Slaughter v. City of Louisville

Decision Date12 June 1888
Citation8 S.W. 917,89 Ky. 112
PartiesSLAUGHTER v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. GODA v. SAME. MILLER v. SAME.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Appeals from Louisville law and equity court.

Dodd &amp Grubbs, Lane & Burnett, and R. W. Woolley, for appellants.

L. N Dembitz, for appellee.

BENNETT J.

As these cases involve the same questions, they, by agreement are to be heard together. They will be disposed of in the order in which they stand.

Slaughter v. City of Louisville. The appellee, by its action in the Louisville law and equity court, sought to subject the real estate situated in the city of Louisville belonging to the appellant, Mrs. Slaughter, to the payment of ad valorem taxes alleged to have been assessed against the same by the appellee for the years 1877 to 1885, inclusive. The appellant resisted the appellee's right to recover these taxes upon the ground that there was no assessment for any one of said years, and upon the ground of errors committed in the election, organization, and official transactions of the various boards provided by law for the hearing of appeals from the alleged assessments. By an act approved February 17, 1866, a board of tax commissioners was provided for, whose duty it was to hear the tax-payers' complaints of improper assessments, etc. This board was required to give notice of its sittings by public advertisement. In the case of Ormsby v. City of Louisville, 79 Ky. 197, (decided by this court in 1880,) it was held that the publication of this notice was a condition precedent to the city's right to collect ad valorem taxes. In the case of Dumsniel v. City of Louisville, 4 Ky. Law Rep.--, (decided by this court in 1882,) it was held that a newspaper advertisement, signed by the city assessor, he being ex officio a member of the board, was not a notice published by the board. The appellee fails to show publication of notice in any other way. It therefore fails to manifest a right to recover of the appellant any of the taxes that might have been assessed prior to 1882. The notice for 1882 appears to have been given in due form. But the board failed to meet at the time fixed by law for its meeting; therefore the levy for 1882 was invalidated.

By an act approved March 29, 1882, the city assessor was directed to reassess any real estate upon which taxes had not been paid, and to assess all property not previously assessed. This act also provides a board of commissioners, consisting of the auditor, treasurer, and chairman of the committee on assessments, whose duty it shall be to be in continuous session for the purpose of hearing appeals, etc. This board never met or organized. According to the decisions of this court, through the failure of said board to organize and meet, the reassessments, if any there were, fell to the ground.

By an act approved April 8, 1882, it was made the duty of the assessor to reassess any real estate that had been erroneously assessed. This reassessment was required to be made as of the 1st day of September, in each year; but the assessor was required to give written notice by mail to each person whose property he proposed to assess before making the assessment. It is not contended that any reassessment, as required by this act, was made, or attempted to be made. Therefore the appellee still shows no right to collect taxes from the appellants up to and including 1882.

The act of April 8, 1882, also regulated the assessments made after its date. These assessments were required to be made on the 1st day of September, 1882, and annually thereafter. The assessment books were required to remain open in the office of the assessor from the 15th to the 30th day of November in each year, during which time any tax-payer dissatisfied with his assessment might file his complaint with the assessor. This act abolished the board of commissioners, and in its stead provided for the appointment of board of equalization, whose duty it was to hear appeals, etc. This board was to be appointed by the mayor by and with the consent of the board of aldermen. The act provided for the appointment of this board in September, 1882; but it was not appointed until November of that year, and the appointment was made without the consent and approval of the board of aldermen. The sittings of this board of equalization in November, 1882 and 1883, were therefore without authority; hence the tax-payers were not called upon to file any complaint with the assessor in reference to erroneous assessments, for the reason that there was no legally appointed board to act upon them. This defect was fatal to the taxes of 1883 and 1884.

By an act approved April 19, 1884, it was attempted to legalize the act of the mayor in appointing the board of equalization without the consent and approval of the board of aldermen. This act attempts to validate the acts of said board. This act also provides that said board "shall have full power, during the months of June and July, 1884, to correct, increase, or reduce any unpaid assessment for the years 1883 and 1884; and any tax-payer delinquent for said years may appear before said board of equalization, by petition in writing, for correction of his tax-bills, as in said act provided." We construe this act to mean that the tax-payer, in order to entitle him to a hearing before said board, was required to file a petition before it, setting forth his complaint, and that it was the duty of said board to be in session during the months of June and July, in order to afford the tax-payer the entire two months in which to file his petition; also that the session, in order to be legal and valid, should have commenced on the first day of June, and continued until the last day of July. The board was created for a special purpose. Its life was fixed for two months, commencing on the 1st day of June, during which time the tax-payer had the right to file his petition setting forth his complaint; and a failure of the board to begin its session on the 1st day of June was equivalent to a notice to the tax-payers that the members of it had declined to act as such; and a subsequent meeting of the board, to-wit, on the 10th of June, was not a compliance with the terms of the act, and the tax-payer was not required to take notice of it.

By an act approved April 28, 1884, which was amended and re-enacted by an act approved May 12, 1884, it is enacted, by the third article of the latter act, that all persons whose property was attempted to be assessed for the years from 1876 to 1882 inclusive, "in the sense that assessments against them were extended upon the assessor's books, and who have not paid those assessments, are, as far as such prior levies or assessments were inoperative and void, assessed now, upon the extended value of such property as appearing on said books, at the following rates," etc. The act supra does not attempt to cure merely defective assessments. The appellee's petition does not disclose that the alleged assessments for the years from 1876 to 1882, inclusive, were merely defective and irregular. Its petition alleges that said alleged assessments were defective; but no fact is alleged...

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15 cases
  • Town of St. John v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs
    • United States
    • Indiana Tax Court
    • December 22, 1997
    ...body with right and duty to exercise judgment in determining value has no right to fix valuation by will alone); Slaughter v. City of Louisville, 89 Ky. 112, 8 S.W. 917 (1889) (Essential to the validity of ad valorem taxation is that there should be an assessment, and the tax-payer is entit......
  • City of Boston v. Turner
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 26, 1909
    ...S.W. 788; Jack v. Weiennett, 115 Ill. 105, 3 N.E. 445, 56 Am. Rep. 129; Rochester v. Bloss, 185 N.Y. 42, 77 N.E. 794; Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 112-123, 8 S.W. 917; Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465; Reynolds Fisher, 43 Neb. 172-182, 61 N.W. 695; Sonnesyn v. Aiken, 12 N.D. 227-231, 97 N.......
  • Gray v. Stiles
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • September 3, 1897
    ...and federal, among them being the following: South Platte Load Co. v. Buffalo Co., supra; People v. Union, 31 Cal. 132; Slaughter v. City of Louisville, (Ky.) 8 S.W. 917; Davidson v. Board of Admnr's of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701......
  • Flanagan v. Forsythe
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • July 30, 1897
    ...it is true that taxes are not debts they are nevertheless liabilities which "operate on the tax payer in invitum." (Slaughter v. City of Louisville, [Ky.] 8 S.W. 917.) ¶16 It is also insisted by counsel for defendant in error that "Section 2296 must be construed as an absolute condition ann......
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