Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1021,78-1021
• Citation: 366 So.2d 157
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: George SLATTERY, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE CORP., Appellee.

Page 157

366 So.2d 157

George SLATTERY, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE CORP., Appellee.

No. 78-1021.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 16, 1979.

Orr, Nathan & Williams, Miami, for appellant.

Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Knight and Fred R. Ober, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant/plaintiff, a licensed polygraph operator, appeals from an "order granting summary judgment and summary final judgment" rendered in favor of appellee/defendant Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., in an action wherein appellant claimed and was denied the following reward offered by appellee:

"$25,000 REWARD"

"Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Florida announces a reward of up to $25,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person or persons participating in the shooting of a Wells Fargo agent, the subsequent robbery which occurred on Saturday, February 22, 1975 at Miami, Florida, and the recovery of valuables lost as a result of this occurrence."

"Information should be directed to Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Florida, P. O. Box 011028, Miami, Florida 33101, Telephone Number (305) 324-4900. The person or persons to whom the reward or any part thereof should be paid will be determined by the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Florida."

Appellant contends that he was entitled to the reward by virtue of his questioning of the perpetrator of the crime during a polygraph examination on an unrelated matter. Such questioning, which occurred on two separate days, eventually resulted in a statement by the perpetrator that he had shot and killed the Wells Fargo guard, which ultimately led to his conviction and sentence for the crime. Appellant argues that, but for his expertise in interrogation and the operation of a polygraph, the authorities would not have linked the perpetrator to the crime. Thus, appellant contends, he is entitled to the reward offered by appellee.

The trial judge, rejecting appellant's argument, entered summary final judgment in favor of appellee on the ground that the offer of reward was never accepted by appellant in that the performance called for by the terms of the offer had not been completed. In particular, the trial judge referred to a stipulation entered into by the parties whereby it was agreed that the stolen property belonging to appellee had not been returned. In that both requirements of the unilateral offer of contract had not been performed (the arrest and conviction of the perpetrator And the return of the stolen property to Wells Fargo) the trial judge determined that appellant had not accepted the offer and thus, no contract had been established. Therefore, the trial judge entered summary final judgment in favor of appellee.

After carefully reviewing the record on appeal, it is our opinion that summary judgment was proper, but not for the reason relied upon by the trial judge. Initially, it must be kept in mind that a reward is contractual in nature, requiring the acceptance of an offer supported by consideration. Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So.2d 692 (Fla.1955). The trial judge based his ruling upon the reason that the terms of the offer amounted to dependent covenants, necessitating the performance of each as a prerequisite to an "acceptance." On the other hand, appellant argues that the covenants are independent of each other and acceptance of the offer of reward was completed upon the satisfaction of one covenant (the arrest and conviction of the culprit). Whether or not the conditions of the offer amounted to independent or dependent covenants is a factual question of intent, the resolution of which Sub judice, was improper on motion for summary judgment. Duncan Properties, Inc. v. Key Largo Ocean View, Inc., 360 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); ...