Sleeper v. Lilley

• Decision Date: 13 June 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action CV-11-006
• Parties: VAUGHN SLEEPER, et al, Plaintiffs, v. DANIEL G. LILLEY, et al, Defendants
• Court: Maine Superior Court

VAUGHN SLEEPER, et al, Plaintiffs, v. DANIEL G. LILLEY, et al, Defendants

Civil Action No. CV-11-006

Superior Court of Maine, Cumberland

June 13, 2014

ORDER

Thomas D. Warren, Justice

Before the court are two post-trial motions by defendants Daniel G Lilley and Daniel G. Lilley Law Offices P.A. (collectively " the Lilley defendants"): (1) a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 5O(b) and (2) a motion for a new trial and remittitur pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(a).

Judgment was entered on January 6, 2014. The Lilley defendants' motions were timely filed on January 16. The first round of briefing was completed a month later, but resolution of the motions was thereafter delayed while portions of the transcript were ordered. A hearing on the motion was held on May 8, supplemental briefs were filed by May 16, and the parties have since filed further submissions based on review of the transcript excerpts that had been obtained.

Legal Principles Applicable to Defendants' Motions

On the Lilley defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 5O(b), the court must determine " if any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that are justifiably drawn from the evidence supports the jury verdict." Russell v. Expressjet Inc ., 2011 ME 123 ¶ 10, 32 A.3d 1030 quoting Madore v. Kennebec Heights Country Club , 2007 ME 92 ¶ 5, 926 A.2d 1180. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The weighing of evidence, including the credibility of witnesses is reserved to the jury. Wood v. Bell , 2006 ME 98 ¶ 12, 902 A.2d 843.

On the motion for a new trial, the Lilley defendants must establish that it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has been committed or that substantial justice has not been done. Davis v. Currier , 1997 ME 199 ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 1207. This standard is not intended to allow a trial judge to substitute his or her view of the evidence for the decision of the jury. Chenell v. Westbrook College , 324 A.2d 735, 737 (Me. 1974). The Lilley defendants' new trial motion relies primarily on alleged errors in the admission of evidence and in the conduct of the trial that allegedly prejudiced the jury.

Arguments Raised

At the outset the court notes that lengthy portions of the legal memoranda submitted by the Lilley defendants on their post-trial motions consist of attempts to reargue the evidence. Whatever the merits of those arguments, they either were or should have been presented to the jury. Neither Rule 50(b) nor Rule 59(a) offers any relief to the extent that the jury found against the Lilley defendants on the evidence.

Moving beyond the Lilley defendants' effort to reargue the evidence, the court finds that a number of their arguments are without merit.^[1] Nevertheless, the court concludes that the following issues raised by the Lilley defendants require further discussion:

(1) whether there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the claim that, absent malpractice by the Lilley defendants, the Sleepers would likely have prevailed on their tortious interference claim before the arbitrator;

(2) whether there was adequate evidence to support the damages claimed on the tortious interference claim;

(3) whether, given the court's summary judgment ruling, the Sleepers should have been allowed to proceed at trial on the claim that, absent malpractice by the Lilley defendants, the Sleepers would likely have prevailed on their IIED claim before the arbitrator;

(4) whether there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the claim that, absent malpractice by the Lilley defendants, the Sleepers would likely have prevailed on their IIED claim before the arbitrator;

(5) whether the court erroneously excluded certain evidence that the Lilley defendants wished to offer on the IIED issue and that might have been considered by the jury on both IIED and on the tortious interference issue;

(6) whether the Sleepers' estimate of the fair market value of their farm and the McCausland damage calculation worked up for purposes of the arbitration improperly influenced the jury notwithstanding the court's instruction that the jury could not consider those figures as evidence of damage;

(7) whether the court's instruction as to the weight to be given to expert testimony was erroneous;

(8) whether under Steeves v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson , 1998 ME 210 ¶ ¶ 17-18, 718 A.2d 186, plaintiffs should not have been entitled to a jury on the question of whether the Sleepers would have prevailed before the arbitrator and the amount of any damage award.

