleff v. Truscelli, 110 A.D.2d 240, 244, 493 N.Y.S.2d 979 affd. 69 N.Y.2d 769, 513 N.Y.S.2d 113, 505 N.E.2d 623). The defendant here would have this court interpret the contract provision to mean that the plaintiffs were required to apply for a mortgage "not to exceed $201,375" rather than one for the existing provision "not less than $201,375". The interpretation the...
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...The court is to give practical interpretation to the language employed and the parties' reasonable expectations. Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726 (2d Dept. 1991), aff'd. 79 N.Y.2d 1016 As outlined above, the Account Agreement permitted Chase to place a hold on an account upon its rece......
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Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc.
...conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction,” Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726, 571 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (2d Dep't 1991), we here conclude simply that whatever triggering rationale might apply to notice of breach, it does not extend t......
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In re Criimi Mae, Inc., No. 98-2-3115-DK.
...contract, giving a practical interpretation of the language employed and the parties' reasonable expectations." Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726, 571 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1991), affirmed 79 N.Y.2d 1016, 584 N.Y.S.2d 424, 594 N.E.2d 918 (1992). However, "where . . . there are internal inconsi......
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Seedansingh v. Ragnanan, 2007 NY Slip Op 33763(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 11/14/2007), 8555-06/
...the court must give "...practical interpretation to the language employed and the parties reasonable expectations." Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726 (2nd Dept. 1991) aff'd, 79 N.Y.2d 1016 (1992). See also, AFBT-II, LLC v. Country Village on Mooney Pond, Inc., 305 A.D.2d 340 (2nd Dept.......
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§ 19.03 Escalations
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