Slaughter v. State
| Decision Date | 17 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. F-94-1312,F-94-1312 |
| Citation | 950 P.2d 839,1997 OK CR 78 |
| Parties | 1997 OK CR 78 Jimmie Ray SLAUGHTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
J.W. Coyle III, Oklahoma City, Patrick A. Williams, Tulsa, for appellant at Trial.
Richard Wintory, Wes Lane, Assistant District Attorneys, Oklahoma City, for appellee at Trial.
J.W. Coyle III, Gloyd L. McCoy, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, William L. Humes, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
¶1 Appellant Jimmie Ray Slaughter was tried by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-92-82, and convicted of two counts of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(A)). 1 Trial commenced on May 16, 1994 and continued until October 7, 1994, when the jury returned its verdict on punishment. 2 The prosecution sought the death penalty, alleging in each count that (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (21 O.S.1991, § 701.12(4)); (2) there existed a probability the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society (21 O.S.1991, § 701.12(7)); and (3) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person (21 O.S.1991, § 701.12(2)). Before the jury began second-stage deliberations, the prosecution dismissed the allegation that the murder charged in Count I was especially heinous, atrocious. As to Count 1, the jury found only that Appellant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person; it did not find that Appellant would be a continuing threat to society. As to Count 2, the jury found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and that Appellant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person; the jury did not find continuing threat. The trial court followed the jury's recommendations and sentenced Appellant to death on each count. We affirm. 3
¶2 At "right around noon" on July 2, 1991, Ginger Neal noticed that her pitbull dog, Ozie, was barking and acting strangely in the back yard. Ozie was somewhat skittish, more so around adults than with children. The dog was in such a hurry to get into the house that he practically ran over a child on his way to his place of refuge in the house. Ms. Neal was sufficiently concerned to glance out in the back yard to see if an intruder were present; she saw nothing. A few minutes later, she heard a noise, as if a car were backfiring or a firecracker had exploded. As Independence Day was only two days away, she thought nothing of the noise. Rhonda Moss, who lived in the same house as Ms. Neal, also heard the noise. At least one other neighbor also heard the backfiring noise. Neither Ms. Moss nor Ms. Neal ¶3 Melody was found on the floor in her bedroom. She had been shot once in the cervical spine and once in the head. In addition, she had been stabbed in the chest and in her genitalia; and there were carvings on her abdomen and breasts which authorities interpreted as symbols of some kind. A comb filled with Negroid hairs, some underwear containing Negroid head hairs, some unused condoms and some gloves were found near Melody's body. No seminal fluid was found in or on Melody. In the bathroom, Melody's curling iron was still plugged in. Baby Jessica was found in the hallway; just days shy of her first birthday, she had been shot twice in the head. The medical examiners who examined the bodies estimated time of death to be approximately between 9:30 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. on July 2.
thought much about it until the bodies of Melody Wuertz and her 11-month-old daughter, Jessica, were found early that same evening in the house next door.
¶4 The prosecution's theory was that Melody was surprised while in the bathroom as she was preparing for work (the evening shift at the Oklahoma City Veterans Administration Hospital); was then paralyzed (but not rendered unconscious) by the shot to the cervical spine; was forced to lie paralyzed and conscious as her child was killed; then was dragged to the bedroom, where she was killed by the shot to her head. The killer then planted the evidence in an attempt to throw investigators off the trail.