By way of background in considering the above subjects, it should be noted that the trial was significantly affected by scheduling issues. Counsel for both parties originally estimated that, with the jury already picked, the case could be tried to a verdict in four or five days. The case was therefore scheduled to begin on December 16. In retrospect this was an ill-advised decision given the nature and complexity of the case. As issues arose and the case bogged down, it became clear that the trial was going to run over into the Christmas week, and the parties and the court began rushing to try to get the case to the jury before the Christmas holiday.

At a certain cost, that objective was achieved.^[2] However, the rush to finish the case prevented the court and the parties from taking the time that should have been allowed to consider certain issues and make an adequate record. The looming Christmas holiday contributed to some of the problematic rulings and the resulting prejudice outlined below.

Tortious Interference Claim

The Sleepers' tortious interference claim depended on Ronald Barnes's testimony that he attended a meeting between Agway and the pool growers at which Agway " recommended" that the pool growers not purchase potatoes from Sleeper Farms. Barnes testified that the " general consensus" he took away from the meeting was that if he purchased seed from the Sleepers, " it would have consequences for marketing my crop the following year." He could not say what Agway had said that left him with that impression.

Barnes's testimony left open whether Agway engaged in some intimidation or merely made a recommendation which resulted in a fear of future consequences that was self-induced on Barnes's part. However, the court concludes that Barnes's testimony and the other evidence offered at trial, taken as a whole, could constitute circumstantial evidence of intimidation. The Lilley defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. This does not, however, resolve the issue of whether a new trial should be granted on issues related to malpractice with respect to the tortious interference claim. As discussed below, there was certain evidence relevant to the issue of tortious interference that the court incorrectly declined to allow the Lilley defendants to introduce. See below at pp. 8-9 & n.4.

There is also a question whether there was adequate evidence that the $30, 000 loss (which Vaughn Sleeper testified was caused by Agway's tortious interference) subsequently resulted in the loss of his farm-which was the basis for the Sleepers' claim of emotional distress. Although the entire farm was not sold off until approximately eight or nine years after Agway's tortious interference, Vaughn Sleeper testified that the process of liquidation began in 2001. However, there was little or no evidence as to why the $30, 000 loss resulted in a need to begin liquidating the farm property, and there was evidence to the contrary-that the Sleepers could have obtained additional credit but Vaughn Sleeper decided he did not want to continue farming. There was also evidence that Agway went into bankruptcy a year after its interference with the Sleepers' sales to the pool growers and was therefore no longer in any position to interfere with the Sleepers' business.

The court does not conclude that no reasonable view of the evidence could support the Sleepers' claim that malpractice on the part of the defendants caused the loss of their farm. However, where there is a significant question as to the sufficiency of the Sleepers' evidence on that issue-given the size of the damage award in this case the court has to look closely at the Lilley defendants' other claims of prejudicial error.

In this connection, the Lilley defendants contend that the court committed error in allowing the Sleepers' expert witness, Jerrol Crouter, to express certain damage opinions. They specifically object to Crouter's testimony that the Sleepers lost their business and their farm as a result of the Lilley defendants' malpractice. The court agrees that, phrased in that manner, Crouter's testimony went beyond what should have been permissible and that there is at least a question whether the limiting instruction which the court gave with respect to Crouter's testimony was adequate to address that issue.^[3] This would not justify a new trial but adds to the court's concerns given the instances of prejudicial error discussed below.

IIED Claim

This claim had a mysterious progression to trial. Prior to trial the Lilley defendants moved for summary judgment as to all of the claims which the Sleepers alleged that the Lilley defendants had negligently pursued at arbitration. In response to that motion, the Sleepers argued that there were disputed issues of fact as to the Lilley defendants' failure to pursue four specific claims: (1) antitrust; (2) unfair competition; (3) tortious interference with an advantageous economic relationship; and (3) defamation. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment dated April 12, 2013 at 3. In opposing summary judgment, the Sleepers did not contend that...