Slaughter v. State, 5449

• Citation: 630 P.2d 517
• Decision Date: 06 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 5449,5449
• Parties: David SLAUGHTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 517

630 P.2d 517

David SLAUGHTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 5449.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 6, 1981.

Michael H. Schilling, Appellate Counsel, and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program (argued), Laramie, on brief, for appellant.

Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, and John W. Renneisen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Cheyenne, on brief, for appellee.

Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

Appellant-defendant was convicted by a Natrona County jury of two counts of burglary. Appellant, David Slaughter, appeals his conviction alleging that the jury was not adequately instructed on the presumption of innocence.

We will affirm.

On appeal, appellant urges a single assignment of error as follows:

"The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to the presumption of innocence, as explained in appellant's offered Instruction D, and thereby denied appellant due process of law by depriving him of his right to a fair trial."

At the trial appellant offered Instruction D on the presumption of innocence taken from Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal, 2.401B, which reads:

"The law raises no presumption against the defendant but rather, the presumption of the law is in favor of his innocence. In order to convict the defendant of the crime charged, every material and necessary element to constitute such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and if the jury entertains a reasonable doubt on any single essential fact or necessary element, it is your duty to give the benefit of such doubt to defendant and acquit him. This presumption of innocence is not merely a matter of form which the jury may disregard at pleasure, but rather it is a part of the law of the land and it is a right guaranteed by that law to every person accused of crime. This presumption of innocence continues with the defendant through all the stages of the trial and until the case has been finally submitted to the jury and until the jury has found that this presumption has been overcome by the evidence in the case convincing you of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

The trial judge refused to give appellant's proffered instruction, but gave Instruction No. 3 as follows: ¹

"The information in this case is only a formal charge and is not to be considered any evidence of guilt on the part of the defendant. Nothing is to be taken by implication against him; the law raises no presumption against him. Every presumption of law is in favor of his innocence, and in order to convict him of the crime charged against him, every fact necessary to constitute such crime must be proved by the state, to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt; and if you entertain a reasonable doubt upon any single fact or element necessary to constitute the crime, it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find him not guilty."

Of course appellant does not assert that there was a total absence of an instruction on presumption of innocence, but contends that the instruction given obscured presumption of innocence because of emphasis on reasonable doubt. He further contends that the important concept of presumption of innocence should have been adequately emphasized so that the jury would focus on that principle.

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of an accused is fundamental law. The history of this presumption can be traced from Deuteronomy through Roman law, English Common Law, and the common law of the United States. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895).

In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-486, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1934-1935, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978), the Court stated:

" * * * While use of the particular phrase 'presumption of innocence' or any other form of words may not be constitutionally mandated, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be held to safeguard 'against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).) * * * "

In numerous cases we have held that error cannot be predicted upon the court's failure to give an instruction that is legally correct if the same principle is adequately covered by other instructions given by the court. In re Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d 470 (Wyo., 1981); Channel v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1145 (1979); Jeffers v. Offe, Wyo., 598 P.2d 450 (1979); Repkie v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1272 (1978); Benson v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 595 (1977); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950); State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865 (1945); Branson v. Roelofz, Wyo., 52 Wyo. 101, 70 P.2d 589 (1937). See also Thayer v. United States, 168 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1948); and State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 617 P.2d 1141 (1980).

In the case at bar the jury was in fact instructed on the presumption of innocence in contrast to cases cited by appellant in support of his position. A veiled suggestion throughout appellant's entire argument is that there should have been a separate instruction on each reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence, apparently the theory being that if two separate instructions are not given one legal principle tends to obscure the other. Appellant cites no cases in support of the theory that two principles of law cannot be explained in a single instruction. In addition, we are not aware of any authority to that effect, nor do we know of any compelling reason why this should be done. In Instruction No. 2 the court said:

" * * * You are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. * * * "

We must assume that the jury followed the court's instruction and did not ignore that portion of Instruction No. 3 that instructed on the presumption of innocence.

Authorities cited by appellant are not applicable to this case. In each of these cases no instruction on presumption of innocence was given and it was unsuccessfully argued that an instruction on reasonable doubt was sufficient to include the concept of presumption of innocence. In the case at bar the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence.

Appellant relies principally on Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, 436 U.S. at 481, n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1932, for the proposition that failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence is error, where the trial court instructed:

" 'Number two, if upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt as to the...