¶5 Appellant (a nurse at the VA Hospital) was a suspect from the very beginning. He and Melody had had a sexual relationship, the result of which Melody became pregnant. Appellant signed an affidavit acknowledging paternity on July 17, 1990, ten days after Jessica was born. Despite this acknowledgment, Appellant's support of the child was meager, a fact Melody mentioned more than once. Melody's insistence on getting Appellant to provide monetary support for her child irritated him. He once remarked to a co-worker at the hospital that Melody was getting "pushy," and if she continued to act that way, he would have to kill her. To another, he said Melody was causing him problems at work, and one day he would have to kill both Melody and Jessica. Appellant was concerned a paternity action by Melody could jeopardize his status as a reserve officer in the Army; additionally, Appellant was married, and his wife did not know about the affairs with Melody and other women. In the fall of 1990, Appellant was called to active duty during the Desert Storm military operation, and was stationed at Ft. Riley, Kansas. He remained on active duty there until mid-July, 1991. During this period, what scant payments Appellant had made to Melody stopped. This forced Melody to seek child support through the Department of Human Services, an action which enraged Appellant. Before her death, Melody expressed to several people her fear that Appellant would take action against her because she had initiated child support proceedings against him.
¶6 Appellant presented an alibi defense. He presented evidence purporting to show he was with his family shopping in Topeka, Kansas, at the time of the murders. Other facts will be presented as they become relevant.
PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
¶7 In his second proposition of error, Appellant claims the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing defense counsel to question prospective jurors about their attitudes toward the death penalty in relation to other sentences. Appellant acknowledges this Court has refused to allow evidence on the cost-effectiveness of the death penalty during the sentencing stage of a capital case. See Smallwood v. State, 907 P.2d 217, 233 (Okl.Cr.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 431, 136 L.Ed.2d 330 (1996). However, he claims the issue here is not that evidence be allowed, but that he should be able to question jurors about their perspectives of the death penalty in terms of cost factors, i.e., that jurors' concerns about the cost of incarceration for life would prompt them to be inclined to support a decision to sentence Appellant to death.
¶8 Appellant is correct in his assertion that he presented a motion in limine concerning the issue. He is also correct that the trial court denied the motion. Beyond that, the record does not support his contentions. Indeed, we have found at least two instances where defense counsel asked the question during voir dire; and on neither occasion was an objection raised by prosecutors. In short, Appellant was allowed to ask his questions. 4 This renders Appellant's complaint moot.
¶9 In his third proposition of error, Appellant alleges the trial court denied him his right to a public trial when portions of voir dire were closed to the public. Again, the record shows the proposition is without merit. After conducting voir dire with all jurors present, the court agreed to individual questioning of the jurors on the issues of capital punishment, the occult and pretrial publicity. Rather than conduct the individual voir dire in the judge's small chambers, the decision was made to have it in the courtroom but to exclude spectators. At that point, the court noticed Melody's parents were in the courtroom, and questioned whether they should be allowed to remain. The prosecutor, Mr. Wintory, expressed his belief the purpose of individual voir dire was to prevent accidental contamination of other jurors, and he had no objection if the parents were allowed to remain. At that point, defense counsel said "I agree with Mr. Wintory, it needs to be public." However, during individual voir dire, the court ordered the parents to leave the courtroom. Defense counsel objected to the fact the prosecutor conferred with the parents privately over the issue, claimed this gave them special status, and moved for a mistrial. After further discussion, it was decided to exclude everyone except the individual jurors. The following exchange then occurred:
Mr. Wintory: Finally, your honor, let me say this. I renew my request that the defense--and this Court question Mr. Slaughter specifically on his waiver of his right to have a public and open courtroom, and that he has since [sic] to the procedure that has been outlined.
Court: You mean as far as the interrogation of members of the panel in camera on these three questions?
Mr. Wintory: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Is that is that [sic] agreeable, Mr. Coyle?
Mr. Coyle [defense counsel]: Yes, sir.
Mr. Williams: I would advise the Court, as an officer of your court, I have conferred with our client and advised him of the matter that Mr. Wintory addresses, and was--would tell you at this time, that Mr. Slaughter has been apprised of the fact of the nature and what this in camera proceeding is. The purpose of it is to safeguard tainting any of the other prospective jurors with any remarks from the juror who is under interrogation. That it would be done in private, that it is an in camera proceeding, albeit in your courtroom, and I have explained that to him and he is perfectly willing for us to proceed in that fashion. Is that correct, Mr. Slaughter?
Mr. Slaughter: That is correct.
Court: Is that...
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