State v. Bills
| Decision Date | 19 April 1915 |
| Docket Number | 330 |
| Citation | 176 S.W. 114,118 Ark. 44 |
| Parties | STATE v. BILLS |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Crittenden Circuit Court; J. F. Gaut-ney, Judge affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Wm L. Moose, Attorney General, Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant, and M. P. Huddleston, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
The case turns upon the meaning of the word "felo-niously" used in describing the defendant's action in receiving and having in his possession the stolen property. We submit that all the elements of knowingly receiving stolen property are alleged in the indictment, and that it would amount to mere repetition to say that he received it with the intent to deprive the true owner of it, after it had been alleged that he feloniously received it. 95 Ark. 321; 94 Ark. 215; 111 Ark. 180; 94 Ark. 65.
No brief filed for the appellee.
The indictment in this cause contains two counts; the first alleges the larceny of the property there described, and the second count charges appellee with receiving the property knowing it to have been stolen. The charging part of the second count is as follows:
"On the 8th day of October, 1914, said person named in the caption hereof, did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly receive into and have in his possession 423 pounds of meat of the value of fifty dollars, the property of St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, a corporation, all of which property had prior to the said time been stolen, and the said person named in the caption hereof, at the time of receiving and taking said personal property into his possession, well knew that the same had been stolen, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas."
A demurrer was interposed and sustained to this second count, and the State has appealed.
The defect complained of is that the indictment failed to allege that the property was received "with the intent to deprive the true owner thereof." This indictment was returned under section 1830 of Kirby's Digest, which reads as follows:
"Whoever shall receive or buy any stolen goods, money or chattels, knowing them to be stolen, with intent to deprive the true owner thereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished as is, or may be, by law prescribed for the larceny of such goods or chattels in cases of larceny."
It is contended upon behalf of the State that the criminal intent to deprive the true owner of his property is charged by the use of the word "feloniously," and in support of this contention we are cited to cases which hold that the word "feloniously" in an indictment signifies an intent to commit a crime. Farrell v. State, 111 Ark. 180, 163 S.W. 768; Turner v. State, 61 Ark. 359, 33 S.W. 104. But while the use of the word "feloniously" does impute an unlawful intent to commit a crime, its use can not supply the omission of the allegations essential to constitute a charge of the commission of the particular offense.
There are a number of cases which hold that the allegation that the property was received with the intent of depriving the true owner thereof is not essential; but, so far as our attention has been called to them, those decisions were rendered in States whose statutes on that subject do not contain the language found in our statute. In 34 Cyc. 520, under the title of "Prosecution and Punishment for Receiving Stolen Goods," the following statement of the law is found:
A number of cases are cited in support of the text. But, in the note to the text quoted, it is said that the rule is otherwise where the statute specifies the fraudulent intent, and a number of cases are cited in support of this note.
Among the cases cited in support of the text quoted from Cyc. is that of Bise v. United States, 144 F. 374, 7 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cos. 165. In that case it was complained that the trial court erroneously overruled a demurrer, and a motion in arrest of judgment, challenging the sufficiency of the indictment on the ground that it was not therein alleged that the stolen property was received without the consent of the owner or with the intent to deprive him of its use and benefit. Judge Van Deven-ter, speaking for the Court of Appeals of this circuit, said:
But it will the noted that...
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State v. Giddings
...that which at common law was but a misdemeanor, or where an act is criminal only if done with a particular intent . . .' In State v. Bills, 118 Ark. 44, 176 S.W. 114, the Arkansas statute made it a crime for a person to receive or buy stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, with intent to d......
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State v. Schneider
...were reached in State v. Harris (Mo., 1958), 313 S.W.2d 664, 669; State v. Navarro (1932), 131 Me. 335, 348, 163 A. 103; State v. Bills (1915), 118 Ark. 44, 176 S.W. 114. Each of these cases hinge upon the rationale stated in Harris, supra, 313 S.W.2d page 'The word 'felonious' is generally......
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Slinkard v. State
...118 Ark. 44, 176 S.W. 114; Kent v. State, 143 Ark. 439, 220 S.W. 814, and Cochran v. State, 169 Ark. 503, 275 S.W. 895. The opinion in the Bills recites the indictment which in effect charges that the defendant did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly receive certain meat, the property of ......
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Kent v. State
... ... convert the property of another to his own use ... (Fleener v. State, supra), yet that charge ... is unquestionably made in the use of the word ... "embezzle" to say nothing of the other words ... employed. The case is readily distinguished in this respect ... from the case of State v. Bills, 118 Ark ... 44, 176 S.W. 114. For in that case the indictment charged ... that Bills did unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly receive ... into and have in his possession property [143 Ark. 443] which ... he knew at the time of receiving same had been stolen. The ... indictment did not ... ...