Slawik v. Folsom
Decision Date | 27 December 1979 |
Citation | 410 A.2d 512 |
Parties | Melvin A. SLAWIK, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Henry R. FOLSOM, Jr., Mary D. Jornlin, Sherman W. Tribbitt, New Castle County and the State of Delaware, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. Reversed.
Sheldon N. Sandler and William J. Wier, Jr., of Bader, Dorsey & Kreshtool, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellant.
Carolyn Berger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for defendants below, appellees.
Before HERRMANN, C. J., DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.
The question before the Court is whether the plaintiff Melvin A. Slawik, former New Castle County Executive, was lawfully removed from office by former Governor Sherman W. Tribbitt, a defendant herein, under the provisions of Del.Const. Art. XV, § 6, 1 on the ground that Slawik had been "convicted," within the meaning of that word as used in Art. XV, § 6, of misbehavior in office or of an infamous crime. In this action by Slawik for damages for wrongful removal from office, 2 the Superior Court held that Slawik was "convicted" as of the time of his removal and that he was not, therefore, wrongfully removed from office. Thereupon, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Slawik v. Folsom, et al., Del.Super., 389 A.2d 775 (1978). The plaintiff appeals. 3
The plaintiff was elected to the office of New Castle County Executive for a four-year term to expire on January 4, 1977.
On March 9, 1976, the plaintiff was found guilty by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware of three counts of making false declarations before a grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
Within 48 hours and prior to sentencing, the defendant Sherman W. Tribbitt, acting in his official capacity as Governor of the State, removed the plaintiff from office under the provisions of Art. XV, § 6, effective immediately on March 11, 1976.
Slawik was sentenced by the U.S. District Court on April 21, 1976. Thereafter, he appealed and, on January 3, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reversed the convictions. U. S. v. Slawik, et al., 3d Cir., 548 F.2d 75 (1977).
The Superior Court held, and the defendants here contend, that the plaintiff was "convicted", within the meaning of that word as used in Art. XV, § 6, by virtue of the jury verdict of guilt alone. The plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that he was not "convicted" within the meaning of Art. XV, § 6, and therefore could not be lawfully removed from office, until the U.S. District Court had finalized the trial process by entering a "final judgment of conviction" by the imposition of sentence.
The law supports the plaintiff's position. Accordingly, we conclude that the removal of the plaintiff from office on March 11, 1976, was invalid when effectuated, but became valid Nunc pro tunc with the imposition of sentence on April 21, 1976. On that date, the plaintiff lost all rights to any salary and benefits of his public office that he may have previously possessed, and the question presented, as to the stage at which a "conviction" is deemed to have occurred, became moot.
The key to the problem is found in the decision of this Court in Fonville v. McLaughlin, Del.Supr., 270 A.2d 529 (1970). In that case, the issue presented was whether or not a candidate for the General Assembly, who had previously been convicted of grand larceny, could avoid the prohibition of Del.Const. Art. II, § 21, 4 because his guilty plea had been stricken pursuant to the expungement provision of the Delaware Probation Statute, 11 Del.C. § 4332(i). 5 This Court there stated:
270 A.2d at 530. Moreover, this Court stated in Fonville that, in considering Del.Const. Art. II, § 21, "distinction must be made between a conviction which is a final judgment, and a plea or verdict of guilty which is only an element of a conviction." 270 A.2d at 531.
Fonville, may not be distinguished from the instant case upon the ground that Fonville dealt with Del.Const. Art. II, § 21, which pertains to eligibility for candidacy to public office, whereas the instant case deals with Del.Const. Art. XV, § 6, which pertains to the right to retain public office. The word "convicted" in the two constitutional provisions must be interpreted consistently and harmoniously under basic tenets of constitutional construction; both deal with the same fundamental constitutional purpose. That purpose, which requires the consistent application of these two provisions, was expressed by this Court in State ex rel. Wier v. Peterson, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 1076 (1976), as follows:
(emphasis supplied)
We hold, therefore, that as used in the Art. XV, § 6, just as in Art. II, § 21, each of which creates a disability to hold public office, the word "convicted" is to be construed as meaning "judgment of conviction" consisting of a determination of guilt by plea or verdict followed by the imposition of sentence. This conclusion is supported by the 1897 Constitutional Debates and the rule generally prevailing elsewhere relative to the establishment of a disability to hold public office.
In the Debates relating to Art. XV, § 6, there are several references to the proposition that the word "convicted" means "convicted by a court" so that a public official subject to removal may be assured of his or her "day in Court". See State v. Collison, Del.Super., 197 A. 836, 842-4 (1938). An accused's "day in Court" in a jury trial on a criminal charge does not end with the guilty verdict of the jury. It ends only when the entire trial process has been completed, including: (1) the opportunity of the Trial Judge to correct any error in the trial, either Sua sponte or upon appropriate motion; and (2) the imposition of sentence. Then, and only then, there exists a judgment of conviction capable of being appealed to a higher Court. A criminal case is not complete and is not disposed of until sentence has been pronounced. Any stage of the trial short of the imposition of sentence is interlocutory and interim only, and does not amount to one's "day in Court" in the full constitutional sense of those words, particularly when a disability of citizenship is the consequence of the conviction.
The conclusion reached here is supported by the authorities in other jurisdictions that have dealt with the precise issue now before this Court. For example, in Commonwealth ex rel. McClenachan v. Reading, Pa.Supr., 336 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 776, 777-8 (1939), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in reviewing proceedings that sought the ouster of several public officials who had been found guilty of federal crimes, 6 stated:
In People v. Fabian, N.Y.Ct.App., 192 N.Y. 443, 85 N.E. 672, 675 (1908), the Court, confronted with a statute that prevented any person "convicted of a felony" from registering to vote...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Slawik v. State
...was invalid when effectuated, but became valid nunc pro tunc with the imposition of sentence on April 21, 1976." Slawik v. Folsom, Del.Supr., 410 A.2d 512, 514 (1979). On remand, the Superior Court awarded Slawik's counsel a fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 provides that in any acti......
-
Barrett v. State, 95-M-01240-SCT
...166 Miss. 530, 146 So. 456 (1933); Helena Rubenstein Int'l v. Younger, 71 Cal.App.3d 406, 139 Cal.Rptr. 473 (1977); Slawik v. Folsom, 410 A.2d 512 (Del.1979); Summerour v. Cartrett, 220 Ga. 31, 136 S.E.2d 724 (1964); Grogan v. Lisinski, 113 Ill.App.3d 276, 68 Ill.Dec. 854, 446 N.E.2d 1251 (......
-
People ex rel. Grogan v. Lisinski, 83-268
...purposes of the statutes relating to ouster, we are persuaded by and adopt the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme Court in Slawik v. Folsom (Del.1979), 410 A.2d 512. In Slawik the plaintiff, tried for making false declarations before a grand jury, was removed from an elective office after he......
-
Kitsap County Republican Central Committee v. Huff
...judgment of conviction consisting of the adjudication of guilt by plea or verdict followed by the imposition of sentence. Slawik v. Folsom, 410 A.2d 512, 515 (Del.1979), quoting from, Fonville v. McLaughlin, 270 A.2d 529 From this review of our own cases and cases in other jurisdictions, we......