Slinkard v. State
| Citation | 103 S.W.2d 50,193 Ark. 765 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1937 |
| Docket Number | 4-4021 |
| Parties | SLINKARD v. STATE |
| Court | Supreme Court of Arkansas |
Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; John S. Combs, Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Earl Blansett and W. N. Ivie, for appellant.
Jack Holt, Attorney General, and John P. Streepey, Assistant, for appellee.
The appellant was tried and convicted in the Benton circuit court of the offense of receiving stolen property and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of one year. From the judgment of conviction he prosecutes this appeal and contends, first that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the indictment which he had duly interposed in apt time. Omitting the caption, the indictment is as follows:
Section 2493 of Crawford & Moses' Digest provides: "Whoever shall receive or buy any stolen goods, money or chattels, knowing them to be stolen, with intent to deprive the true owner thereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished as is, or may be, by law prescribed for the larceny of such goods or chattels in cases of larceny."
The defect claimed to exist in the indictment is that it fails to allege that the goods were received by the defendant "with the intent to deprive the true owner thereof," and to sustain this contention we are referred to the cases of State v. Bills, 118 Ark. 44, 176 S.W. 114; Kent v. State, 143 Ark. 439, 220 S.W. 814, and Cochran v. State, 169 Ark. 503, 275 S.W. 895. The opinion in the Bills case recites the indictment which in effect charges that the defendant did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly receive certain meat, the property of a railway company, "all of which property had prior to the said time been stolen, and the said person named in the caption hereof, at the time of receiving and taking said personal property into his possession, well knew that the same had been stolen, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas." The court noted that the offense charged was a purely statutory one, an essential element of the offense being that the stolen property was received "with the intent to deprive the owner thereof," and, as the indictment under review wholly failed to charge this element, that it was fatally defective and should have been so held on demurrer.
In Kent v. State, supra, the indictment considered was one for embezzlement. It was contended that the indictment was insufficient for the reason that it did not allege that the property was embezzled "with intent to embezzle or convert to his own use." The court held that the indictment was sufficient for the reason that the word "embezzle" used in the indictment conveyed the idea of the intent to convert to his own use.
In Cochran v. State, supra, the opinion did not set out the indictment, but the court stated that the indictment copied in the transcript failed to contain an allegation that the goods were received by the defendant "with the intent to deprive the true owner thereof." Following the rule announced in State v. Bills, supra, the court held the indictment fatally defective.
The indictment we now consider, however, is not similar to the indictments held to be bad in the Bills and Cochran cases. It does contain the allegation that the defendant "received into his possession two hogs, property of Lonzo Hegwood, knowing at the time that then and there said hogs had lately before been stolen, taken, and carried away with the unlawful, wilful, and felonious intent to deprive the true owner of his property aforesaid, * * *." The appellant contends that the allegation relative to the intent refers to the original larceny and not to the defendant's receiving the property.
Section 3014 of Crawford & Moses' Digest provides in effect that no indictment is insufficient, nor the proceedings thereunder affected, by any defect "which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of defendant on the merits." We are of the opinion that the indictment involved in the case at bar, while perhaps inaptly drafted, is sufficient, and that appellant's interpretation of the indictment is not the only one to which it is susceptible. The expression contained in the indictment "* * * with intent to deprive the true owner of his property" refers both to the felonious taking and the felonious receiving and while it is not couched in the exact language of the statute it does carry with it the exact meaning. Certainly, it was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the nature of the crime so that he might adduce evidence as to the honesty of his purpose in receiving the stolen hogs, and this he did. The trial court instructed the jury on that phase of the case in the following language: "I charge you that if you find that the defendant purchased the hogs in question in good faith, having no knowledge that said hogs had been stolen, even though they had been stolen, then you should acquit the defendant."
The appellant contends for a second ground for reversal that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for a continuance. It was alleged in this motion that the case was set for trial in defendant's absence of which fact he was ignorant until the afternoon of September 21 (Monday) and on the following morning (September 22, Tuesday) he caused subpoenas to be issued for his witnesses and placed same in the hands of the sheriff, which were returned unserved as to ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Murchison v. State
...verdict when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and this is the extent of the scope of our review. Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50; Higgins v. State, 204 Ark. 233, 161 S.W.2d 400; Ashcraft v. State, 208 Ark. 1089, 189 S.W.2d 374; Wootton v. State, 232 Ark.......
-
Eddington v. State
...views the evidence in the light most favorable to sustain the Jury verdict. Dowell v. State, 191 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.2d 23; Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50; Higgins v. State, 204 Ark. 233, 161 S.W.2d 400; and Lamb v. State, 218 Ark. 602, 238 S.W.2d 99. Whether to believe the Sta......
-
Cheney v. State
... ... it necessary to set out in detail here. It suffices to say ... that we have considered all the testimony and are of the ... opinion that the evidence, when given its strongest probative ... force in favor of the state, as we are required to do ... (Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 ... S.W.2d 50) is amply sufficient to warrant the jury's ... finding that appellant assaulted the prosecuting witness, ... Robinson, with the intent to kill him. The testimony was ... sufficient to show malice on the part of the appellant ... Malice may be either ... ...
-
Tate v. State
...favorable to the state. Turnage v. State, 182 Ark. 74, 30 S.W.2d 865; Clayton v. State, 191 Ark. 1070, 89 S.W.2d 732; Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50; Combs v. State, 194 Ark. 1155, 107 S.W.2d 526; Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 264, 106 S.W.2d 1019. The record reflects that the st......